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The *Journal of Unification Studies*, a journal of the Unification
Theological Seminary, is a forum for committed engagement with
Unification theology and practice, addressing concerns of the theo-
logical community and the professional ministry. To clarify founda-
tional issues in Unification theology, the *Journal of Unification
Studies* welcomes commentary and critical studies of texts and doc-
trines, as well as historical studies of the Unification Church and the
life of its founder. To promote dialogue and understanding, it invites
papers from diverse viewpoints which engage Unificationist themes,
as well as papers which build bridges to other communities of faith.
To foster living spirituality, it welcomes essays discussing the rela-
tionship between theology and practice. To address contemporary
social, cultural, political, scientific and economic issues from a
Unificationist perspective, the journal solicits social commentaries
and reviews of current books, films and media.

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Articles

Book Reviews

From the Editor

Welcome to the first issue of the *Journal of Unification Studies*. The launching of this publication realizes a long-sought dream of the faculty at the Unification Theological Seminary to provide a journal which can be a forum for investigations into Unification theology, philosophy and practice. It also marks a new level of maturity for the community of Unificationist and Unification-related scholars and intellectuals. Even though the Unification Church (now the FFWPU) is only 43 years old, its tradition of theological reflection has already gone through substantial development to reach the moment when this journal could be launched.

It is in itself exceptional that a new religion, still bathed in the white-hot heat of continuing revelation by its living founder, could have consolidated a tradition of theological reflection. It is far more frequent for a religious movement to pass through the death of the founder, followed by a considerable period of simple remembrance and re-presentations of the founder's words, before any substantive theological thinking would arise. St. Paul, for example, did not begin his distinctive theological work until some fifteen years after Jesus' passing. Perusals of the histories of Islam, the Latter-Day Saints and Christian Science show a similar pattern of theological silence in deference to the unchallenged authority of their living founders.

Unificationism, on the other hand, was graced from its early days with two pioneering thinkers who produced substantial work in philosophy and theology. I am referring first to the late Dr. Sang Hun Lee, author of *Essentials of Unification Thought* (1992) and *The End of Communism* (1985),[1] who developed both Unification Thought as a philosophical system and the theory of Victory Over Communism, a thorough and trenchant treatment of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and political theory. The pioneering Unificationist theologian was Dr. Young Oon Kim, the first Professor of Theology at the Unification Theological Seminary and author of *Unification Theology* (1980) and *Unification Theology and Christian Thought* (1975).[2] Like St. Paul, Dr. Kim was a missionary whose work in America required a cultural translation. The work of these elders marked the first stage of Unification theological and philosophical reflection and set the tradition for their students, some of whom are published in this issue.

The second stage in the development of Unification theology began with the founding of the Unification Theological Seminary in 1975. Soon afterwards, the seminary became the site of ecumenical conversations with Christian scholars and ministers from diverse denominations. Out of the give-and-take of these discussions, dozens of academic theologians gained insight into Unification theology and a cadre of Unificationist students gained proficiency in apologetic theology. A number of these conversations were published, notably *Exploring Unification Theology* (1978) and *Evangelical-Unification Dialogue* (1979).[3] Several of the non-Unificationist participants in these conversations published articles in such volumes as: *A Time for Consideration: A Scholarly Appraisal of the Unification Church* (1978) and *Ten Theologians Respond to the Unification Church* (1981).[4]

As these discussions became more frequent, they led to the creation of the New Ecumenical Research Association (New ERA) in 1980, and later the International Religious Foundation (IRF) in 1983, as institutional supports for expanded dialogues, both ecumenical and interreligious. The conferences sponsored by these organizations became the locus for Unificationist theological reflection during this second stage. In books such as *God: The Contemporary Discussion (1982), Hermeneutics and Horizons* (1982), *The Family and the Unification Church* (1983), *Restoring the Kingdom* (1984) and *Society and Original Sin* (1985),[5] articles by Unificationists and non-Unificationists treating a variety of theological and social topics stood side-by-side. Moreover, in a symposium on Unification Thought published as *The Establishment of a New Culture and Unification Thought* (1991),[6] Unificationists stood toe-to-toe with distinguished professors of philosophy and social theory.

On entering the third and current phase, investigation into Unificationist theological, philosophical and social thought should stand on its own ground. While the tenor of past conferences promoted mainly theological apologetics, contemporary Unificationist reflection should include systematic, critical and constructive works. It should embrace reflection and investigation into the wide variety of activities through which Unificationists seek to fulfill their callings, whether in the fields of religion and philosophy or more widely in the humanities and the arts. This phase opened with a collection of Unificationist essays, *Unification Theology in Comparative Perspectives* (1988), and has continued with the recently published *Explorations in Unificationism* (1997).[7] Now, with the inauguration of the *Journal of Unification Studies*, this reflection has a permanent home.

Two articles in this first issue deal with the lingering stigma still attached to the Unification Church and Reverend Moon, in spite of numerous indications that in 1997 the church is finally achieving mainstream status in American society.[8]

Thomas Ward and Frederick Swarts correct an inexcusable oversight in the current crop of histories of the Cold War period, which have passed over in silence Reverend Moon's considerable efforts spent in the fight against communism. In a careful and balanced presentation, Ward and Swarts do not attempt to prove the rather difficult claim that Reverend Moon's work was *decisive* in the defeat of communism. Limiting themselves to facts which have objective support, their thesis is more modestly put:

> [Reverend Moon's] activities comprised a broad spectrum which spanned the domains of politics, religion, the media, academia and grassroots activism. Yet, for whatever reason, Reverend Moon has been disregarded in existing histories purporting to identify contributors to the fall of Soviet communism, whereas other less prominent actors often appear center stage.

In support of this thesis, the authors have amassed a wealth of data, backed up by extensive citations, to show that Reverend Moon's investments in the media, e.g., *The Washington Times*, programs of ideological education such as CAUSA and IFVOC, and face-to-face diplomacy with communist leaders, each had significant impact on the course of the Cold War. This is the first definitive study of Reverend Moon's substantial accomplishments in this area.

Jonathan Wells reviews the National Council of Churches Faith and Order Commission's 1977 "study document" critiquing the theology of the Unification Church. It amounted to a smear of the church and its founder, inasmuch as its authors refused to accept repeated offers for consultation with Unificationist theologians or even with objective scholars familiar with Unification theology. The NCC continues to distribute the Critique, even though it violated a cardinal principle of ecumenical relations, that all groups be accepted and evaluated according to their own self-understanding. In a thorough analysis of the claims of the NCC Critique, Wells points out its many misrepresentations of the Divine Principle. Contrary the Critique's conclusion that "the claims of the Unification Church to Christian identity cannot be recognized," Wells argues point by point that the Divine Principle's understanding of Trinity, Christology, and the saving work of Christ can well be construed as within the normative traditions of Christian theology. Undoubtedly, the issues surrounding the Unification Church's Christian identity need further clarification; this could be possible in the context of respectful ecumenical relations between the Unification Church and the NCC. A constructive step in that direction would be for the NCC to withdraw its Critique and publish a letter of retraction.

In light of the bowdlerized theology of the NCC Critique, it is fitting that Robert Price has written an article dissecting one reason why traditional Christians are uncomfortable with new indigenous expressions of Christianity and why they so often cast them outside the pale of orthodoxy. Christian mis-

sions, of course, have planted the seeds of faith in many lands and among many cultures. But these same missionaries are scandalized when some of their seeds sprout into indigenous movements which translate Christianity into the idiom of another culture. Churches like the Kimbanguists of Zaire, the Latter-Day Saints of North America, the Taiping rebels of China or the Unification Church born in Korea have taken the powerful Christian idea of Incarnation seriously and claimed for their own leader the mantle of prophet, apostle, brother of Christ, or even Messiah. Why do they cause offense? asks Price. He compares these new Christian movements to the first Christians who labored to translate Judaic messianic concepts into the cultural world of Hellenism. They, too, struggled mightily with the question of the what, who and how of Incarnation. Biblical scholars have uncovered the seeds of these diverse expressions of Christianity in the New Testament itself, but the church could not bear with them, and so restricted the limits of orthodoxy. Thus, for Western Christians who regard the historic Hellenistic formulations of the Church as normative, and who do not wish to admit that some of their own cherished doctrines were never absolute but rather also the result of a cultural translation, these movements present a fundamental challenge to Christian identity.

Mature philosophical reflection often finds valuable insights in other traditions, which can illuminate the understanding of one's own position. Keisuke Noda looks at the problem of how a person comes to understand truth. He finds in Unification philosophy a thread common to the Western philosophers Husserl and Nietzsche as well as to Zen Buddhism, that true understanding is far different from grasping conceptual knowledge. True understanding is to embody the truth in one's being. Noda's article elucidates why the Divine Principle is so difficult to understand: to truly know the Word of God, we have to embody the Word in our thinking, feeling and behavior. It is to realize the fullness of one's being, what the Divine Principle calls an "individual embodiment of truth." Here is a strong critique of the materialist epistemological presuppositions of Western culture and a rich resource for our own deeper apprehension of the Word.

Laurent Guyénot gives us a *tour de force* of biblical scholarship to make the case for the Divine Principle's view that John the Baptist's failure to support Jesus was a decisive blow to his ministry. Such scholarly investigation is necessary if the Divine Principle's assertions about the relationship between John and Jesus are to find any support in the world of biblical studies, which relies on the historical-critical method. Guyénot's approach is in line with a paper of Anthony Guerra,[9] who showed that historical criticism supports the Unification position that the crucifixion of Jesus was not the will of God; a point of agreement explicitly affirmed by Marcus Borg, who noted, "Unification's claim that Jesus' intention was not to die for the sins of the world is historically correct."[10]

The essay by Yoshihiko Masuda draws together a number of social themes to delineate the shape of the realized eschatology unfolding in our time. Few topics for Unificationists have been more mysterious and open to misunderstanding than what form the future world will take. Masuda has brought clarity to this issue by pointing to the unfolding trend in all areas of social relations in the 1990s, away from the old paradigms of dependence and independence towards a new paradigm of interdependence. In line with Unificationism's emphasis on the family, he identifies as a primary locus of this new paradigm the growing awareness of the feminist movement, which has begun of late to abandon the model of the independent, assertive, self-realized woman in favor of woman in a warm and loving mutual relationship with her husband. Moreover, in line with Unificationism's teaching that the final war to usher in the Kingdom has been the struggle between democracy and communism, Masuda argues that communist ideology's promotion of the conflictual paradigm had been the chief obstacle to recognizing the value of interdependent relationships. Reverend Moon's leadership in the struggle against communism (see Ward and Swarts's paper) is thus directly linked to his teaching that interdependent relations characterized by true love are to bloom in the Kingdom.[11]

The reigning psychological theories of moral development as expounded by Piaget and Kohlberg are discussed by Jennifer Tanabe, who then points out their major weakness: they postulate that moral development arises solely from intellectual structures within the individuals, independent of social and familial context. Recent research indicates, however, that moral development is inextricably linked with family and cultural norms. In this context, Tanabe presents the family model of moral development advocated by Unification Thought. In a careful and detailed analysis, she demonstrates that the Unification Thought model explains more about the stages of human development, particularly in the stages of adolescence and adulthood, than do the structural models of Piaget and Kohlberg. It also generates testable hypotheses which seem to fit the empirical data. This paper will be of particular value to character educators and psychologists who want a theoretical foundation for Unificationism's apparently common-sense ideas about the centrality of the family.

At the launching of the *Journal of Unification Studies*, it is fitting that we remember Isaac Newton's phrase, "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." First of all we thank the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, without whose dedication to truth none of the insights in this journal would be possible. We also are deeply appreciative of Dr. David S. C. Kim, the first president of the Unification Theological Seminary, whose enthusiastic advocacy of academic ecumenism helped fuel the advance of Unification theology, particularly during the conference phase of its development. Gratitude is also due to the many scholars and intellectuals, of the faculty at

UTS and elsewhere, who over the years have added their insights to the discourse on Unification theology. Mention has already been made of our debt to Drs. Sang Hun Lee and Young Oon Kim. Dr. Lee passed to the other side on March 22, 1997, and we dedicate this first issue to his memory.

—Andrew Wilson

Notes

1. Sang Hun Lee, *Essentials of Unification Thought: The Head-Wing Thought* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1992); *The End of Communism* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1985).
2. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980); *Unification Theology and Christian Thought* (New York: Golden Gate Publishing Co., 1975).
3. M. Darrol Bryant and Susan Hodges, eds., *Exploring Unification Theology* (Barrytown, NY: Unification Theological Seminary, 1978); Richard Quebedeaux and Rodney Sawatsky, eds., *Evangelical-Unification Dialogue* (New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1979).
4. M. Darrol Bryant and Herbert W. Richardson, eds., *A Time for Consideration: A Scholarly Appraisal of the Unification Church* (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1978); Herbert Richardson, ed., *Ten Theologians Respond to the Unification Church* (New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1981).
5. Frederick Sontag and M. Darrol Bryant, eds., *God: The Contemporary Discussion* (New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1982); Frank K. Flinn, ed., *Hermeneutics and Horizons* (New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1982); Gene G. James, ed., *The Family and the Unification Church* (New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1983); Deane William Ferme, ed., *Restoring the Kingdom* (New York: Paragon House, 1984); Durwood Foster and Paul Mojzes, eds., *Society and Original Sin* (New York: Paragon House, 1985).
6. *The Establishment of a New Culture and Unification Thought* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1991).
7. Anthony Guerra, ed., *Unification Theology in Comparative Perspectives* (New York: Unification Theological Seminary, 1988); Theodore T. Shimmyo and David A. Carlson, eds., *Explorations in Unificationism* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1997).
8. See "Gated Religions," *The Christian Century*, April 16, 1997, p. 382, in which it is stated that the Unification Church has "achieved mainstream status." Also indicative is support for the 1997 World Culture and Sports Festival from thousands of church leaders and the city of Washington, D.C.
9. Anthony J. Guerra, "The Will of God and the Crucifixion of Jesus," *Unification Theology in Comparative Perspectives*, pp. 87-103.
10. Marcus Borg, "The Historical Jesus and Unification Theology: An Appraisal and

Critique," in Frank K. Flinn, ed., *Christology: The Center and the Periphery*, God the Contemporary Discussion Series (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 125.

11. According to the Divine Principle, the "messianic kingdom [is] built on the principles of interdependence, mutual prosperity and universally shared values." *Exposition of the Divine Principle* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1996), p. 344.

RUSH TO HISTORY: A NOTABLE OMISSION IN POSTMORTEM LITERATURE ON THE COLD WAR

Thomas J. Ward and Frederick A. Swarts

In two dizzying years the world witnessed the epic dissolution of the Soviet empire, beginning with Solidarity's victory in Poland on June 4, 1989, punctuated by the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 and culminating with the implosion of the Soviet Union itself December 25, 1991. The sudden collapse caught most by surprise: the working hypothesis held that communism would remain a dominant fixture in the world order. Those committed to ending the communist threat were themselves unprepared for the precipitous nature of its demise.

Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the rush has been on among scholars, analysts and pundits to identify the key personalities and factors which contributed to the Soviet empire's disintegration. Competing theories abound, with fundamental roles having been ascribed to Ronald Reagan, Pope John

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Dr. Frederick Swarts is a biologist and an educator currently conducting research related to ecosystem maintenance in the Pantanal region of Brazil. He served until recently as the Administrative Director of the American Leadership Conference. Dr. Swarts did his doctoral studies in biology and education at Columbia University and at the Union Institute where he was awarded his Ph.D. in 1992.

Paul II, Mikhail Gorbachev, Norman Podhoretz, Alexander Solzhenitzen and Sidney Hook, as well as to freedom fighters, refuseniks and populist forces such as Solidarity. Some, in their interpretation of the various developments, have opted to depersonalize the process, crediting phenomena such as evolving patterns of economic development, or the information revolution.

Lacunae in the postmortem literature on communism's collapse have already begun to be noted.[1] Nevertheless, despite voluminous analysis and commentary, omissions still need to be addressed. Our intent in this article is to point out one particularly salient case. During the Cold War, Korean religious leader Sun Myung Moon and the various organizations which he founded appear frequently and conspicuously in numerous and diverse facets of the war against communism. Literally billions of dollars and a plethora of organizations and activities committed to winning the Cold War can be traced to the initiatives of Reverend Moon. These activities comprised a broad spectrum which spanned the domains of politics, religion, the media, academia, and grassroots activism. Yet, for whatever reason, Reverend Moon has been disregarded in the existing histories purporting to identify contributors to the fall of Soviet communism, whereas other less prominent actors often appear center stage.

Among the recent contributions to the postmortem literature is Richard Gid Powers' *Not Without Honor* (1995), which professes to be *"The History of American Anticommunism."*[2] This 554-page opus of names and organizations omits all of the American entities associated with Reverend Moon, and their involvement in opposing communism throughout the 1970s and 80s. In the 672 pages of *On the Brink: The Dramatic Behind the Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women who Won the Cold War* (1996),[3] Jay Winik did record a brief mention of one Reverend Moon-related organization, *The Washington Times,* but only in noting its early reporting on the unfolding story of Iran Contra.[4]

Likewise representative is an article by Wesleyan professor Peter Rutland in *The National Interest.*[5] Critical of sovietologists' failure to accurately forecast the Soviet Union's fall, Rutland did single out one foreign policy specialist (Zbigniew Brzezinski) and one edited volume of essays for "showing extraordinary prescience about the Soviet political system" and "pride of place for a precognition of the events of 1989–1991."[6] The essays to which Rutland referred were the proceedings from a conference entitled "The Fall of the Soviet Empire," held in 1985 in Geneva by the Professors World Peace Academy, an organization founded by Reverend Moon.[7] Rutland asserted:

> It is hard to believe that the Moonies got it right when the CIA, Brookings, RAND, Harvard, Columbia and the rest got it wrong, but I would urge skeptics to read the book.[8]

Rutland goes on to point out, however, that none of the contributing authors were members of the Unification Church, ostensibly having failed to uncover that the conference's theme of the imminent demise of the Soviet empire was developed in consultation with Reverend Moon, who stood firm on that title in spite of subsequent objections by some of the conference conveners.[9] Rutland's seemingly presumptive dismissal of Reverend Moon and the Unification Church could also explain his failure to consider Reverend Moon's history of public prognoses, documented from at least the early 1970s, that fundamental flaws in the Marxist-Leninist ideology would lead to the collapse of the Soviet bloc by the end of the 1980s.[10]

Why have historians omitted Reverend Moon's role in opposing communism during the Cold War? Given the far-reaching size of the effort and its extensive coverage by the major print and broadcast media of the time, a serious scholar could hardly claim complete unfamiliarity with Reverend Moon's involvement during the Cold War. It is possible, of course, that some historians failed to grasp the totality of the effort, given the many, diverse organizations involved. On the other hand, some historians may well have chosen to prejudicially ignore the literature given the controversial subject, or deigned to distance themselves from what they may have assumed to be insincere self-promotion. Reverend Moon and his organizations may also have been summarily dismissed as inconsequential to the battle against communism. Whatever the motivation for leaving out Reverend Moon's historic role, the consequence is that students of history have not yet been afforded a more indepth analysis of what research reveals to be rather striking activities during the Cold War.

In this article, we do not pretend to provide an all-encompassing elaboration of Reverend Moon's efforts against communism. Nevertheless, we will review certain pivotal initiatives and, where appropriate, indicate the ways in which they impacted upon the Cold War. We will begin with initiatives in the media, notably *The Washington Times*; then turn to efforts at ideological education; and finally treat Reverend Moon's direct contacts with communist leaders.

1. Building a Media Network

Certain policies pursued by President Ronald Reagan in his efforts to end the Cold War stalemate met opposition and derision in the establishment media. The President's effort to follow through on President Jimmy Carter's commitment to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II intermediate range missiles in Western Europe resulted in media criticism and a storm of protests in both America and Europe. President Reagan's advocacy of the Strategic Defense Initiative was derisively referred to as "star wars" in the press and viewed as destabilizing the delicate balance of power, thus escalat-

ing the threat of nuclear war. Reagan's support of the Nicaraguan contras met with decided opposition as did his description of the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire."[11]

The international media network created by Reverend Moon helped to demonstrate the viability of the Reagan Doctrine and had an impact on key congressional votes. It also affected public opinion and the establishment media's coverage of Cold War issues. Of the media projects undertaken by Reverend Moon in the United States (which include *The New York City Tribune*, New York's Spanish-language newspaper *Noticias del Mundo*, and *Insight Magazine*, among others), the founding of *The Washington Times* (1982) was certainly the most significant. The *Times* broke key news stories on Soviet bloc operations, and sometimes brought to the front pages vital Cold War issues which newspapers such as *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* chose to bury on back pages.[12] The *Times* highlighted Soviet human rights violations, did expansive features on the public relations and lobbying activities of left-leaning organizations such as the Christic Institute and the Institute for Policy Studies, and frequently reported on the Soviets' nuclear build-up and their sizeable military and logistic aid to national liberation movements in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Within the first three years of its existence, *The Washington Times* became one of America's most quoted newspapers.[13]

Three issues help to illustrate the *Times*' role in the Cold War: Nicaragua, Gorbachev and the U.S. Congress, and SDI.

a. Nicaragua

One area of notable coverage was on the anticommunist insurgency in Nicaragua known as the Contras. *The Washington Times*' investigations and reportage lent credence to executive and legislative efforts to support that Nicaraguan Resistence in its commitment to derail that country's move into the Soviet-Cuban sphere of influence. For example, from April 8 to 12, 1985, just prior to a crucial Congressional vote on providing support to the Nicaraguan contras, the *Times* ran a five-part exposé on how leftist grassroots networks were pressuring the U.S. Congress to abandon the freedom fighters.[14] When on April 24, 1985 the U.S. Congress voted down a bill to provide $14,000,000 in humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan resistance, dealing a major geopolitical setback to the Reagan administration, *The Washington Times* took the U.S. Congress to task, announcing on May 6, 1985 its establishment of an infrastructure to seek private humanitarian funding for the contras.[15] The *Times* also announced its decision to provide the first $100,000 of seed money for the project. Co-chaired by Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Simon, Midge Decter and Michael Novak, the *Times*-initiated Nicaraguan Freedom Fund became national news—much to the discomfiture of the Congress.[16] In its

news coverage, the *Times* contrasted the Congressional negative vote with the subsequent trip by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra to Moscow, April 28–29, 1985 to secure additional Soviet aid, and it also reported on new shipments of Soviet military supplies to Nicaragua.[17] The *Times'* strong focus continued until the Congress reversed its position in June, resulting in a new $27,000,000 commitment of humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance.[18] American aid to the contras, as well as the provision of stinger missiles to the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan which the *Times* also strongly supported, were decisive factors in the eventual wearing down of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and in the Soviet decision to abandon Afghanistan.

b. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

On November 1, 1983, *The Washington Times* did a high profile, full-color article on this space-based anti-missile system and on one of the project's key supporters, Lt. General Daniel O. Graham.[19] In its editorial policy, the *Times* rigorously and frequently advocated the system's development.[20] Indeed, when President Reagan unveiled SDI in a March 23, 1983 TV address, the *Times* editorialized that this address was "maybe President Reagan's best ever," stated that the idea of a space-based shield has "had our interest and support for months" and cited its potential leverage in future arms negotiations.[21] This advocacy can be contrasted with the position of *The New York Times*, which strongly called for restraints on SDI's development.[22] Reflecting the debate of the time, *The New York Times* further denigrated both the program and Reagan's position on its development and deployment with such terminology as "a pipe dream," "a projection of fantasy into politics," "science fiction," and "dangerous folly," and concluded that Reagan left the impression that SDI is "a harebrained adventure that will induce a ruinous race in both offensive and defensive arms."[23] Regardless of U.S. internal debate on SDI's efficacy, the fact remains that President Reagan's unswerving commitment to this program (and the support of publications such as *The Washington Times*) contributed to a shift in the Soviet Union's handling of the nuclear issue vis-a-vis the United States.[24]

c. Gorbachev and the U.S. Congress

In November of 1987, *The Washington Times* ignited a nationwide controversy which resulted in a rescinding of plans to have Mikhail Gorbachev be the first communist leader to address a joint meeting of Congress. This privilege had previously only been extended to foreign dignitaries who were strong allies of the United States, such as Lafayette, Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterand. Nonetheless, the White House and Democratic congressional leaders apparently had negotiated behind the scenes to afford this honor to President Gorbachev on December 9, during the

Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Washington, D.C. *The Washington Times'* breaking of this story (first broached on November 13 and headlined on November 17) and its follow-up coverage and editorializing helped to generate a furor among conservative lawmakers.[25] The swelling chorus of opposition led the White House and the congressional supporters of the invitation to begin backpedaling by November 20 and to totally abandon plans for the address by November 22. In the months following this public embarrassment, President Gorbachev took a number of steps, including his announcement to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which clearly established *glasnost* as more than a political ploy.

That the *Times* would play such a pronounced role in the Cold War was apparently intuited by affected parties from its inception. Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese governments allowed the *Times* to open a news bureau in their capitals. The radical left newsletter *Overthrow* in its June/July 1982 issue called for sabotage of *The Washington Times*,[26] and the *Times* was subjected to frontal attacks in leftist publications such as *CovertAction* and *CounterSpy*.[27] On the other hand, it was reported that Ronald Reagan made a practice of reading *The Washington Times* every morning,[28] and *The Washington Times* was credited with certain of President Reagan's responses to critical foreign policy issues, including the 1985 forced landing and apprehension of Palestinian terrorists responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the cold-blooded murder of American businessman Leon Klinghoffer.[29]

d. The Washington Times' Impact on Other World Media

The impact of Reverend Moon's *Washington Times* extended to the news disseminated worldwide, including in communist and frontline countries. In 1988, Nobel peace laureate Oscar Sanchez Arias, then president of Costa Rica, a country bordering on Nicaragua, told the American Society of Newspaper Editors that Costa Rican newspapers depended on *The Washington Times* for news of their world. He went on to say that the only American newspaper Costa Rican citizens know exists is *The Washington Times*, and that if Costa Rican newspapers published something from the U.S. it was from the *Times*.[30] In 1990, future Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro Barrios, owner of *La Prensa*, the only daily newspaper which dared to defy Nicaragua's Sandinista government, confided to *The New York Times'* editorial board that the Sandinistas themselves regarded *The Washington Times* as "the newspaper of the Nicaraguan opposition."[31]

Throughout the 1980s the World Media Association (WMA), a media-related organization associated with *The Washington Times*, provided journalists from numerous publications with first-hand exposure to numerous vortices of the Cold War. In 1983, WMA brought 155 journalists, from 55

countries, to visit sites on the border of Nicaragua and Honduras, including refugee camps and the track known as "Blood Alley" which two days after the Media Association tour was the site where Sandinista solders killed two American journalists. That same year, journalists were brought to Europe by WMA to report on the Nuclear Freeze Movement and afforded the opportunity to cover the October 22 massive demonstration in Bonn against NATO's planned deployment of Euromissiles. During the same tour, a side visit to East Berlin by WMA allowed journalists to observe a plethora of East German posters opposing the deployment of US cruise missiles, and a total absence of any criticism against the presence of Soviet SS 20's on East German territory.

In 1984, WMA sponsored a journalist fact-finding tour focusing on the Southeast Asia front lines, including a trek inside communist Kampuchea to meet with leaders of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front who were resisting the large Vietnamese military presence in their country. Other fact-finding trips included encounters with leaders of RENAMO, UNITA, SWAPO and Solidarity. The WMA tours, which often also included meetings with heads of state and detailed government briefings, provided journalists access to first-hand information on the status of communism, largely validating the salience of the Reagan Doctrine.

2. Ideological Education

Personalities such as the Reverend Carl McIntyre and Dr. Fred Schwartz and his Christian Anti-Communist Crusade are recognized by Richard Gid Powers for their grassroots initiatives against communism, as are the controversies which surrounded them.[32] Nevertheless, these activities are dwarfed by the anticommunist activities initiated by Reverend Moon (and the controversies related to them) which Powers fails to mention.

In his critique of communism, Reverend Moon emphasized Marxism's ideological shortcomings. This contrasted with criticisms of Marxism developed by figures such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Robert Conquest and Richard Wurmbrandt who tended to focus primarily on the enormity of the atrocities committed by the Marxist-Leninist system. In the case of Solzhenitsyn and Conquest, their writings also occasionally explored the character flaws of communism's protagonists, including Lenin and Stalin. On certain occasions, Solzhenitsyn also commented eloquently on the ideologcial bankruptcy of communism; however, he ostensibly felt no need to formulate a systematic, comprehensive critique of Marxism-Leninism. Critiques of Marxism's deeds and doers played an important role in revealing the disturbingly sinister dimension of Marxism, yet such approaches were blunted in some circles by the moral equivalence argument which played down com-

munism's excesses by pointing to the problems on the anticommunist side as
well.

In his approach to communism, Reverend Moon chose to focus on devel-
oping and popularizing an analysis and critique of Marxism-Leninism's
underlying tenets. From his own life experience, he had come to view the
Marxist ideology itself as the Achilles' heel of communism, having con-
cluded that the Marxist positions on alienation, dialectical materialism, and
historical materialism were scientifically and philosophically invalid. His
exposure to this theory and its consequences had been extensive, having
worked as a missionary in North Korea from June, 1946 to December, 1950.
This period included two years and eight months in a concentration camp in
Hungnam, North Korea where he, like other prisoners, was subjected to
required indoctrination in Marxism.

Over time, Reverend Moon, with the collaboration of one of his associ-
ates, Dr. Sang Hun Lee, formalized a comprehensive analysis of Marxist-
Leninist ideology, including Marxist political economy. Reverend Moon
devoted special attention to the practical implications of Marxism-Leninism's
militantly atheistic position, the *point de départ* of his opposition to commu-
nism. His analysis and critique came to be known as Victory Over
Communism theory (VOC). The first English language translation of this
material was published in 1972. It was refined through subsequent rendi-
tions.[33] One adaptation of this material, the *CAUSA Lecture Manual* (1985),
was translated into eleven languages. In his book *Jesuitas, Iglesia y Marxismo*,
Spain's renowned historian and former Minister of Culture Ricardo de la
Cierva wrote that "the CAUSA Lecture Manual offers the best analysis of
Marxism-Leninism in print."[34]

While VOC had a serious academic dimension, it distinguished itself
from other ideological critiques of Marxism by being adapted for presenta-
tion to general audiences. During the 1970s, and 80s, millions throughout East
Asia, North America, Latin America, Europe, and Africa, including political
leaders, scholars, religious leaders, national security experts, military officers
and grassroots activists, were educated in VOC theory.

a. VOC Activities in Korea and Japan

Popularization of VOC first began in Korea in 1963 when Reverend Moon
initiated what came to be known as the International Federation for Victory
over Communism (IFVOC).[35] By the early 1970s VOC theory had estab-
lished itself as one of the principal sources of anticommunist education in
South Korea. In 1974, *The Washington Monthly* reported that *annually* hun-
dreds of thousands of civil servants, local officials and soldiers in South Korea
were being trained in VOC theory, with government cooperation.[36] On June
7, 1975, an anticommunism rally organized and addressed by Reverend Moon

attracted over 1 million demonstrators at Yoido Island in Seoul, Korea.[37] Regular education programs continued during the 1970s and 1980s and a strong grassroots VOC organization was established throughout the Republic of Korea. Activities included a nationwide campaign to boost South Korean morale in 1983 in the wake of the Soviet downing of KAL 007, and the terrorist bombing of South Korean officials in Rangoon, Burma. It resulted in hundreds of thousands of South Koreans joining in rallies and demonstrations in every major South Korean city.

VOC activities in Japan began with the establishment in 1964 of a student VOC organization, and an IFVOC national chapter in 1968. In response to the proliferation of anti-American activities on Japanese university campuses in the 1960s, the Japanese VOC movement held public teach-ins, pertaining to the ideological limitations of Marxism-Leninism. The activities continued throughout the 1980s. Frequently these programs provoked a violent reaction from leftist students. In the print and broadcast media, IFVOC challenged Japan's Communist Party to public debates on Marxist theory more than 60 times, with the Communist Party circumventing each such challenge.[38] The Japanese Chapter of IFVOC also played a crucial role in the Taipei-based WACL (World Anti-Communist League) beginning in 1970.[39]

b. CAUSA

Following the Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua in July, 1979, Reverend Moon inaugurated VOC activities in Latin America under the auspices of CAUSA International, the name used beginning in 1980 for the IFVOC organization in the West. Under the leadership of Dr. Bo Hi Pak, CAUSA developed a state-of-the-art audio-visual presentation of VOC theory, and throughout the 1980s it conducted hundreds of seminars in Latin America for political, military and civic leaders. It set up branch offices in the Caribbean (the Dominican Republic), the Southern Cone (Uruguay), and in Central America (Honduras). Between 1983 and 1987, CAUSA's Central American office alone conducted over 120 seminars, for more than 10,000 political leaders, scholars, military officers, teachers, students and *campesinos*. At the request of the Salvadoran government and with their support, CAUSA's Central American director, Mr. Jesus Gonzalez, frequently penetrated the lines of Salvadoran guerrilla (FMLN)–controlled territory to conduct seminars on VOC theory for local residents.

In the 1980s CAUSA International also developed a significant presence in North America and in Europe. Between 1980 and 1990, CAUSA International conducted more than 250 VOC conferences in 40 nations, mostly three- and four-day programs, attended by an estimated 60,000 leaders. These programs mobilized the support and involvement of presidents, vice presidents, cabinet officers, senators and other high-ranking officials. From

as early as 1982, CAUSA USA, CAUSA France, CAUSA Uruguay and other national chapters also organized and conducted many of their own conferences. By 1985, CAUSA conferences were even secretly being conducted in Nicaragua and Poland.

c. VOC Activities in America

While many of CAUSA's worldwide activities had important implications, it is particularly appropriate to highlight some of the initiatives taken in the United States. Reverend Moon's American VOC activities began with the creation of the Freedom Leadership Foundation (FLF) in 1969. Functioning primarily out of Washington, D.C., FLF conducted seminars on Marxism and organized rallies and demonstrations exposing and denouncing human rights violations occurring behind the Iron Curtain. The FLF published texts critical of communism and created a bi-weekly newspaper, *The Rising Tide*, which was widely distributed and read by members of Congress and their staff. Throughout the Vietnam conflict, the FLF steadfastly supported the American military presence in Vietnam.

When President Reagan took office in 1981, there was a pervasive public attitude of resignation towards communism's long-term staying ability. American anticommunism itself had grown weak, defeated and scattered during the previous Ford and Carter administrations, and generally was portrayed negatively in the media.[40] Meanwhile, the Left actively promoted their positions, targeting universities, African-American and Latino communities, and various religious bodies, which often proved to be fertile ground for their efforts. It thus came as no surprise when President Reagan's Central American policy was openly challenged by these sectors, including the leaders of most U.S. mainline Protestant denominations.[41] Such resistance hindered White House plans to rebuild America's military and face down Soviet expansionism.

During the 1980s, American VOC programs intensified, resulting in an interesting synergy between the educational foci of these programs (i.e., methods for responding to Soviet expansionism and ideology) and the strategic goals of the Reagan doctrine. Beginning early in the Reagan administration, Reverend Moon directed massive funds towards projects aimed at strengthening the American public's resolve against communism. CAUSA International and its affiliated projects, including the International Security Council and the American Leadership Conference, conducted hundreds of educational programs and conferences. They targeted a broad range of American opinion makers, including students and professors, journalists, religious leaders, military officers, national security experts, political leaders and grassroots activists.

Initiated by Reverend Moon in 1983, CAUSA USA first organized VOC programs for American religious leaders, who were the prime targets of Leftist

organizations such as CISPES (Citizens in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador) and Witness for Peace (a pro-Sandinista organization committed to stopping aid to the Nicaraguan contras). CAUSA USA described its central objectives as educating Americans about the dangers of atheistic communism in theory and practice, and as developing programs aimed at addressing social conditions which had permitted communism to take root. Between 1984 and 1986, over 70,000 Christian ministers heard the CAUSA critique of Marxism.[42] In 1985, CAUSA USA organized 27 national VOC conferences, each attended by 300–700 religious leaders, as well as an estimated 200 local programs for clergy.

CAUSA USA seminars had notable appeal in the African-American Christian community, a constituency which had not traditionally been pursued by organizations opposed to Marxism-Leninism. Dr. David N. Licorish, Publisher and Senior Editor of *The Baptist*, devoted an issue of that magazine to CAUSA and even chose to reprint Dr. Martin Luther King's sermon "Why a Christian Cannot Be a Communist."[43] Writing of his experience at a CAUSA seminar, Licorish noted CAUSA's ability to attract people of diverse ethnic and racial origins.[44] Numerous prominent Civil Rights leaders such as Dr. Ralph Abernathy and Dr. James Bevel, a key strategist for Dr. Martin Luther King, also became active in CAUSA USA activities and often were featured speakers at their events.

In 1985 CAUSA USA decided to expand its initiative to the general public. It launched a national signature drive, inviting Americans to sign a petition in support of the organization's efforts to educate Americans about the dangers of atheistic communism. Over 10 million Americans signed this petition, and these results were reported to the White House.

American political leaders were the focus of another organization offering VOC theory, the American Leadership Conference (ALC), founded in 1986 under the chairmanship of Amb. Phillip V. Sanchez, former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia and Honduras. This CAUSA International program provided a forum where legislators could explore and discuss international and domestic issues. However, the principal focus of the ALC program was to educate elected officials about Soviet military strategy and on the underlying tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology, contrasting it with the historical and philosophical foundations of American democracy.

Aided by an invitational committee consisting of some 50 state legislators from throughout the United States and an advisory board of former diplomats, congressmen and governors, the ALC elicited a considerable response from American political leaders. By the end of 1990, over 10,000 had attended one of 30 national, three- to four-day anticommunism conferences.[45] Participants included around 100 current and former members of Congress, 130 mayors, more than 2,000 state legislators, many prominent federal and

state officials, as well as university presidents and leaders of think tanks, grassroots organizations and private foundations. In addition to the CAUSA presentations on Marxism-Leninism, guest speakers added their views on American military strategy and domestic policy. ALC speakers included 25 members of Congress (e.g., Senators Jesse Helms, Al Gore and Richard Lugar, Congressman Henry Hyde) and other luminaries (e.g., Alan Bloom, Thomas Sowell, Mona Charon and Maureen Reagan). At most conferences, participants also heard presentations by those with an intimate experience of front-line Marxist-leaning states, including UNO (United Nicaraguan Opposition) leaders Pedro J. Chamorro Barrios, Arturo Cruz and Adolfo Calero, Nicaraguan Roman Catholic Church official Monsignor Bismarck Carballo, and American Indian Movement (AIM) leader Russell Means who shared his experiences with the Ramo, Sumo and Miskito resistance to Nicaragua's Sandinista government.

Active and retired military officials were exposed to VOC theory under the aegis of the CAUSA International Military Association (CIMA). More than 800 retired high-ranking officials of the United States armed forces attended CAUSA presentations on VOC, including a sizeable number of America's retired four-star generals and full admirals.[46] A number of those officers later played crucial roles in the formation of a grassroots, activist organization founded in 1987, known as the American Freedom Coalition (AFC). With opposition to Marxist-Leninist expansionism as one of its ten founding planks, AFC drew significant media attention on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November, 1987 when it organized rallies in all fifty states reminding Americans of the millions of men, women and children who had been senselessly eliminated in the Soviet Union, China, Cambodia and elsewhere in the name of communism.

Another organization initiated by CAUSA International, the International Security Council (ISC), gathered together strategists, diplomats, government officials, academics and former senior military officers to assess American military security and the relevance of diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. During the latter years of the Cold War, ISC held 43 conferences, symposia and roundtables, published 39 position and research papers, and started an academic journal, *Global Affairs*. Chairing the symposia were national security and foreign affairs experts such as Eugene V. Rostow, Charles Lichenstein, Richard Perle and Richard Pipes.[47] ISC's strategic recommendations concurred with President Reagan's decision to strengthen America's strategic position through a substantial military build-up.

Reverend Moon's ministry on the university campus was carried out by the Collegiate Association for the Research of Principles (CARP), a Unification Church-related organization which became known during the 1980s for its rallies, publications and seminars countering communist expan-

sion and Marxist ideology. CARP regularly countered CISPES demonstrations, which called for cutting off U.S. military support to El Salvador, and conducted its own rallies on campuses calling for an end of the Soviet and Cuban presence in El Salvador and Nicaragua.[48] The oppression of Solidarity in Poland was a focus of CARP rallies, as was the persecution of religious belivers in the USSR. High-profile KAL 007 protests by CARP were covered by print media such as *Newsweek, USA Today, U.S. News and World Report,* and *The Philadelphia Inquirer* and depicted in these publications as representative of America's outrage at the Soviet downing of a civilian Korean airliner resulting in 269 fatalities.[49] CARP's organization of KAL 007 and other anti-Soviet demonstrations on colleges "from Columbia to Madison to Berkeley," led the Revolutionary Communist Party USA's newspaper, *Young Spartacus,* to describe CARP in one of its headlines as "Campus Shock Troops for Anti-Soviet War Drive."[50]

Reverend Moon's extensive educational initiatives on Marxism-Leninism undoubtedly strengthened the understanding of, and conviction against, communism in key sectors of American society: clergy, university students, political leaders, minority communities and scholars.[51] Such efforts, combined with the vocal rallies and demonstrations, would have helped to expand the base of public support for Ronald Reagan's foreign policy.

Reinforcing these programs were many films, videos and multi-media presentations on Marxism. For example, human rights violations inside Nicaragua gained greater visibility due to the efforts of Lee Shapiro, a CAUSA International associate. At great personal risk, Shapiro traveled with the Nicaraguan Resistance forces. He filmed, wrote, produced, and directed the award-winning documentary entitled *Nicaragua was Our Home,* which captured on film testimonies of the atrocities committed by the Sandinistas against the Miskito Indians. The documentary was aired nationally by PBS (which made the highly irregular demand for a wrap-around pointing out the filmmaker's ties to CAUSA International). It was also previewed at the White House on June 28, 1985, and President Reagan personally commended Shapiro for his work.[52] CARP also produced a full-length film entitled *El Salvador: Revolution and Romance,* which highlighted the Marxist-Leninist ties of the FMLN.[53] Such educational efforts helped the general public to understand the ideological bankruptcy of communism, the duplicity of the Marxist appeal for human rights, and the real threat of Soviet expansionism.

3. Contacts with Communist Leaders

Reverend Moon's anticommunism activities also included a mediating dimension, which initially he most visibly pursued through the previously mentioned WMA (World Media Association). In 1982, Reverend Moon asked

WMA to organize fact-finding tours which would bring Western journalists to the Soviet Union. Between 1982 and 1989, WMA brought hundreds of American and foreign journalists to Russia and many of the other Soviet republics. As early as 1983 these journalists dialogued with leaders of *TASS, Pravda, Izvestia*, and Novosti News Agency. Early WMA participants were subjected to verbal sparring matches with Soviet specialists in disinformation; however, relations had improved by the 1988 fact-finding tour, when WMA received permission for the first time for a journalist exchange program with the U.S.S.R.[54] The following year, WMA hosted Soviet journalists on a tour of the United States. The Soviet delegation included Albert Vlasov, Chairman of the Board for Novosti News Agency. That tour opened the way to a working relationship between the WMA and the Soviet media, including *Izvestia*, Novosti, and *The Moscow News*.[55]

On April 11, 1990, Reverend Moon met in Moscow with U.S.S.R. President Mikhail Gorbachev. An aftermath of the meeting was the decision by the U.S.S.R. to allow its leadership to attend American Leadership Conferences. In December of 1990 and February of 1991, the ALC sponsored seminars for 80 deputies of the Supreme Soviet (federal, republic and city levels), as well as delegations of some 60 cabinet ministers and members of parliament from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Attendees included Sergei Lushchikov, then the Soviet Minister of Justice, and General Oleg Kalugin, former director of KGB operations in the United States. Participants received lectures on VOC theory as well as briefings on the underpinnings of Western democracy. From April 30 to May 7, 1991, the World Leadership Conference, affiliated with ALC, sponsored an unprecedented seminar and fact-finding tour in Washington, D.C. for approximately 200 high-ranking Soviet officials and political leaders, comprised of official delegations from all 15 republics of the U.S.S.R. This was the only time during these final years of the Soviet Union that any person, government or private organization brought together representatives from all of the 15 Soviet republics. In attendance were 26 deputies of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and some 75 deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the various republics, as well as Republic vice-presidents, cabinet ministers and ambassadors. While in the United States, the delegation met with federal officials in Washington, D.C. and with city and state officials and business representatives in the New York City area.[56]

a. Reverend Moon and North Korea

Reverend Moon's Cold War efforts also extended to isolated and potentially volatile North Korea. Because of his outspoken views against communism, Reverend Moon was long viewed with hostility in North Korea. As late as 1987 the FBI arrested a reputed member of the Japanese Red Army, an orga-

nization with established ties to North Korea, for his involvement in an assassination plot which targeted Reverend Moon.

Reverend Moon nonetheless secured an invitation in November, 1991 to meet with D.P.R.K. President Kim Il Sung. The meeting led to some tangible results. A few months after this visit, President Kim Il Sung gave his first interview to the Western Press in 20 years, via *The Washington Times*. In the interview Kim Il Sung expressed his desire to improve U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations. The meeting also led to an opportunity to concretely improve such relations via the aforementioned American Freedom Coalition (AFC).

During May and June of 1992, the AFC conducted a peacemaking mission to Pyongyang after consultation with the Bush White House. The 40-person delegation, headed by former Congressman Richard Ichord, included numerous former Congressmen and federal officials, including former CIA Deputy Director Max Hugel and Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, nephew and namesake of Gen. MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of U.N. troops who had repulsed the 1950 attack on the South. The AFC delegation targeted the cooling of abusive language (toward the US and South Korea) by D.P.R.K. officials as the principal goal of their visit. The delegation addressed this and other topics with high-ranking Party officials, including Kim Young Sun, architect of Pyongyang's foreign policy, and with President Kim Il Sung himself, who hosted the delegation for lunch and spent more than three hours responding to their questions.

In a subsequent June 23, 1992 meeting in New York, a North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations relayed to Congressman Ichord and several other members of the AFC delegation to Pyongyang that the D.P.R.K., as a consequence of the recent AFC visit, had made a unilateral decision to cancel its annual anti-American demonstrations.[57] Such demonstrations had taken place every June 25th to July 27th since the end of the Korean conflict.[58] On the request of the D.P.R.K. official, Congressman Ichord conveyed this decision to the Bush administration, which he did on June 24, 1992. The anti-American demonstrations have remain suspended since that time.

b. Theological Paradigm

It is useful to reflect upon the paradigm or prism through which Reverend Moon apparently approached these meetings with Presidents Gorbachev and Kim. The Divine Principle, the religious teaching of Reverend Moon, posits the biblical struggle between Cain and Abel as the underlying dynamic of all historical development. Cain and Abel were brothers; instead of murder they should have reconciled with each other peacefully. Such a peaceful reconciliation between hostile brothers was realized by Jacob and Esau. Their struggle, again between a younger brother and an elder brother, is seen as a continuation of the original Cain-Abel rivalry. Jacob finally won the respect

of Esau, and thus resolved the Cain-Abel problem in his family. He could achieve this result by preparing well for his encounter with Esau, having acquired a certain level of spiritual and material strength. In accord with this view, all struggling individuals, nations and blocs can be analyzed as taking the positions of Cain and Abel, Jacob and Esau.

For Reverend Moon, the Cold War represented a different level and expression of the same Cain-Abel/Jacob-Esau struggle. Like Jacob, Reverend Moon returned to his homeland to meet Esau (Kim Il Sung) only once he could be recognized as a man of accomplishment. Having become a leading anti-communist, Reverend Moon's meeting with President Kim, the most hardline of communists, took on a wider significance. The peaceful reunion and reconciliation of these two leaders represented the resolution of the East-West struggle at the place where the the outbreak of first violent East-West conflict had occurred following World War II.

Reverend Moon's role in the struggle against communism did not end with his encounter with Kim Il Sung. According to his teachings, communism emerged because of real social injustices and is the consequence of deep-seated human resentment which can only be healed through service and love. Based on this understanding, Reverend Moon has continued to work in places such as North Korea and the People's Republic of China, with the expressed goal of resolving the problem at the very root. It is anticipated that his involvement will thus continue.

Conclusion

This article has traced only some of the contributions which Reverend Moon and organizations which he founded made to the struggle against communist expansionism. Such efforts expended more than capital. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Unification Church missionaries were sent clandestinely to every Eastern European country. In the U.S.S.R., some were imprisoned and later expelled from the country. In Czechoslovakia and in Poland, Church missionaries were jailed for up to six years. Several members were executed after the communist takeover of Ethiopia because of their Church affiliation. CAUSA filmmaker Lee Shapiro, who had produced *Nicaragua was Our Home,* was killed by Soviet soldiers on October 9, 1987 while filming with the Afghan Resistance. Martin Bauer, President of CAUSA International in the Dominican Republic, was assassinated in 1985.[59]

Reverend Moon's activities may have filled a unique niche during the Cold War. While nongovernmental, his media initiatives and educational initiatives in key sectors of society bolstered internal support for governments opposed to communism. A distinctive feature of his work was the extensive popularization of a comprehensive ideological critique of Marxism-Leninism.

Meanwhile, Reverend Moon carried out activities in communist nations them-selves which seem designed to help the leadership of those nations come closer to the leading Western powers.

Reverend Moon was acutely attuned to the dominant importance of the United States in the struggle against communism. Perhaps for this reason, he placed so much emphasis on the need for an anticommunist president to guide the nation, which for him was fulfilled in the person of Ronald Reagan. Upon Reagan's election, Reverend Moon systematically developed programs designed to support the President in his stance against communism—programs such as *The Washington Times* and the various organizations which worked to develop an anticommunist consensus among a broad spectrum of politicians, religious leaders, statesmen, and civic and educational leaders.

How different would the course of the Cold War, and more specifically the fate of Nicaragua, SDI, and the Reagan doctrine have been, had Reverend Moon's educational and grassroots activities and *The Washington Times* never existed? Would this void have otherwise been filled? Any such assessments constitute mere speculation, yet one matter remains evident. During the 1970s and 1980s Reverend Moon's anticommunist activities were the target of deri-sion in publications such as *The New York Times, The Washington Post, Newsweek, Time,* and *The Los Angeles Times,* and they were the focus of decided animosity in leftist publications including *Izvestia, Pravda, El Nuevo Diario, Barricada, Granma, CounterSpy, USSR Today, Nation* and *CovertAction.*[60] Yet today he and the organizations which he founded do not appear in Western accounts of the demise of communism.

Notes

1. Ralph de Toledano, "Not without Smear," *National Review* 48, no. 9 (May 20, 1996), pp. 68–69.
2. Richard Gid Powers, *Not Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism* (New York: Free Press, 1995).
3. Jay Winik, *On the Brink: The Dramatic Behind the Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women who Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
4. *Ibid.,* p. 475. Other recent contributions to the postmortem literature notable for omitting discussion of any organizations associated with Reverend Moon include such works as Jay Coleman, *The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), Jay Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire* (New York: Random House, 1995), and Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, *His Holiness* (New York: Doubleday, 1996).
5. Peter Rutland, "Sovietology: Notes for a Post-Mortem," *The National Interest* 31 (Spring 1993), pp. 109–122.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
7. Alexander Shtromas and Morton Kaplan, eds., *The Soviet Union and the Challenge of the Future* (New York: Paragon House, 1988).
8. Rutland, p. 111.
9. Notably, one month prior to the Geneva conference, a similarly titled conference for professors, "The Fall of World Communism," was conducted by Reverend Moon's Unification Thought Institute. This program, held July 22-26, 1985 in Korea, featured a keynote address by the Institute Director, Dr. Sang Hun Lee, entitled "Communism has Come to an End," published in *Unification Thought Quarterly* 9 (February 1986), pp. 38-47. See also *Communism Has Come to an End* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1986).
10. For example, Reverend Moon made the prediction during a speech in Paris in April 1972, "Communism will fall in its 70th year." Sun Myung Moon, "The Way of Restoration," *God's Will and the World* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1985), p. 77.
11. Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 568–71.
12. Such, for example, was *The Washington Times'* coverage of the defection of the No. 5 man in the KGB, Vitaly Yurchenko, which *The Washington Post* initially did not even cover, and the *Times'* early front-page coverage, versus the Post's virtual disregard, of the Soviet sailor who in 1985 twice jumped ship into the Mississippi River to defect, a feat which ultimately threatened the U.S.–U.S.S.R. summit.
13. Alex Jones of *The New York Times* reported in 1985 that officials of *The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal*, AP and UPI say that "they regularly review *The Washington Times* for news leads and pick up important news items." He called the *Times* the "third most-quoted newspaper in America," after only *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, and reported that AP alone cited the *Times* in more than 80 major dispatches from D.C. in 1985. *The New York Times*, May 26, 1985, p. 44.
14. "The Network," *The Washington Times*, April 8–12, 1985.
15. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Editorial," *The Washington Times*, May 6, 1985, p. A1.
16. "Paper to Aid Nicaraguan Rebels," *The New York Times*, May 7, 1985, p. A14; "U.S. Ex-Officials Lead 'Contra' Fund Drive," *The Washington Post*, May 9, 1985, p. A34; Ed Rogers, "Simon to Direct Nicaragua Fund," *The Washington Times*, May 8, 1985, p. A1.
17. *A Tribute* (Washington, D.C.: *The Washington Times*, 1990), "Our Times: The Life of an American Newspaper."
18. The U.S. House reversed its April 24 position and passed on June 12, 1985, a bill for Contra nonlethal aid. The U.S. Senate reaffirmed on June 6 and June 20, 1985 its prior support for Contra humanitarian aid. A compromise between the chambers, allowing $27 million in nonmilitary aid to the Contras, was reached on July 26, 1985 with final approval and submission to the White House on August 1, 1985.
19. Tom Nugent, "Daniel Graham: Sheriff of the 'High Frontier,'" *The Washington*

Times, November 1, 1983, pp. B1-2. Note: Other organizations founded by Reverend Moon also supported SDI with videotapes, and sponsored Graham's appearance before gatherings of American political leaders and grassroots activists.

20. "Editorial: Let's *defend* America," *The Washington Times*, March 25, 1983, p. A11; Tom Carhart, "Time for High Frontier," *The Washington Times*, March 25, 1983, p. A11; "Editorial: ABM: security vs. serenity," *The Washington Times*, October 21, 1985, p. A9; "Editorial: Hanging tough," *The Washington Times*, October 13, 1986, p. A11; "Editorial: Budget essentials," *The Washington Times*, October 14, 1986, p. A9; "Editorial: Not dead, only sleeping," *The Washington Times*, October 15, 1986, p. A9; "Editorial: SDI in the near term," *The Washington Times*, October 16, 1986, p. A11.

21. "Editorial: Let's *defend* America," *The Washington Times*, March 25, 1983, p. A11.

22. "Editorial: Nuclear Facts, Science Fictions," *The New York Times*, March 27, 1983, p. E18; "Editorial: The War Over Star Wars," *The New York Times*, October 15, 1986, p. A26; "Editorial: In the Reagan World, With No Missiles," *The New York Times*, October 19, 1986, p. 22; "Editorial: In the Real World, With the Bomb," *The New York Times*, October 19, 1986, p. 22.

23. "Editorial: Nuclear Facts, Science Fictions," *The New York Times*, March 27, 1983, p. E18; "Editorial: In the Reagan World, With No Missiles," *The New York Times*, October 19, 1986, p. 22.

24. McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerald Smith, "Reykjavik's Grounds for Hope," *The New York Times*, October 19, 1985, p. 23.

25. Jeremiah O'Leary, "Gorbachev Arrival set for December 7," *The Washington Times*, November 13, 1987, p. A5; Jeremiah O'Leary and Gene Grabowski, "Gorbachev may Address Congress," *The Washington Times*, November 17, 1987, p. A4. The role of *The Washington Times* in leading the editorial campaign and stopping the planned address was encapsulated by *The Times'* Editor-in-Chief, Arnaud de Borchgrave, in an December 4, 1987 speech before the American Leadership Conference.

26. "Moonie Tunes, Too," *Overthrow* 4, no. 2 (June/July 1982), p. 1.

27. See for example, Louis Wolf & Fred Clarkson, "Arnaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship," *CovertAction* 24 (Summer 1985), pp. 34–35; Fred Clarkson, "Pak in the Saddle Again," *CovertAction* 20 (Winter 1984), pp. 38–39; and "Moonies Move on Honduras," *CounterSpy* 7/4 (June/August 1983), p. 46.

28. Anne Reilly Down, "What Managers Can Learn From Manager Reagan," *Fortune*, September 15, 1986, p. 38; Alex Jones, "Washington Times and Its Conservative Niche," *The New York Times*, May 26, 1985, p. 44.

29. Hugh Sidey, "Let's do it," *Time*, October 28, 1985, p. 37.

30. Oscar Arias, address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, J.W. Marriott Hotel, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1988. Cited in *A Tribute* (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Times, 1990).

31. Cited in *A Tribute*.

32. Richard Gid Powers, pp. 294, 295, 302, 392.

33. Examples of publications devoted to ideological critiques include *Communism: A Critique and Counterproposal* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom Leadership Foundation, 1973 [1972]), Sang Hun Lee, *The End of Communism* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1985 [1984], Andrew Wilson, *Communism: Promise and Practice* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom Leadership Foundation, 1975), and *CAUSA Lecture Manual* (New York: CAUSA Institute, 1985).

34. Ricardo de la Cierva, *Jesuitas, Iglesia y Marxismo* 1965–1985: *La Teologia de la Liberacion Desenmascarada* (Barcelona, Spain: Plaza y Janes, 1986). See also the comments of New York University sovietologist Albert Weeks on *The End of Communism*: Albert Weeks, "A thought system which will overcome communism" [Book Review of Sang Hun Lee, *The End of Communism*], *The Unification Thought Quarterly*, 1/9 (February 1986), pp. 94–97.

35. The organization was formally incorporated in 1968. By 1980, IFVOC had branches in over 100 countries, totaling about seven million members.

36. John Marks, "From Korea With Love," *The Washington Monthly* 5/12 (February 1974), p. 55.

37. "Moon Rally Draws 1 Million," *The Korea Herald*, June 8, 1975.

38. Kasumi Otsuka, former National President of CARP-Japan, personal communication, April 2, 1996.

39. Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson, *Inside the League* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986), p. 69; Fred Clarkson, "Moon's Law: 'God is Phasing out Democracy,'" *CovertAction* 27 (Spring 1987), pp. 36–46.

40. Richard Gid Powers, pp. 359, 398, 406.

41. "World Council Attacks U.S. Policy in Central America," *The Washington Post*, July 30, 1983, p. B6.

42. The CAUSA USA programs for clergy were conducted under the aegis of the CAUSA Ministerial Alliance (CMA)

43. Three articles on CAUSA appeared in *The Baptist Monthly Magazine* 11/1 (September–October 1985), pp. 3–11, 38.

44. David Licorish, "From the Editor," *The Baptist Monthly Magazine* 11/1 (September–October 1985), pp. 3, 38. Licorish also opined on these pages: "CAUSA has not only convinced me; it has converted me... CAUSA presents the evil ideology of communism in the simplest yet didactic and dynamic way so that even children can understand what it is all about."

45. In addition, every state legislator in the United States was mailed a video of the American Leadership Conference in 1987.

46. Herbert Sparrow, "Causa International Military Association Conference," *The Retired Officer* (May 1986), pp. 24–27. Senior retired military officers (Colonel and above) also attended the American Leadership Conference, including 63 holding the rank of Admiral or General (Brigadier General and up).

47. Lars Erik Nelson, "The Case of the Moon-struck Military," *New York Daily News*, November 14, 1988.

48. Ross Gelbspan, "Documents: Moon Group Aided FBI," *The Boston Globe*, April 20, 1988, p. 1.

49. See for example, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 8, 1983, p. A1; "Grassroot protests grow," *USA Today*, September 8, 1983; "Trigger-Happy Soviets," *U.S. News & World Report*, September 12, 1983, p. 22; "The Spreading Impact," *U.S. News & World Report*, September 19, 1983, p. 24; "Angered over Soviet attack, Americans get revenge," *Newsweek*, September 23, 1983, p. 43; and *Newsweek*, September 26, 1983. Also note "Campus ignited by anti-Soviet demonstration," *Columbia Spectator*, September 15, 1983, p. 1.

50. "Campus Shock Troops for Anti-Soviet War Drive," *Young Spartacus* (October 1983), pp. 5, 9.

51. The impact of the VOC conferences on attendees is reflected not only in numerous unpublished participant letters and reflections, but also in the published literature. For example, MGen Herbert Sparrow wrote "The CAUSA movement warrants admiration and respect... It [the CAUSA conference] offers a stimulating intellectual experience," and MGen R. G. Cicolella is quoted as saying "I've never attended a conference or seminar that to me was more meaningful, interesting, pleasant or useful than this one" (Herbert Sparrow, "CAUSA International Military Association Conference," *The Retired Officer* (May 1986), p. 27). In a December 22, 1986 letter to the American Leadership Conference, one state senator (now Governor) reflected "I do not believe I have attended an event that has had a more profound impact on my life." Likewise representative are the comments of Dr. David Licorish (above, note 44).

52. Ronald Reagan, letter to Shapiro, November 6, 1985. (Copy of letter viewed by authors.)

53. In 1982, CARP was commended for this and other efforts by Salvadoran President Napoleon Duarte.

54. A factor in the improved relations between WMA and the Soviet leadership may have been Soviet recognition of *The Washington Times* as a major player after its role in having President Gorbachev uninvited from addressing a joint meeting of Congress in December, 1987.

55. The *Moscow News*, as well as *Za Rubezhom*, also carried Reverend Moon's first interviews in 13 years: "Prejudice and Hatred are the Result of Ignorance," *Moscow News*, April 15-22, 1990, p. 13; "A Spiritual Revolution is Needed," *Za Rubezhom*, November 17-23, 1989, p. 16.

56. Judy Randall, "Soviet officials visit Island," *Staten Island Advance*, May 7, 1991, p. A26; Steven Walker, "Newark is port of call for visitors from Soviet," *The Star-Ledger*, May 7, 1991; "Tricks of the trade," *North Jersey Herald & News*, May 7, 1991, p. A11.

57. The senior author of this paper was part of both the AFC delegation to North Korea and the June 23, 1992 meeting in New York City.

58. On June 25, 1950, the Korean War began and on July 27, 1953, a truce was signed which ended the conflict.

59. From April, 1948 to October, 1950 Reverend Moon himself was imprisoned in a concentration camp in Hungnam, North Korea, escaping summary execution only when the camp was liberated by United States forces on October 14, 1950.

60. See, for instance, "Moonies, WACL and Vigilantes: The Religious Right in the Philippines," *CovertAction Information Bulletin* 29 (Winter 1987), pp. 21–24; "Privitizing the War," *CovertAction* 22 (Fall 1984), pp. 30–33; "Moonies Move on Honduras," *CounterSpy* 7 (June–August 1983), pp. 46–47; "Moonies: CARP," *CounterSpy* 5 (August–October 1981); "Les sectes fondamentalistes, les Moons et la contre-revolution en Amerique centrale," *Granma*, La Havane, July 10, 1983, p. 10; "God, Man and the Reverend Moon," *The Nation* 228/12 (March 31, 1979), pp. 325–328; "Essence and 'Evil Goals' of the Sect 'Unification Church,' *USSR Today*, August 3, 1987; *Izvestia*, August 25, 1984; and *Pravda*, March 23, 1987.

THEOLOGICAL WITCH-HUNT:
THE NCC CRITIQUE OF THE
UNIFICATION CHURCH

Jonathan Wells

On June 21, 1977, the Commission on Faith and Order of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (the NCC) released to the press and other interested persons a "Critique of the Theology of the Unification Church as Set Forth in *Divine Principle*." The Critique describes itself as a "study document" prepared primarily for the purpose of "theological assessment," not an official policy of the NCC, and cautions against using it for "arbitrary or punitive purposes." The conclusion of the Critique is that the Unification Church is not a Christian Church, and that its claims to Christian identity cannot be recognized.

Before and after the preparation of their report, however, the Commission refused to meet with experts on Unification theology, and the Critique contains numerous errors and misrepresentations. As a scholarly or ecumenical effort in theological assessment, the Critique is a failure. Furthermore, despite its claim that the Critique is not official policy and should not be used for arbitrary or punitive purpose, the NCC has distributed the Critique through official channels for two decades and condoned its use in partisan attacks on the Unification Church. Thus the NCC Critique, though cloaked in theological language, looks suspiciously like a witch-hunt.

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1. The Preparation and Distribution of the Critique

Approximately one year before the Commission on Faith and Order released its Critique, a preliminary report had been prepared for the Commission by Dr. William L. Hendricks, Professor of Theology at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary in Texas. At first, members of the Unification Church were unaware that the report was being prepared, and only learned of it because of widespread newspaper coverage.

Dr. Young Oon Kim, Professor of Theology at Unification Theological Seminary and author of *Unification Theology and Christian Thought*,[1] wrote to Dr. Hendricks to correct some serious misunderstandings in his report. Dr. Kim also wrote to the Commission requesting that a friendly discussion be initiated to prevent further misunderstandings. She followed this up with a telephone call and letter to Dr. Jorge Lara-Braud, Executive Director of the Commission, reiterating her request for dialogue. A similar request was then made by Dr. Herbert Richardson, a Presbyterian minister and Professor of Theology at the University of Toronto, who was serving as a theological consultant to the Unification Church. The Commission refused to meet with Dr. Kim or Dr. Richardson, or with any other representative of the Unification Church. Furthermore, although Dr. Hendricks acknowledged in his preliminary report that he was "not competent to judge English translations of Korean works," the Commission never consulted anyone with such competency.

In addition to Drs. Hendricks and Lara-Braud, the Commission included Sister Agnes Cunningham, Professor of Patrology at Mundelein Seminary (Roman Catholic), and Dr. J. Robert Nelson, Professor of Theology at Boston University. During the year between Dr. Hendricks's preliminary report and the issuance of the final Critique, large volumes of material (including Dr. Kim's book) were submitted to the Commission. As the Critique explains in its Introductory Statement, the Commission "received solicited and unsolicited authoritative statements of self-clarification from the Unification Church and some of its sympathizers," but "for the sake of keeping the discourse entirely within the realm of what is authoritative and in the public domain," it chose to ignore these materials and to "confine itself to the official doctrinal text of the Unification Church, namely *Divine Principle*."[2]

The Commission's stated reason for ignoring the materials which were sent to it is transparently disingenuous, given its own acknowledgment that some of them were "authoritative" and the undeniable fact that some of them (including Dr. Kim's book) were already "in the public domain." Its decision to ignore expert opinions, from Unificationists and others, casts serious doubt on its claim to have produced an objective "study document" for the purpose of "theological assessment." Since the Commission persisted in its misrepresentations of Unification theology even after Dr. Kim had pointed them out,

it seems to have been less interested in assessing Unificationism than in discrediting it.

In its Introductory Statement, the Critique explains that, as a study document, it "does not become official policy" of the NCC "unless, through an appropriate process, the Council's governing board approves it." This process was never followed, and the Critique never became an official policy of the NCC. Several years after it was initially distributed, a representative of the Unification Church approached NCC officials Joan Campbell and Eileen Lindner and objected to the Critique's misrepresentations of Unification theology. Campbell and Lindner replied that the Critique could not be retracted or revised because it was only a study document, not an official policy of the NCC.

Yet the Critique has been widely circulated by the NCC as though it *were* an official policy. It was initially distributed in June, 1977, with a cover letter on NCC stationery (Appendix A). Soon afterwards, it was published with NCC permission in the quarterly *Occasional Bulletin of Missionary Research*. In 1985 an official NCC cover letter accompanied the Critique when it was sent to American religion editors and reporters; and in 1987 the Critique was again distributed with an official NCC cover letter (Appendix B) together with a similar critique by the National Christian Council of Japan. As Secretary-General of the World Council of Churches, Emilio Castro regarded the NCC Critique as definitive, and announced publicly that there is nothing more to be said about the Unification Church. From 1991 to the present, the Critique has been officially circulated in Japan, Korea, Europe, and the Caribbean, as well as South America, where Roman Catholic bishops recently cited it in a letter condemning the Unification Church.

The Critique's introductory statement claims that "nothing would be more contrary to the spirit of this critique than for it to be used for arbitrary or punitive purposes," and that the NCC is "wholeheartedly committed" to religious liberty. Yet the official cover letter which accompanied the NCC's 1987 mailing of the Critique (Appendix B) encourages people to obtain further information on the Unification Church by contacting "the office within the Southern Baptist Convention that deals with cults." The letter even provides the address of the anti-cult office. Under the circumstances, the NCC's professed commitment to religious liberty seems hollow, to say the least.

The actual uses to which the Critique has been put also belie the NCC's claim to be concerned about religious liberty. In 1984, opponents of the Unification Church in England used the Critique to justify a lawsuit challenging the Church's tax-exempt status, costing the Church almost half a million dollars in legal fees before the lawsuit was dropped in 1988. In the United States, members of the Unification Church continue to be denied membership in many campus ministry groups on the basis of the Critique's conclusions. Some ministers of mainline Christian churches in America have even lost their

jobs for attending conferences sponsored by the Unification Church, with the NCC Critique being used to justify their dismissal.[3]

Therefore, although the NCC Critique purports to be a scholarly exercise in theological assessment—a sincere effort to clarify one church's claim to Christian identity—the closed-door manner in which it was prepared suggests that its authors set out not to understand Unification theology, but to discredit it. Not surprisingly, as we shall see below, the Critique seriously misrepresents Unification theology. And although the NCC warns that the Critique is not official policy and should not be used for arbitrary or punitive purposes, it continues to distribute it through official channels and condone its use as a weapon against Unificationists and their friends. Under the circumstances, the NCC's pious caveats seem to be merely a disguise for a witch-hunt against the Unification Church.

2. The Contents of the Critique

According to the Critique's Introductory Statement, its principal purpose is "to clarify the claim to Christian identity made by the Unification Church." According to the Critique's Conclusions, The NCC defines "continuity with the Christian faith" in the following affirmations:

1)   Essential to Christian identity is the biblical affirmation that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, the eternal Word of God made flesh.
2)   The life, death and resurrection of Jesus are the ground and means of the salvation of persons and of the whole creation.
3)   The triune God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—has acted as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier identifying with the suffering and need of the world and is effectively saving it from sin, death, and the powers of evil.
4)   There is an essential relationship between faith in the saving work of the triune God and obedient response of the believing community.

One could legitimately question the adequacy of these criteria. For example, some Christian churches would prefer narrower (or at least clearer) criteria, though even if applied consistently in their present form they would exclude some current members of the NCC (such as the non-trinitarian Swedenborgians and Friends). Historically speaking, defining "Christianness" has always been a controversial enterprise, and only the seven ecumenical councils between 325 A.D. and 787 A.D. were able to claim anything approaching a general consensus.

For the sake of argument, however, let's accept the NCC criteria as they stand. Applying them to the Unification Church, the Critique concludes:

A.   The Unification Church is not a Christian Church.
     1. Its doctrine of the nature of the triune God is erroneous.
     2. Its Christology is incompatible with Christian teaching and belief.
     3. Its teaching on salvation and the means of grace is inadequate and
     faulty.
B.   The claims of the Unification Church to Christian identity cannot be rec-
     ognized.
     1. The role and authority of Scripture are compromised in the teachings
     of the Unification Church.
     2. Revelations are invoked as divine and normative in *Divine Principle*
     which contradict basic elements of Christian faith.
     3. A "new, ultimate, final truth" is presented to complete and supplant
     all previously recognized religious teachings, including those of
     Christianity.

So the Critique judges the Unification Church to be non-Christian in four
doctrinal areas: trinity, christology, salvation, and scripture. Let's examine
these in order.

a. Trinity

According to the Critique, "the doctrine of the Triune God, as set forth in
Divine Principle, is incompatible with Christian teaching." This refers to the
Divine Principle's use of the word "trinity" to mean a true man and true
woman centered on God: Adam and Eve should have formed a trinity "as True
Parents centered on God," but because of the fall they formed "a trinity cen-
tered on Satan"; when Jesus came as the second Adam he and the Holy Spirit
formed the "spiritual Trinity"; and when Christ comes again he will establish
the "substantial Trinity," which will be both physical and spiritual. (pp. 216-
218)[4] The Critique judges this to be "inconsistent with Christian understand-
ing" of the doctrine of the Trinity. (III.B.6)

     Actually, Unification theology *has* a doctrine of the Trinity which is
thoroughly consistent with traditional Christian formulations, but the Critique
missed it. According to *Divine Principle*, God has dual characteristics of pos-
itivity and negativity, and internal character and external form. God's heart is
described as the internal subject of the dual characteristics of Logos and
Universal Prime Energy; yet God is indivisibly One. The relevant passages
in *Divine Principle* (pp. 20-39) are reminiscent of Augustine's reflections on
the mystery of God's internal relations in *de Trinitate*, or of Karl Barth's dis-
cussion of God's "modes of being" in *Church Dogmatics*.

     In 1978, Catholic philosopher and theologian Sebastian Matczak saw "a
point-for-point parallel between Unification philosophy and Christian theol-

ogy" in their "understanding of the internal character of God." Matczak
described the Unification view of God as follows: "The Father is Heart and
Love, the eternally begotten Son is the Logos, and the Holy Spirit... is the cre-
ative energy and activity of God. This conceptualization of the Trinity—that
doctrine so central to Christianity—is closer to my understanding of the truth
than are many of the other diverse explanations of the Trinity taught in the
various churches."[5]

Perhaps because *Divine Principle* uses unfamiliar language, the NCC
Critique misinterpreted its discussion of God's dual characteristics as evidence
of a "cosmic dualism which conflicts with Christian biblically based teaching."
(III.B.1) The Critique goes on to claim that in *Divine Principle* "the eternal
unity of the one God is jeopardized by the assertion that upon such dual essen-
tialities... depends the very being of God." (III.B.1.a) This is oddly inconsis-
tent with the Critique's earlier assessment that "the God portrayed in *Divine
Principle* is a monotheistic God." (II.D.2) It is also incorrect: God's unity is
no more jeopardized by "dual essentialities" than by the "three persons" of tra-
ditional trinitarian formulations. If the Faith and Order Commission had not
refused to meet with scholars of Unification theology, it would have realized
that "dual essentialities" refers to inner relations in God, not to two gods.

Then what about the Unification use of the term "trinity" to describe rela-
tions between God, man and woman? Since this terminology refers to rela-
tions between God and human beings, in traditional theological categories it
would actually be considered part of the doctrine of Christology. In fact, the
section on "Trinity" in *Divine Principle* is in the chapter entitled
"Christology." Such terminological confusion is not surprising when one con-
siders that *Divine Principle* was written by and for Koreans who were not the-
ologically trained. We will consider this christological use of "trinity" below.

So the NCC's Commission on Faith and Order, ignoring the views of
Unificationists and other scholars, misread a christological statement as a
trinitarian one. Then, contradicting its own assessment of *Divine Principle* as
"monotheistic," it misinterpreted Unification theology's doctrine of God's
internal relations as a form of cosmic dualism. On this point, the Critique is
dead wrong. In fact, the Unification doctrine of God is thoroughly consistent
with the traditional Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

b. Christology

According to the NCC, two necessary elements of "continuity with the
Christian faith" are the affirmations that (i) "Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ,
the eternal Word of God made flesh," and (ii) "the life, death and resurrec-
tion of Jesus are the ground and means of the salvation of persons and of the
whole creation." The first of these concerns the person of Christ, and the sec-
ond the work of Christ.

(i) The Person of Christ

The Critique acknowledges that *Divine Principle* describes Jesus as "the incarnation of the Word." (II.D.3) In fact, *Divine Principle* also affirms that "Jesus is the Word made flesh" and "Jesus is God in the flesh." (pp. 211, 292) These passages are unquestionably consistent with the NCC's first criterion for continuity with the Christian faith.

The Critique maintains, however, that other passages in *Divine Principle* are inconsistent with its affirmation that Jesus is the Word made flesh. For example, *Divine Principle* explains that Jesus is "one body with God," but "the body can by no means be the mind itself." Therefore (as the Critique points out in II.D.3), Jesus "can by no means be God Himself." (p. 211) On the same page, *Divine Principle* explains that since Jesus is "the incarnation of the Word," and "all things were made through the Word," it is appropriate to call Jesus "the Creator." Yet "Jesus, on earth, was a man no different from us except for the fact that he was without original sin." (p. 212)

This last phrase is virtually identical to one formulated by the Ecumenical Council at Chalcedon in 451 A.D. The Definition of Chalcedon attempted to balance Christ's divinity and humanity without confusing the two. *Divine Principle* also attempts to affirm both without confusing them. Whether Unification Christology is consistent with Chalcedon has been debated by theologians for almost two decades,[6] with critics arguing that *Divine Principle* leans too far in the direction of Christ's humanity. To be fair, however, one must realize that *Divine Principle* was written in the context of a Korean fundamentalism for which "Jesus is God" was all that needed to be said about Christology. In that context, many of *Divine Principle's* statements were necessary correctives to the devaluation of Christ's humanity.

The NCC Critique overlooks the fact that balancing the divinity and humanity of Christ has always been a difficult issue for Christian theology, and judges the Unification view as though this issue did not exist. Even worse, the Critique misrepresents Unification Christology to make it sound less orthodox than it is. According to the Critique, *Divine Principle* claims that "'Jesus Christ came as the Messiah,' but only in the sense of the 'Messianic expectation of the Israelites' (p. 139)." (II.D.3) Significantly, the word "only" does not occur in this passage from *Divine Principle*, but was inserted by the authors of the Critique. Divine Principle, like the Bible, attributes many different titles and roles to Jesus; these include "Messiah," "the second Adam," "our savior," "perfected man," "the Tree of Life," and "the incarnation of the Word," to name just a few. The Critique's claim that *Divine Principle* limits Jesus' role to fulfilling the Messianic expectation of the Israelites is blatantly false.

Could this misrepresentation be a result of mere carelessness? Perhaps. But in judging the Unification view of Jesus without even acknowledging the long-standing difficulty of balancing Christ's divinity and humanity, the

Critique betrays an eagerness to condemn Unification theology which suggests that "carelessness" is too kind.

(ii) The Work of Christ

According to the Critique, *Divine Principle* "cannot be regarded as Christian" because it asserts "the failure of Jesus to fulfill 'the salvation of both spirit and body' (p. 147)" and "the failure of Jesus to achieve his mission (p. 196)." (III.B.7) But the Critique thereby misrepresents *Divine Principle*.

On pages 147-148, *Divine Principle* states that Jesus "should have fulfilled the salvation of both spirit and body," and that "if they had become one with him in both spirit and body by believing in him, fallen men could have been saved both spiritually and physically," and "he would have established the Kingdom of Heaven on earth" without delay and without the need for a second coming. Unfortunately, "due to the disbelief of and persecution by the people, he was crucified." After the loss of his physical body, Jesus was able to "establish the basis for spiritual salvation by forming a triumphant foundation for resurrection through the redemption by the blood of the cross," but fallen people "cannot fulfill physical salvation" until the second coming. This explains why, in the followers of Jesus, "original sin remains in the flesh and is transmitted continuously from generation to generation," and thus why St. Paul lamented that "I of myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin. (Rom 7:22-25)"

It is important to note that this passage does not attribute failure to Jesus, but to the people who disbelieved him. Similarly, *Divine Principle* explains on page 196, "when God's will to fulfill the purpose of creation centering on Adam failed, He sent Jesus... [but] this will was again a failure, due to the disbelief of the people." In other words, it was Adam (not God) who failed the first time, and it was the people (not Jesus) who failed the second time. The Critique misrepresents *Divine Principle* by claiming that it labels Jesus a failure.

One of the NCC's criteria for "continuity with the Christian faith" (discussed below) is the affirmation that "there is an essential relationship between faith in the saving work of the triune God and obedient response of the believing community." (IV.4) Consistent with this criterion, Unification theology maintains that Jesus' saving work could not be completely effective without an obedient human response, but the Critique obscures this point when it incorrectly attributes failure to Jesus.

The question remains whether Unification theology is consistent with the view that (in the NCC's words) "the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus are the ground and means of the salvation of persons and of the whole creation." *Divine Principle* maintains that God "handed Jesus over to Satan" to be cru-

cified, "in order to save the whole of mankind." Jesus then "established the spiritual foundation of faith through the 40-day resurrection period to separate Satan, after giving up his physical body to the cross as a sacrifice. By doing this, he pioneered the way for the redemption of the sins of all men." (pp. 360-361)

In other words, although the crucifixion was not God's initial plan, and became necessary only because of the disbelief of the people, it nevertheless laid a foundation for future salvation. *Divine Principle* states, "we can never deny the magnitude of the grace of redemption by the cross." (p. 142) According to Protestant theologian Durwood Foster, "insofar as the passage just quoted is given weight—and there is a more than negligible line of thought supporting it in *Divine Principle*—how can it be said that Jesus failed?"[7]

If the NCC's view of the work of Christ is interpreted to mean that Jesus' life, death and resurrection are *necessary* for salvation, there is arguably no conflict between it and Unification theology. On the other hand, Unification theology would be incompatible with the view that Jesus' life, death and resurrection are *sufficient* for complete salvation (though *Divine Principle* maintains that it would have been sufficient if people had believed in him). Even many Christians, however, regard salvation as (in some sense) incomplete until the eschaton;[8] the question then turns on the Unification doctrine of eschatology.

The Critique claims that Unification eschatology "is incompatible in critical and essential ways with that which is acknowledged, recognized and taught in Christian churches throughout the world." (III.B.7) The truth is, however, that eschatology is the least clearly defined of all Christian doctrines. According to Protestant theologian Darrol Bryant, "the doctrine of eschatology within the Christian traditions has yet to achieve either a creedal or dogmatic definition that would justify outright dismissal of the eschatology put forth by the Unification movement."[9] In any case, eschatology plays no part in either the Critique's criteria for Christian identity or its formal conclusions, so the matter remains unsettled.

(iii) Divine Principle's Use of the Word "Trinity"

The concluding section of *Divine Principle's* chapter on Christology is devoted to "trinity." The word is used to refer to a variety of relationships: that between Adam and Eve centered on God before the fall, that between Adam and Eve centered on Satan after the fall, that between Jesus and the Holy Spirit centered on God after the crucifixion, that between the True Parents and God at the time of the Second Coming, and that of all married couples centered on God in the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. (pp. 217-28)

In every case, "trinity" in *Divine Principle* includes relationships between created beings. Even in the case of Jesus, *Divine Principle* seems to

be referring to Christ's human nature. (The nature of the Holy Spirit is not clear from the text, but Unificationists have tended to regard it as the feminine aspect of God.) In traditional Christian theology, "Trinity" refers only to relationships among God's internal "persons" or "modes of being." *Divine Principle's* untraditional use of "trinity" in this context must be distinguished from the Unification doctrine of God's Heart, Logos and Energy, discussed above, which more nearly resembles the traditional Trinity.

Once the terminological confusion is set aside, a deeper and more interesting issue emerges. According to *Divine Principle's* untraditional use of "trinity," if Adam and Eve had not fallen they would have formed a union with God just as substantial and inseparable as the subsequent union of Jesus with God. *Divine Principle* maintains that Jesus, as the second Adam, would have taken a bride if he had not been prevented from doing so by the crucifixion, since God's image is both masculine and feminine: "male and female He created them." (Gen 1:27) But Jesus incarnated only God's masculinity, so at the time of the second coming a couple known as the True Parents will form the substantial trinity with God that Adam and Eve should have formed in the beginning. In the ensuing kingdom of heaven on earth all married couples will eventually form such unions. (pp. 41-46)

Although the idea that Adam and Eve might have formed a union with God comparable to that of Jesus may sound strange to some modern Christians, early Christian fathers such as Irenaeus[10] taught that if Adam had not fallen he would have become like Jesus, and that God became man in order that man might become God. According to the ecumenical councils of Nicea and Chalcedon, the Logos is the only-begotten Son of God, but the human nature of Jesus to which it was united was like us in all respects except for sin. Jesus even had his own will, distinct from God's will. So the idea that a human nature other than Jesus' could be similarly united with God was not alien to the early church. In fact, as Thomas Aquinas pointed out, God is infinite and human nature is finite, so the Logos could conceivably be united to more than one human nature.[11]

Therefore, orthodox Christian theology cannot exclude the possibility that God will become incarnate again in a human nature other than Jesus'. What traditional Christianity sees as merely possible, however, Unification theology sees as necessary to fulfill God's original ideal of a world populated by sinless, perfected families centered on Him. Though untraditional, the Unification view has scriptural support. According to Rev 3:12, "He who conquers, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God; never shall he go out of it, and I will write on him the name of my God, and the name of the city of my God, the new Jerusalem which comes down from my God out of heaven, and my own new name."

Unification theology clearly goes beyond traditional christology in its

expectation of further unions between the divine and human natures. But does it thereby contradict the Christian tradition, or merely extend it? An analogous question might be: Did Christianity contradict the basic elements of Jewish faith, or merely build on them? These are fascinating and important theological questions, but they are not addressed by the superficial and distorted reading of *Divine Principle* which forms the basis of the NCC Critique.

c. Salvation

According to the NCC, continuity with the Christian faith requires the affirmations that "the life, death and resurrection of Jesus are the ground and means of the salvation of persons and of the whole creation," and that "there is an essential relationship between faith in the saving work of the triune God and obedient response of the believing community." The Critique considers Unification theology un-Christian because it "is based, in part on the failure of Jesus to achieve his mission (p. 196)," and because it lacks "any clear indication of the existence of the Christian community as Church and the role of grace and divine intervention by God in human history." (III.B.7)

As we have seen, the allegation that *Divine Principle* labels Jesus a failure is false. Furthermore, *Divine Principle* clearly affirms that the "life, death, and resurrection of Jesus" form the necessary foundation for subsequent salvation. The question is whether this foundation is sufficient. As the Critique points out, *Divine Principle* maintains that because Jesus had to sacrifice his physical body on the cross, the salvation he brought was only spiritual. Physical salvation awaits the second coming—a thoroughly traditional notion. Where Unification theology goes beyond the tradition is its understanding of the role of True Parents in completing the process of salvation, not in its claim that the process remains uncompleted until the second coming.

The Critique asserts that Unification theology lacks "any clear indication of the existence of the Christian community as Church." According to *Divine Principle,* however, Jesus gathered his disciples after the resurrection to establish Christianity "as the Second Israel for the erection of the Kingdom of Heaven." Thus Christians are "the chosen people... who are to establish the foundation for the Messiah of the Second Advent." (pp. 362, 370, 519)

The Critique charges that *Divine Principle* lacks "any clear indication of the existence of the... role of grace and divine intervention by God in human history," and even "posits a gulf between the Creator and creation which prevents God from crossing for the purpose of historical intervention (pp. 105, 148)." (III.B.1.b; III.B.7) *Divine Principle* clearly affirms, however, that "God is behind human history, leading it toward one absolute purpose." (p. 340) Some specific examples of God's intervention in human history are: "God had the second son Abel offer symbolic sacrifices"; "He exercised the providence of the flood judgment"; "God commanded Abraham to offer sacrifices"; "God

had Moses smite the Egyptians"; and "God finally handed Jesus over to Satan" to be crucified. (pp. 248, 253, 264, 302, 360) In fact, God's active involvement in human history is such a pronounced feature of *Divine Principle* that it seems no one on the Commission read the book all the way through.

The NCC's criterion that Christians affirm an "essential relationship between faith in the saving work of the triune God and obedient response of the believing community" appears not to have been a factor in the Critique's conclusions. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Commission could have faulted Unification theology on this point. Together with its emphasis on God's providential work, *Divine Principle* emphasizes the necessity of human response. Thus from the very beginning "the perfection or non-perfection of man depended not only on God's power of creation but also upon man's response." Humans thus have a "portion of responsibility," the fall was "the result of man's own error," and fallen people must participate in setting up the "foundation to receive the Messiah." (pp. 55, 104, 240) As discussed above, there was even an essential relationship between the completion of Jesus' salvific work and the people's obedient response. The Critique's conclusion that the Unification "teaching on salvation and the means of grace is inadequate and faulty" ignores these points, and is thus unfounded and arbitrary.

d. Scripture

The Critique notes that "for Christians, the biblical witness remains the normative authority," and maintains that "this is not the case in *Divine Principle*, which acknowledges the higher authority of Sun Myung Moon." (III.B.5) The Critique concludes that "the role and authority of scripture are compromised in the teachings of the Unification Church," and "revelations are invoked as divine and normative in *Divine Principle* which contradict basic elements of Christian faith." (IV.A.1,2)

Divine Principle does, in fact, refer to "new truth" brought by Sun Myung Moon in the form of "a revelation from God Himself," and it cautions against fundamentalism by explaining that the "Biblical words are a means of expressing the truth and not the truth itself." (pp. 16, 131) But from start to finish, the attitude of *Divine Principle* is that new revelation cannot contradict the Bible, though it may re-interpret it or go beyond it. *Divine Principle* disputes some interpretations of the Bible which are common among Christians, but it consistently regards the Bible itself as normative and authoritative. Reformed biblical scholar Thomas Boslooper wrote in 1984, "there is no denying the importance of the Hebrew-Christian scriptures to Unificationism." Boslooper noted, "in Unificationism there is the highest regard for scriptures of all religions of the world. At the same time the authority and normative value of the Old and New Testaments are held in the greatest esteem."[12]

The Critique purports to find contradictions between *Divine Principle* and basic Christian doctrines, and dismisses it pejoratively as a "secret, esoteric truth" which, "similar to occult schemes of various character, cannot be admitted into Christian thought without distorting it." (III.B.2) But it is the Critique itself which is guilty of distortion here, since (as shown above) it misrepresents the Unification doctrines of God, Christ and salvation.

The Critique claims that *Divine Principle* presents itself as the "new ultimate, final truth" which will "complete and supplant all previously recognized religious teachings, including those of Christianity." (IV.B.3) Once again, the Critique is guilty of distortion. The quoted passage actually states that the "new, ultimate, final truth, however, cannot come either from any man's synthetic research in the scriptures and in literature, or from any human brain," but "must appear as a revelation from God Himself." *Divine Principle*, however, does *not* claim to be the complete expression of this, but "only part of the new truth." (pp. 15-16) And it does not intend to supplant Christianity, but to promote its fulfillment: *Divine Principle* regards Christianity as "the central religion that will accomplish the purpose of God's providence of restoration" by restoring "the one great world family which God had intended at the creation." (p. 123)

The Critique acknowledges that "within the diverse communions and traditions of Christianity there are many ways of understanding scriptural authority and interpretation," and even admits that *Divine Principle* uses biblical texts "in the manner of many Christian literalists." (II.B.5) In theological terms, the use of biblical texts is the subject of hermeneutics. In 1978, Protestant theologian Frank Flinn wrote, "the relation between the literal and spiritual senses of the Scriptures has always been the central problem of Christian hermeneutics," and "the conflict between the hermeneutics of established Christianity and that of the Unification Church is a continuation of the very same debate which has always been present in Christianity."[13] In other words, Unification hermeneutics is continuous with at least some elements of the Christian tradition.

Despite the diversity of Christian views on scripture, and the similarity between the views of Unificationists and some Christians, the Critique concludes on the basis of various distortions of *Divine Principle* that Unification theology's use of the Bible is un-Christian. This is not what one would expect from a sincere effort at theological assessment, but from a deliberate attempt to discredit the Unification Church.

e. Additional Misrepresentations

Not content to distort Unification theology in areas related to the NCC's criteria for Christian identity, the Critique is littered with additional (and apparently gratuitous) misrepresentations. Among these are miscellaneous charges

that Unification theology is too spiritual (or too materialistic), or that it regards Satan as a second God, or that it advocates questionable practices in sex and marriage, or that it is anti-Semitic.

For example, the Critique charges, *"Divine Principle* posits a dualism in human nature between 'spirit man' and 'physical man'... which minimizes the goodness of the body and militates against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection." (III.B.1.d) The Critique does not explain how the distinction between spiritual and physical "minimizes the goodness of the body," nor does it explain why this view is any less Christian than St. Paul's: "It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body." (1 Cor 15:44) And in a following section, the Critique apparently reverses itself, claiming that the Unification doctrine of salvation is un-Christian because it "elevates what is material at the expense of the spiritual." (III.B.3) The Critique does not reconcile these conflicting accusations, nor does it explain how either of them relate to the NCC's criteria for Christian identity.

The Critique also claims, *"Divine Principle* so elevates the power of Satan as to teach what inevitably appears to be a second, rival god." (III.B.1.c) But *Divine Principle* explicitly rejects this sort of dualism: "all things were created by one God," and God is good, so Satan must be "a being originally created for the purpose of goodness who later fell and was degraded." (p. 70) It was only because of the fall that "man established the world of Satan's sovereignty instead of the world of God's sovereignty. Thus we call Satan the 'ruler of this world' (John 12:31) or the 'god of this world.' (2 Cor 4:4)" (p. 103) In this regard, Unification theology is thoroughly Christian, and the closest it comes to calling Satan "a second, rival God" is to quote St. Paul.

Along the same lines, the Critique asserts that Unification theology explains the fall of man "in a way which is incompatible with the Bible and Christian theology," because it characterizes Lucifer as "the external source of evil and sin, which he transmits by sexual union to Eve, who passes it on to Adam by the same mode." This allegedly leads to "questionable teachings and practices of sex and marriage." (III.B.1.e) In the Unification doctrine of the fall, however, Lucifer was not an "external source of evil and sin" but fell with Adam and Eve only when those two disobeyed God's commandment. Furthermore, as Catholic theologian Francis Clark has pointed out, "the interpretation of the Fall of the Angel, as being an act of fornication, has many echoes in ancient religious literature," and "the Apologists of the second century found no difficulty in accepting the notion of carnal commerce between angelic spirits and women."[14] In other words, the Critique distorts both Unification and traditional theology on the fall; but since the fall is not even mentioned in the NCC's criteria for Christian identity, this section appears to be irrelevant to the Critique's conclusions.

The Commission never explains what Unificationist teachings and practices of sex and marriage it considers "questionable." In fact, the major practical consequence of the Unification doctrine of the fall is a strict prohibition on extramarital sex, a prohibition which is thoroughly at home in the Christian tradition. By labeling unnamed practices "questionable," the Critique glibly defames members of the Unification Church. This is not "theological assessment," but a smear tactic.

Finally, the Critique charges Unification theology with having a "consistently and unrelievedly negative" attitude toward the Jewish people, leading to "an inevitable antisemitism." (III.B.4) Yet the Critique recognizes that "Christians have, at times, written and spoken in a manner that was antisemitic," and fails to acknowledge that many of the passages in *Divine Principle* which it alleges to be antisemitic are actually references to passages in the New Testament. Furthermore, the Unification Church had already responded publicly to allegations of antisemitism a year before the Critique was prepared, condemning the persecution of Jews as "the most hideous, abject and cruel form of hatred," and gratefully acknowledging the indebtedness of the Unification movement to "the true and righteous prophets" of the Jewish tradition "who prepared the foundations on which we stand."[15] Therefore, the Critique's charge of anti-Semitism, like its insinuation that Unificationists engage in questionable practices of sex and marriage, is false and defamatory.

3. Conclusions

The NCC Critique of the Unification Church distorts *Divine Principle* by quoting it incorrectly, quoting it out of context, and interpreting it in ways which Unificationists and other scholars reject. It also judges Unification theology unfairly, by applying standards which some traditional Christians and some of the NCC's own members do not meet.

Whether Unification theology is Christian or not is an interesting and important question. Answering it would require a clear and consistently applied definition of "Christian," and an accurate and fair-minded understanding of *Divine Principle* as well as other authoritative Unificationist texts. The NCC Commission on Faith and Order has not met either of these requirements.

As a study document—that is, as a scholarly analysis of Unification theology—the Critique is a failure. If a college undergraduate were to write a paper on Augustine's *City of God* which misrepresented that book as badly as the NCC Critique misrepresents *Divine Principle*, the paper would deserve a failing grade. As an exercise in ecumenical understanding, the Critique is also a failure. No self-respecting ecumenical organization would presume to tell people what their religious beliefs are, while ignoring protests that they

were being misrepresented. Even if we dismiss its scholarly and ecumenical pretensions and evaluate it as a heresy indictment, the Critique is a failure. By refusing to let Unificationists represent themselves, the Commission's conduct was a travesty of justice, resembling a medieval Star Chamber (in which the prosecutor is also judge and jury) rather than a modern court of law.

It is not uncommon for people to misunderstand the beliefs of others. The Critique's errors, however, cannot be excused as innocent misunderstandings. The Commission was informed *before* finishing the Critique that its analysis was full of errors, yet it refused to acknowledge them. After the Critique was published and distributed, Unificationists again objected that the Critique misinterpreted Unification theology. Officials of the NCC acknowledged the objections, but claimed that as a mere "study document" the Critique was immune from rebuttal, revision or retraction. Under the circumstances, the NCC's continuing distribution of the Critique suggests that its motive is deliberate misrepresentation, and that the "unofficial" label is merely the NCC's way of ducking responsibility for that misrepresentation.

The NCC insists that it is "wholeheartedly committed" to the religious liberty of the Unification Church. Yet the NCC has distributed the Critique through official channels for two decades, encouraging people to contact an anti-cult group for further information. During those two decades, the NCC was aware of at least some of the damage that the Critique inflicted on Church members and their friends. Under the circumstances, it seems that the NCC's professions of concern for the religious liberty of the Unification Church are hypocritical.

So the Critique misrepresents Unification theology, and the NCC continues to distribute it in the knowledge that it is damaging to members of the Unification Church and their friends. Thus the NCC is engaged in the deliberate and malicious propagation of falsehoods. Though cloaked in theological language, the Critique is not a "study document" or a "theological assessment," but a weapon in a witch-hunt.

Notes

1. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology and Christian Thought* (New York: Golden Gate, 1975).
2. *Divine Principle* (Washington, D.C.: HSA-UWC, 1973).
3. See, for example, *The New York Times*, March 25, 1988.
4. For the remainder of this essay, page numbers refer to passages in *Divine Principle* (1973). Roman numerals followed by Arabic numerals, separated by periods, refer to sections of the Critique.
5. Sebastian Matczak, "God in Unification Philosophy," in *A Time for Consideration: A Scholarly Appraisal of the Unification Church* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press,

1978), pp. 220-257.

6. See, for example, Durwood Foster, "Unification and Traditional Christology: An Unresolved Relationship," in *Ten Theologians Respond to the Unification Church*, edited by Herbert Richardson (New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1981), pp. 181-199; also Jonathan Wells, "Unification Christology," in *Unity in Diversity: Essays in Religion by Members of the Faculty of the Unification Theological Seminary*, edited by Henry O. Thompson (New York: Rose of Sharon Press, 1984), pp. 135-147.

7. Durwood Foster, "Unification and Traditional Christology: An Unresolved Relationship," p. 191.

8. Incomplete in the sense that the resurrection, the final judgment and the establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven will come in the future; and many Christians see the last of these as requiring a transformation of the social order.

9. M. Darrol Bryant, "Unification Eschatology and American Millennial Traditions: Continuities and Discontinuities," in *A Time for Consideration*, pp. 261-274.

10. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, books 3-5.

11. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* III.3.7. See also Jonathan Wells, "Unification Christology," p. 144.

12. Thomas Boslooper, "Unificationism and Biblical Studies," in *Unity in Diversity*, pp. 297-323.

13. Frank K. Flinn, "Christian Hermeneutics and Unification Theology," in *A Time for Consideration*, pp. 141-166.

14. Francis Clark, "The Fall of Man in Divine Principle," in *Ten Theologians*, pp. 143-165.

15. *The New York Times*, December 19, 1976. See also Henry O. Thompson, "A Study in Anti-Semitism: Israels in Divine Principle," in *Unity in Diversity*, pp. 73-133.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE
CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A.

COMMISSION ON FAITH AND ORDER
475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027 (212) 870-2560

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Dr. Jorge Lara-Braud
Executive Director

Sr. Ann Patrick Ware, S.L.
Associate Director

                                                                June 1977

Dear friend:

     Enclosed you will find our Commission's study document entitled "A Critique of the Theology of the Unification Church as Set Forth in _Divine Principle_." You have expressed interest in it and that is why we are sending it to you. I consider it self-explanatory.

     You might want to know, however, who the chief drafters were. The basic text was done by Sister Agnes Cunningham, Professor of Patrology at Mundelein Seminary (Roman Catholic). As of mid-June, she is the President of the Catholic Theological Society of America. She was assisted by Dr. J. Robert Nelson, Professor of Theology at the School of Theology at Boston University. He is a Methodist and the new President of the American Theological Society. Also assisting was Dr. William L. Hendricks, Professor of Theology at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary at Fort Worth, and the immediate past-President of both the American Academy of Religion in the Southwest and the Commission on Religious Studies in the Southwest. I myself, a Presbyterian, also worked with these three persons in the drafting of the final text.

     We hope it will serve a constructive purpose.

                                        Cordially yours,

                                        Jorge Lara-Braud

JLB:eb
Encl.

Appendix A.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE
CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A.

Bishop Philip R. Cousin, President   Dr. Arie Brouwer, General Secretary

COMMISSION ON FAITH AND ORDER
Dr. William Rusch, Chair   Brother Jeffrey Gros, F.S.C., Director
ROOM 872, 475 RIVERSIDE DRIVE, NY 10115-0050   (212) 870-2569

1987

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Director of the Institute of Religion at the Texas Medical Center in Houston.
He is A Methodist and was President of the American Theological Society. Also
assisting was Dr. William L. Hendricks, Professor of Theology at Southwestern
Baptist Theological Seminary at Fort Worth and past-President of both the
American Academy of Religion in the Southwest and the Commission on Religious
Studies in the Southwest. Dr. Jorge Lara-Braud, of San Francisco Theological
Seminary, was the director of this office at the time and also assisted in
drafting the final text.

Also included is a short study done by the National Christian Council of Japan
which was translated by Robert Northup and Kyoji Buma. Rev. Northup is
currently the Director of the Japan and Hong Kong office of the Division of
Overseas Ministries for the National Council.

Should you not be familiar with the office within the Southern Baptist
Convention that deals with cults, it would be useful for you to be in touch
with them. They have done considerable work on the Unification Church and
other communities of this sort. The address is:

Dr. Maurice Smith, Director
Department of Interfaith Witness
Home Mission Board, Southern Baptist Convention
1350 Spring Street, N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30367

We hope the enclosed study will serve a constructive purpose. To help cover
the cost of printing and postage, our office would appreciate a $2.00
contribution towards that expense.

Most sincerely,

Brother Jeffrey Gros, F.S.C.

JG:bh

Appendix B.

CONTEXTUALIZATION AS INCARNATION

Robert M. Price

I have long been fascinated with missiological and theological debates over "contextualization" or "indigenization" because they seemed especially likely to illuminate the long-obscure "black box" of Christian origins. When theologians hold out for the right of Third World Christians to articulate their faith in their own experiential and conceptual terms,[1] they are at least implicitly acknowledging that the earliest Christianity had undergone much the same process. This is the secret subtext of the debate, and the reason for the surprising vehemence[2] of the discussions. The various syncretistic movements born on the mission fields of Africa, Latin America and Asia, e.g., the Aladura churches of Africa,[3] are unwitting pawns in a proxy war over volatile issues of demythologizing, remythologizing, and propositional revelation. The amount of liberty to be accorded to the indigenous churches is in direct proportion to that one believes the earliest churches to have exercised. This becomes clear in the unease provoked by Daniel von Allmen's article, "The Birth of Theology: Contextualization as the dynamic element in the formation of New Testament theology."[4] This ground-breaking essay is precisely parallel to Ernst Käsemann's famous 1951 lecture, "Begründet der neutestamentliche Kanon die Einheit der Kirche?" ("Is the New Testament Canon the Basis for the Unity of the Church?").[5]

Käsemann, requested by the World Council of Churches to conjure from the Aladdin's Lamp of "Biblical Theology" a theological platform for ecumenical unity, found instead that it was the New Testament canon itself that

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was the root of the problem. It was the problem not the solution, the apple of discord rather than the olive branch, the sword not the ploughshare. For within its canonical boundaries could be found a genuine precedent to which any sectarian faction could and did appeal against its rivals. Käsemann painted a scenario in which the New Testament canon was not unlike the Jerusalem Temple in the last days before the capitulation to Titus: a holy precinct occupied by warring messianic militias. No wonder the churches could not settle their differences by appealing to the New Testament! It was trying to put out the fire with gasoline!

In the same way, Von Allmen looked through the "wrong" end of the telescope, using the tumultuous mutation of Christianity in the modern day as a lens through which to sharpen our focus on earliest Christianity.[6] Rudolph Bultmann had already, in agreement with *Religionsgeschichtlicheschule* (History of Religions School) scholars Wilhelm Bousset and Richard Reitzenstein, taken for granted the variegated cosmopolitan syncretism of the Hellenistic world as the hot house in which the gospel seed had sprouted into a luxuriant jungle of exotic hybrids combing the myths of Gnosticism, Jewish Apocalyptic and the Mystery Cults. What Von Allmen did was to show how the same process was repeating itself today as the gospel seed takes root in all manner of far-flung cultures with their inherited religious backgrounds. If the earliest missionaries in New Testament times had contextualized the gospel, remythologized it in the fantastic trappings of their own cultures' myths, why complain if modern mission churches do the same thing, reinventing Christianity as the Hellenistic apostles did? In one bold stroke, Von Allmen was both claiming the Christianity of the New Testament, with its evolving, creative character, as a precedent legitimizing parallel indigenization today;[7] and implicitly invoking the principle of historical analogy to show that present-day tendencies to syncretism in the mission churches corroborate the *Religionsgeschichtlicheschule* picture of (syncretistic) Christian origins.

Conservative churchmen, shocked by syncretistic trends in the churches their missionaries spilled sanctified sweat and blood to establish, find themselves in the position of any parent faced with the unpleasant reality that junior suddenly has his own opinions and that they do not match his parents'. Instead, those opinions seem (to the parents) unduly influenced by the young person's peers and by current fads and fashions. What is the parent to do? To preempt the child's choices is to stymie his maturity. To force the child to do what the parent thinks is right—is wrong! Even if you win the particular battle, you lose the war. Either the child, frustrated, will rebel against the parent's authority altogether, or, worse yet, he will meekly acquiesce and never develop mature autonomy. So with the churches. They fear to see the younger, syncretistic movements compromising the faith once and for all delivered to the saints, but should they impose a stifling theological legalism? Which is

more to be feared: heretical mutation or orthodox suffocation?

Perhaps parents are so defensive, so over-protective, because they are defending themselves, their own past, more than their children's future. That is, if they agree the younger generation of churches may be entitled to find their own way to a new expression of the gospel, even to a new gospel, will the implication not be that the older generation had made an idol of what had only temporary and local, not universal, significance? If we allow that Obeah metaphysics and ancestor worship may be a legitimate context for remythologizing the gospel, doesn't that mean that traditional Nicene Christianity was no more than a historically relative, hence dispensable, clothing for the gospel, rather than the essence of the gospel itself? Richard J. Coleman puts it:

> The heart of the matter can be expressed, "Does God reveal himself in concepts and propositions which are direct and objective?" Or from a different perspective the central issue might be worded, "Can man formulate statements about God and his nature that are valid for everyone in all places and times?" The evangelical answers an emphatic "yes" to both questions, the liberal an emphatic "no." Both questions are irretrievably bound to the issue of historical relativity.[8]

The issue is that of "propositional revelation." The traditional conservative and the liberal modernist are both saying that revelation comes in time-bound forms, but the liberal is willing to put major theological concepts into this category, while the conservative limits the time-bound character only to the specific wording of the biblical text. Do the concepts (e.g., Jesus' Sonship) lie on this or that side of the great divide between the temporal and the eternal?[9] Are concepts the revelation, or only the time-bound forms of revelation? If the latter, we are saying revelation is non-propositional. Clark H. Pinnock, whom I would judge the only Evangelical theologian now worth reading, puts the matter clearly: "Are theological propositions merely mundane objectifying representations, ideas from within the rim of human genius, set forth in response to an ecstatic revelation experience?"[10] His answer is equally clear: "Revelation... is essentially propositional in nature,"[11] i.e., a revelation of normative, divinely provided "didactic thought models."[12]

Another way of putting the central issue in this debate over contextualization and what it implies about the relativism of Christianity *per se* is the difference between Paul Tillich and Karl Barth, on the left and right extremes of the Neo-Orthodox spectrum, respectively.[13] Tillich employed the "method of correlation" between gospel and culture, admitting that the blanks which the gospel must fill are redrawn by the needs and questions of every age. Barth, on the other hand, insisted that the questions of an unregenerate humanity are worthless and can only provide a Procrustean Bed to truncate the gospel, as Liberalism had always done. No, Barth said, we cannot even see

what the right questions are until the gospel force-feeds us the answers! Applied to the missionary issue of syncretism, this conservative position fears the gospel will be gambled away in any hybrid fusion with "indigenous" alien mythemes. But from the Tillichian standpoint, where there cannot be said to be any revelation at all if no one receives it, like a tree falling in a forest with no one there to hear it, the gospel will become a dead fetish, a museum relic, unless it is indigenized, contextualized ever anew.

The two alternatives might be compared to two images drawn from other religions.[14] If we insist that the major doctrines and mythemes (e.g., of a transaction between God and Satan to redeem humanity, or a courtroom scene at the end of the world) must be maintained, at most only conveyed by new analogies (as in the missionary book *Peace Child*), then we are saying something very much like the Islamic claim that the Qur'an exists only in Arabic. If translated into any other language, even in the best translation possible, it no longer counts as the word of God. There is more than a mere analogy between linguistic translation and cross-cultural re-description.[15] We may take two examples from the theological reconceptualization entailed in translating the Hebrew Tanakh into the Greek Septuagint. As Hans-Joachim Schoeps[16] shows, the Hebrew word *Torah* tempers the implication of "law" with that of "instruction." Viewing it as a sort of "instruction manual," Jews regard the Torah as a gift of grace, hardly as a burden, as anyone will readily understand who has faced the prospect of installing a new computer without benefit of a manual! One bemoans such "freedom from the law"! But then you find there is after all a set of instructions, but it becomes clear that they have been poorly rendered into your language by someone not adept in it! Even so, when the "instruction manual" of the Torah was translated into another language, the very word "Torah" suffered damage in the shipping! It emerged as the Greek *nomos*, which denoted something more like "law" in the sense of an inflexible and punitive traffic code. For Moses to present "the Law" to the people of Israel would be like reading them the riot act! And that's pretty much what Luther thought Moses was doing!

Similarly, Hebrews 10:5-10 cites Psalm 40:6-8 to expound the idea that the heavenly Christ assumed a body of flesh to offer it as a sacrifice. While such a notion of an incarnation of a god was quite familiar in the Hellenistic world, it represented a radical departure in terms of biblical theological categories. And the Psalm quote abets the incarnational understanding only once it, too, has been reincarnated into a Greek form. For the original text was a simple declaration by a worshipper that he stands ready to heed the command of God that he report to the temple to bear witness to answered prayer. It is this which is prescribed for him in the sacred Torah scroll. But the Septuagint has changed the line "Ears thou hast dug for me," i.e., you have given me an attentive ear, into "a body thou hast prepared for me," an interesting sugges-

tion of Apollinarian incarnationism (the Logos took on little more than a human body, not a complete human persona). The Hellenistic religious conceptuality is introduced and facilitated by means of the translation of the Hebrew text into the Greek language.

And this is what Islamic theologians are afraid of. The Word of God may possibly be more a matter of concepts than of individual words, but the concepts are built from certain Arabic words, and they will not survive unscathed in the words of any other language. Buddhists have the same problem trying to identify what it is that is transmitted in the process of reincarnation. There is no *atman*, no unchangeable soul, and yet there is some continuity despite the changing of physical form. Is it the other four *skhandas* (aggregates) of the ego-self that pass on, the same deck of cards but reshuffled? How much change can occur before we are no longer talking about a constant object beneath the changes? And this brings us to our opposite alternative for understanding theological contextualization. Rather than the Word of God staying put in its original language lest it mutate into something else, we might envision contextualization akin to the Buddhist analogy of soulless reincarnation as each candle lighting the next in the series. Such a "passing of the torch" would be replication of a kind, to be sure, but *what* kind?

The issue here is the same debated by Arians and Athanasians: would the newly recontextualized gospel be *homoousias* (of the same nature) with the original or only *homoiousias* (of like nature) with it? If the latter, Paul would be rather upset: "not that there is another gospel, but there are some who... want to pervert the gospel of Christ. But even if we or an angel from heaven should preach to you another gospel contrary to that which we preached to you, let him be damned!" (Gal 1:7-8).

James D.G. Dunn, in his *Unity and Diversity in the New Testament*, deals with much the same issues that are central to Daniel von Allmen's essay, namely the degree to which the contextualizing of the gospel already in the New Testament represents several layers of substantial reformulation. Dunn asks if it is possible to distill a core of essential gospel behind the variety of forms it has taken in the New Testament documents. The results are meager: all the New Testament writers presuppose that salvation has something to do with Jesus the man who died but was exalted. The implication is strangely like, yet also unlike, that arrived at by Harnack. Is there a basic gospel kernel which can be isolated from the husk? It depends whether this analogy is meant to be closer to the analogy of a pearl inside an oyster or to the DNA in a cell. (Here again, please note, the concept itself changes with the terms used to express it!). The pearl may be removed from the oyster and placed in another casing without any loss. But one cannot strip the DNA from a cell. The DNA is a component of a cell. It is nothing by itself, any more than your picture tube would be worth anything without the rest of the TV set. Harnack saw

the gospel of the higher righteousness and the infinite value of the individual soul as a pearl which had been and always would be transferred from casing to casing. Dunn saw the gospel essence as more like DNA, dependent for existence equally on whatever cell matter surrounded it. Dunn would see the gospel as a soul that can be passed on only by reincarnation in a new body— "For we know that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. Here indeed we groan, and long to put on our heavenly dwelling, so that putting it on we may not be found naked." (2 Cor 5:1-3) By contrast, Harnack would see the gospel as a body that can be transferred from place to place by any type of vehicle, an ox-cart, airplane, space ship, gondola, or automobile. Harnack's gospel-kernel is both necessary and sufficient unto itself, while Dunn's is necessary but not sufficient: it must always be incarnated.

To borrow yet another set of early theological terms, we might say that the Dunn/Von Allmen version of the gospel is strictly enhypostatic. It attains hypostatic instantiation for the first time only in combination with some incarnate form. Historically, the incarnate humanity of Jesus was said to be enhypostatic, receiving its personhood, as distinct from its real human quality, from its divine side (Leontius of Byzantium). If not for the project of the incarnation, there would have been no human Jesus. Piet Schoonberg[17] suggested a reversal of the ancient schema, so that the Logos would be understood as *anhypostatic*[18] (without personhood of its own) until it became *enhypostatic* in its union with the human person Jesus of Nazareth. It is Schoonenberg's version that would be parallel to the "reincarnation" of the gospel in new cultural-philosophical contexts.

I have already remarked on the similarity of Von Allmen's understanding of the remythologizing of the New Testament gospel and Rudolf Bultmann's. The similarity still holds. Here I think of the remark of Bultmann to the effect that, while we know very little about the historical Jesus, all we need to affirm is the fact that there was one. We need to affirm the *das* not the *was* of the Incarnation. The *that*, not the *what*. The fact, not the content. Bultmann's disciples threw off his yoke to embark on a "New Quest of the Historical Jesus" (Fuchs, Ebeling, Bornkamm, Käsemann, Robinson, etc.). They feared becoming Docetists, emptying the ostensible "incarnation" of any genuine human historicity. Bultmann feared such an endeavor, whether it met with any plausible success or not, would lead to a new liberal Protestant hero-worship of Jesus rather than acceptance of the (more abstract) Christ of faith.

Another disciple of Bultmann, Walter Schmithals, did the opposite. As I read him,[19] Schmithals overtakes Bultmann and passes him on the way (John 20:3-10). Schmithals argued that the concept of an authoritative itinerant apostle of Christ was not inherited by Christianity from its Jewish

ancestry but rather borrowed from Syrian Gnostics whose apostles did not bear the tidings of a recently incarnated Savior, now returned to heaven. Instead, they preached the inner indwelling of a Christ spirit who had become incarnate in all Gnostics, paramountly in the Gnostic apostle himself who was fully cognizant of the indwelling of the Christ-*Aion* in him and sought to awaken his hearers to the mystery of "Christ in you, the hope of glory." (Col 1:27) Thus "when it pleased God to reveal his Son in me," the Galatians received Paul "as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus." (Gal 4:14) We see the fuller implications of this in the Apocryphal Acts of Paul, John, Andrew, Peter and Thomas. These Acts are docetic, and all of them sooner or later feature a scene in which Christ himself appears in the likeness of the apostle. In accord with Schmithals's theory, these Acts attest the earlier ministry of Gnostic apostles who first preached an exclusively interior Spirit-Christ with which one was anointed unto salvation and enlightenment. This Christ was not and had never been a single physical individual. Rather, each and every Gnostic might and did incarnate him. I believe that if we broaden out Von Allmen's picture of early Christian theological diversity, evolution and adaptation by adding Schmithals's sketch of the Gnostic apostles to the mix, we will be able to make sense of even more of the phenomena of syncretism and indigenization.

Schmithals's notion of Gnostic apostles of a Christ within is exactly analogous to the shocking Zen Buddhist saying, "If you chance to meet the Buddha on the road—*kill* him!" Because the real Buddha is inside you. Mahayana Buddhism (of which Zen is a subtype) is docetic. The incarnation of the Buddha was a mere appearance. It follows that both Buddhism and Bultmannism, alike docetic, have embraced the same model of missionary expansion via remythologization (reincarnation). Buddhism and Bultmannism seem to me exactly parallel in that each recognizes a particular self-understanding or understanding of human existence as its gospel. All else is negotiable and inessential. Any cosmological or even theological assumptions will do. Since in neither case does salvation/liberation/authenticity depend upon a particular God-belief or God-concept (that would be to reduce the existential encounter with grace to the mastery of a theological theory, hence a scheme of self-salvation by cognitive works), any can be tolerated. The belief in miracles was equally tangential in both Buddhism and Bultmannism. If one prefers theologians less radical than Bultmann, suffice it to note that moderate Reformed and Evangelical theologians like Jack Rogers and G. C. Berkouwer share with Bultmann the basic notion that the abiding and only infallible aspect of the New Testament is its core-proclamation of salvation.

In a recent piece of contextualizing theology, Hee-Sung Keel's "Jesus the Bodhisattva: Christology from a Buddhist Perspective,"[20] the writer adopts "the theological method of Claude Geffre, who regards the history of theol-

ogy as a series of incarnations of the Word."[21] Indeed, we have found it dif-
ficult to avoid incarnational analogies. Geffre's insight is crucial and, when
combined with Bengt Sundkler's striking notion of the messianic and prophet-
ic founders of Third World indigenous churches as being living "icons" of
Christ,[22] it can be extended even further, enabling us, I think, to solve a very
important problem.

　　　Euro-American Protestant and Catholic theologians get mild indigestion
hearing of certain social, sexual and family-structure adaptations taking place
in the younger churches. A serious upset stomach begins to churn at attempts
to mix traditional Christianity with, e.g., reincarnation or ancestor-veneration.
But the migraines start in earnest when leadership emerges in the form of
charismatic individuals shouldering the capacious mantel of prophet, apostle,
or even messiah. Such indigenous church leaders in past eras have included the
Apostle Mani, the Prophet Joseph Smith, and Hong Xiuquan, the Brother of
Jesus and Taiping Messiah.[23] Contemporaries include Simon Kimbangu, Andre
"Jesus" Matswa, Simon Peter Mpade, the Prophet Harris and the Reverend Sun
Myung Moon. In the cases of individuals like these, conservatives are quick
to hurl accusations of "antichrist" and "false prophet," just as Martin Luther
vilified the Pope as a usurper of the centrality of Christ. But even liberal,
"mainline" churches are minded to rend their garments in outrage and shock
when they hear such claims and suddenly discover that the word heresy, long
since relegated to the ecclesiastical mothballs, may have some continued util-
ity after all! Even secular taxonomists of religion may feel compelled to place
such a movement in a new classification simply because another figure is
threatening to eclipse Jesus. In this case no value judgment lies at the basis of
the judgment, only taxonomic fastidiousness. If Christianity is defined over
against its fellow Semitic monotheisms by virtue of its Christocentricity, any
shift of the center of gravity should destabilize the Christian identity of a move-
ment. In the 1950s the Universalist Church in America adopted as its corpo-
rate logo a design featuring a circle with a cross off center, a bit to the left,
indicating that Universalism acknowledges its Christian roots but was in the
process of transcending them, moving beyond them. But it hadn't yet reached
any new center. Their off-center cross might stand for all these indigenous
younger churches which seem to be evolving beyond their Christian roots but
have not yet arrived anywhere else. It would not be fair to brand them non-
Christian (or "post-Christian" as does Oosthuizen[24]) since that is to jump the
gun and to anticipate a stage not yet reached—and which may never be
reached. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has not yet moved
far enough away from Christocentricity as to be merit being called The Church
of Joseph Smith of Latter Day Saints. It is still quite clearly a Christian move-
ment, though it may be farther removed from the ideal type of Christocentric
Christianity. And so with the Unification Church.

If the old Universalist symbol of an off-center cross would be an apt visual icon for such Christian movements with a new prophet, apostle or messiah, is there any way of making sense of this "off-center" character in terms of Christian theological categories? That is, can we explain it in terms which will leave its Christian identity intact, that will make sense of the rising importance of the new guru intelligible *as a Christian development* and not just as a development, implicitly, away from Christianity to something else? Yes, there is. This is where we may find it useful to synthesize the approaches of Geffre and Sundkler. Suppose that, à la Geffre, each new advance of the Christian gospel into a new cultural system is best understood as a new incarnation of the gospel Word. What new light would this throw on Sundkler's suggestion that charismatic apostles and messiahs in these movements be understood not as rivals of Christ, hence as Antichrists, but rather vicars or icons of Christ, symbols that point beyond themselves, as Jesus himself did, pointing on to his Father, claiming for himself the status of the way, not of the destination?

I think the result would be to recognize each such charismatic icon of Christ as, to paraphrase Ritschl, "having the value of Christ for them." Each one might be understood as an appropriate extension of the incarnation into the new cultural framework. Each instance would be a new "scandal of particularity" in order that the members of each culture might recognize in Christ, "This at last is flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone!" In fact it almost begins to look as if anything short of such radical incarnational contextualism should count as a kind of docetism, since it would impose a barrier between the "incarnate Christ" who is said to have become "at all points as we are yet without sin," but who really remains a stranger to the cultural distinctives that define us. À la Schmithals's Gnostic Christ, the incarnation would not really have been fulfilled until the proclaimed Christ took on the human flesh of the apostolic proclaimer.

This means that even from the standpoint of a Christian in a more traditional Christian community, someone like the Reverend Moon, self-proclaimed Lord of the Second Advent, could be acknowledged as a true extension of the incarnation of the Word in Christ. And, at least in the case of this movement, such a construal is remarkably close to the movement's own theological self-understanding according to which the Reverend Moon has assumed the continued function of Christ, bearing the mantel of Jesus as Elisha did that of Elijah.[25]

Notes

1. A. G. Hogg, *Karma and Reincarnation: An Essay Toward the Interpretation of Hinduism and the Re-Statement of Christianity* (Madras: Christian Literature Society, 1909, rpt. 1970); Robin H. S. Boyd, *India and the Latin Captivity of the*

Church: The Cultural Context of the Gospel, Monograph Supplements to the Scottish Journal of Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); John S. Mbiti, *New Testament Eschatology in an African Background: A Study of the Encounter between New Testament Theology and African Traditional Concepts* (London: SPCK, 1971); Robert J. Schreiter, *Constructing Local Theologies* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1986).

2.   G. C. Oosthuizen, *Post-Christianity in Africa: A Theological and Anthropological Study* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968).

3.   G. C. Oosthuizen and Irving Hexham, eds. *Empirical Studies of African Independent/Indigenous Churches* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992); Gordon MacKay Haliburton, *The Prophet Harris: A study of an African prophet and his mass-movement in the Ivory Coast and the Gold Coast 1913-1915* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Marie-Louise Martin, *Kimbangu: An African Prophet and his Church*, trans. D.M. Moore (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976); Bengt G.M. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa* (London: International African Institute, 1961); Bennetta Jules-Rosette, *African Apostles: Ritual and Conversion in the Church of John Maranke*, Symbol, Myth, and Ritual, Victor Turner, series ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975).

4.   *International Review of Mission* 64/253 (January 1975), pp. 37-52.

5.   Available as "The Canon of the New Testament and the Unity of the Church" in *Essays on New Testament Themes*, trans. W.J. Montague, Studies in Biblical Theology 41 (London: SCM, 1964), pp. 95-107.

6.   John G. Gager, *Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity*, Prentice-Hall Studies in Religion Series, John P. Reeder, Jr. and John F. Wilson, series eds. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975) performs a similar maneuver, using the lens of recent studies of Millenarian and Revitalization Movements to reexamine early Christianity. Bengt Holmberg, *Sociology and the New Testament: An Appraisal* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), p. 80, and Jonathan Z. Smith, "Too Much Kingdom, Too Little Community," *Zygon* 13 (1978), pp. 123-130, seem to me to miss the important point when they object that Gager's comparative model is ultimately drawn from Christian-influenced cargo cults, ghost dances and boxer rebellions and that Gager thus winds up comparing Christianity to Christianity, not to a non-Christian "control group." So what? Gager might describe what he is doing a bit differently, but the validity of his experiment is by no means affected by this lack of clarity. To raise the question of Christian influence is merely to inject the confusion of the genetic fallacy. Christianity has taken many different social forms. Gager's is an attempt to compare the vestiges of our knowledge of early Christianity with the lineaments of a distinctive type of Christian movement with the goal of seeing how well the two match. A close match might indicate that in these Revitalization sects the Christian DNA had bred true, that they are an atavistic throwback, as the birth of a man who looked rather apish might help corroborate our surmises about our anthropoid forbears. Daniel von Allmen's comparison of hypothesized ancient Christianity with modern Aladura Churches is similarly

apt and similarly revealing. In fact, Von Allmen's and Gager's studies would tend to strengthen each other.

7. Alfred Loisy pursued much the same program, e.g., in his *The Gospel and the Church*, trans. Christopher Home (1903, rpt. 1912, 1976), his rebuttal to the Liberal Protestant Adolph von Harnack. Harnack maintained that one ought to strip away the temporary, culturally relative "husk" of Apocalyptic Judaism to find the abiding kernel of Jesus' message: the higher righteousness and the infinite value of the human soul. All the rest was dead wood, superfluous husk. Loisy, on the contrary, maintained that what Harnack took for the kernel was instead a seed, something destined for growth and containing potent germs of future, very different things, including all the oak-like growth of the Catholic and Orthodox churches (whose liturgies and vestments Harnack had dismissed as superstitious mummery). Loisy had more of a traditional Catholic appreciation for the heritage of the church, but he was also much more radical, as a New Testament critic, than Harnack. His historical Jesus was much more like Albert Schweitzer's benign Charles Manson than Harnack's pious Leo Buscaglia. Loisy saw that to canonize theological evolution, instead of drawing some canonical line somewhere, about some particular set of non-negotiable doctrines and stories, was to make possible Catholic Modernism. One need not embrace the liberal biblicism of the Modernist Protestants, the latest in a historic series of Protestant "back to the Bible" movements. One might instead freely admit that the truth is a growing organism and look forward to new developments. Von Allmen is much like Loisy in this respect.

8. Richard J. Coleman, *Issues of Theological Warfare: Evangelicals and Liberals* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), p. 87.

9. Cf. Bernard Ramm, "The Continental Divide in Contemporary Theology," *Christianity Today*, October 8, 1965, rpt. in Frank E. Gaebelein, ed., *Christianity Today* (New York: Pyramid, 1968), pp. 57-72.

10. Clark H. Pinnock, *Biblical Revelation: The Foundation of Christian Theology* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1976), p. 110.

11. *Ibid.*, 66.

12. Clark H. Pinnock, "An Evangelical Theology: Conservative and Contemporary," *Christianity Today*, January 1979, p. 24.

13. What makes Tillich theologically left-wing Neo-Orthodox rather than just plain liberal? First, his concern to interpret biblical mythology rather than stripping it off (siding with Bultmann against Harnack and Kant). Second, his agenda to "save the appearances" of the whole Christian creed instead of "jettisoning" (Bishop Pike) troublesome articles of faith completely, as David Griffin, A *Process Christology* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973; rpt. New York: University Press of America, 1990), p. 12, admits he does with the resurrection which winds up being pretty vestigial in his system. Third, his belief in an encounter with the Truth from outside the human situation, in contrast to "Christ of Culture" liberals who understand revelation simply to "re-present" the best views and insights of human nature and culture (e.g., Schubert M. Ogden, *The Reality of God*; David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for*

Order; Fritz Buri, *Can We Still Speak Responsibly of God?*).

14. I believe that in an attempted exercise in cross-cultural, multi-religious theology, the form, the method, must reflect the content. That is, it will be inauthentic to proceed in a manner drawn deductively from Christian premises and then impose the results on the data of diverse religious phenomena. Religious pluralism and inductivity must be woven into our method along the way. Thus, recognizing that the various religions have produced a whole range of answers to a whole range of problems that all of them face, we will be fools to keep our parochial blinders on till we reach the end of our deliberations, just as no scholar would begin his or her research into a major topic without first examining the research and thinking of others on the same topic.

15. I borrow the term from David M. Kelsey, *The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).

16. Hans-Joachim Schoeps, *Paul: The Theology of the Apostle in the Light of Jewish Religious History* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), p. 29.

17. Piet Schoonberg, *The Christ*, trans. Della Couling (New York: Seabury Press, 1971), pp. 85, 87.

18. The term goes back to Cyril of Alexandria who, however, applied it to the human nature of Jesus, not to his Logos-nature.

19. Walter Schmithals, *The Office of Apostle in the Early Church*, trans. John E. Steely (New York: Abingdon, 1969).

20. Hee-Sung Keel, "Jesus the Bodhisattva: Christology from a Buddhist Perspective," *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 16 (1966), pp. 169-185.

21. Claude Geffre, *Le Christianisme au risque de l'interpretation* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1983).

22. Bengt Sundkler, *Zulu Zion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 193, cited in Jack Thompson, "Beyond Heterodoxy: Orthosynthesis and the African Independent Churches," *IRF: A Newsletter of the International Religious Foundation* 2/5 (Sept.-Oct. 1987), p. 14.

23. Jonathan D. Spence, *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (New York: Norton, 1996); Vittorio Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults,* trans. Lisa Sergio (New York: Mentor Books, 1965).

24. Oosthuizen, *Post-Christianity in Africa.*

25. This pattern also has the benefit of paralleling naturally the relevant anthropological categories. See Scott D. Hill, "The Local Hero in Palestine in Comparative Perspective" in Robert B. Coote, ed., *Elijah and Elisha in Socioliterary Perspective*, Society of Biblical Literature Semeia Studies, Edward L. Greenstein, ed. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), pp. 37-74, in which we read of an age-long series of local prophets and miracle-workers whose shadow is cast so long that forever afterward new charismatic individuals of the same type are perceived as the return or reincarnation of their predecessors, just as some perceived Jesus as the return of Elijah or of John the Baptist, or John the Baptist as the returned Elijah.

UNDERSTANDING THE WORD
AS THE PROCESS OF EMBODIMENT

....

Keisuke Noda

W hat do we mean when we say we understand the Word? Do we mean that we have a conceptual grasp of an idea? Do we mean something more? When Reverend Moon speaks of understanding the Word, he often means it in the sense of embodiment: "Don't understand God's words only with your head, but know them in your heart and perceive them through your body."[1] We can find numerous phrases of this kind in Reverend Moon's speeches. In *Exposition of the Divine Principle,* a perfected human being is described as the "incarnation of the Word."[2]

In the Korean text of *Exposition of the Divine Principle,* the term *chae-hyul* is used in the context of understanding the Word.[3] Though usually translated by the English word "experience," *chae-hyul* means both embodied experience and understanding at the same time. This term is one of several words common to Far Eastern cultures, often translated "experience," which have the connotation of knowing through embodiment.[4] *Chae-hyul* consists of two Chinese characters. The first character means "body" and the second, "salvation." The second character consists of two parts, "mind" and "blood." Understanding the Word thus means bodily experience, and it is the salvation of the body—salvation involving both the blood and the spirit. Although I will not further pursue a speculative etymology of the term, it is quite interesting

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to note its construction. The inseparability of understanding and embodied experience, which is exemplified in the meaning of *chae-hyul*, is a central theme of this essay. Through expository analysis, we will clarify the meaning of understanding as the process of embodying knowledge. This clarification can, I believe, elucidate what we mean by "understand" when we say we understand the Word.

1. Understanding: Conceptual and Embodied

Understanding the Word is supposed to be a liberating power which can free one from inauthentic human nature, characterized by bondage to bodily desires. However, as long as understanding the Word remains only conceptual, one's reality is left untouched. There is a great difference between what I understand conceptually versus what I *am* and how I *am*. In discussing religious or ethical knowledge, the gap between knowing and being is a serious problem.

Let's discuss what it means to understand something from the perspective of the involvement of the self. There is a mode of understanding in which one is detached from what one tries to understand. One stands in the position of a neutral observer and tries to see the subject matter without involvement of the self. A typical example of this mode of understanding is found in science. In science, it is entirely irrelevant who you are, what you are or how you are. All that matters is the phenomena under observation, which one understands as independent things. The act of understanding means to stand as a bystander and grasp knowledge as pieces of information.

There is another mode of understanding in which one cannot separate oneself from what one tries to understand. One's mode of being—namely what one is, how one is and who one is—is essential to what one understands. Religious or ethical knowledge is of this kind. What one can see and understand is limited, depending upon the kind of person one is. Everyone has a horizon which determines the range and scope of what he or she can know. A person's mode of being determines his horizon and the limit of his knowledge. The essential feature of this kind of knowledge is the involvement of the self.

When we speak about understanding in the latter sense, we always speak about its degrees. There are unending degrees in understanding. For example, the simple phrase "true love" means drastically different things to different people, depending upon the person's experience of love and ability to love. Understanding here is inseparable from being. Vital religious or ethical knowledge is more a matter of *being* rather than a matter of *having*. Properly speaking, one is enlightened to the knowledge.

The contrast between these two modes of understanding, that is, understanding as a neutral observer standing apart from what one understands, and

understanding as a mode of being where one is essentially involved in what one understands, is roughly parallel to another distinction: conceptual understanding and embodied understanding. It can be argued that one cannot draw a strict dichotomy between these two modes, as every act of understanding involves both conceptualization and embodiment to a varying degree. Nevertheless, some types of understanding, notably of scientific knowledge, are entirely in the conceptual mode, while other kinds of understanding, notably of religious and ethical knowledge, necessarily involve embodiment. Science and religion typify these two modes of understanding in their purest form. *Exposition of the Divine Principle* explains the contrasting modes of knowing in science and religion in terms of truth, i.e., "internal truth" and "external truth."[5] This essay can be seen as an attempt to highlight this contrast in relation to the phenomena of understanding.

The strength of conceptual understanding is its clarity. It pursues clear definitions and logical relationships among ideas. It establishes an independent body of knowledge accessible to all. Everyone can reach this understanding without much concern about who one is or how one is. Many Western philosophers, inspired by the advancement of modern science, formulated its spirit into philosophy. They saw the task of philosophy in bringing the clarity of mathematics and science to all realms of human knowledge. Thus mathematics and science have played a key role in the development of Western philosophy. Plato, Descartes and Kant are a few major figures who constructed their philosophies by taking these disciplines as models. In the 20th century, both Logical Positivism and Analytic Philosophy have held logic, mathematics and modern sciences in high esteem, setting them up as the ideal standard for all knowing.

However, one cannot pursue religious knowledge in the same way as one pursues scientific knowledge. If one pursues mathematical and scientific clarity when seeking for religious or ethical knowledge, one cannot gain a fruitful result. The heart of the matter is, as I stated above, the involvement of the self. One's mode of being can open up or close off one's access to knowledge. To clarify this point, I want to discuss the relevancy of the self to knowledge and the self as the doorway to knowledge. Following that discussion, I will clarify the meaning of knowledge as embodiment.

2. The Self and Access to Knowledge

a. Heart as the Primordial Essence of the Human Being

Human beings do not exist in the same way as material things exist. For humans, how and why one exists is always an issue. The sense of being is

always the center of concern. It was Heidegger who clarified this interpretive mode of being in human beings. Each one of us always understands the sense of one's existence in a particular manner. Why do human beings exist with the essential concern for one's own being? Certainly *to be* (being or to be alive) or *not to be* (non-being or death) lies at the heart of concern for human beings. Heidegger's analysis is interesting and has its merit. However, a detailed discussion of Heidegger's sense of being would entail treating the issue of temporality (death), and therefore lies beyond the scope of this essay.

In Unification Thought, the Theory of Original Human Nature explicates the essential trait of human existence as heart. Heart is not the kind of property one can have or lose. It is not a thing one can hold or lose as one does with a possession. Defined as "the emotional impulse to obtain joy through love,"[6] heart is the primordial basis of all conscious and unconscious activities. Heart is the basis of care and concern. People have the tendency to be either careful or careless about themselves, other people, and things because the human being is a Being of Heart. Heart constantly radiates its concern as the sun radiates light. When looking over the land, the area one can see and the limit of its horizon are determined by the area illuminated by light from the sun. Likewise, the world one can experience and the limit of one's horizon are limited by the extent of caring and concern flowing from one's heart. In other words, one's world is determined by the quality of one's love. Our world is bounded by the limit of love and heart.

Among the things with which human beings are concerned, one's own being is the fundamental issue. Whether one is (being or life) or is not (non-being or death) is always an issue. At the center of concern is *how* one is and *what* one is. One's being can become meaningful or meaningless depending upon the way one relates to oneself. At the root of this self-relation is the heart. It is the first primordial essence of the human being.

In everyday life, we talk about being human or inhuman. To be human designates, in essence, one's capacity of heart or quality of love. Since heart is the essence of one's character, being human is ascribed to a person whose heart is abundantly flowing. A person is said to be inhuman if his flow of heart is somehow disturbed and hence he cannot relate to the self and to others.

b. Authenticity and Inauthenticity

In speaking about any trait of human beings, we always encounter the crucial distinction between what is authentic and inauthentic, original and non-original, true and false. We cannot talk about love, for example, without making qualifications, distinguishing between authentic love and inauthentic love, original love and non-original love, true love and false love. Although every human being has the innate capacity of heart to give caring love, the heart's growth to maturity can be disturbed and perverted. Perverted love can

appear as excessive possessiveness toward or obsession about a particular person or thing. It can also appear as an extreme lack of concern and incapacity to receive love.

Much religious and ethical knowledge concerning human conduct appears in the form of commandments. This knowledge has a prescriptive dimension. Its prescriptions operate in the gap between how one ought to be and how one in fact is. Furthermore, the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity applies to all aspects of human life because of this pervasive and deep gap between how one ought to be and how one is. In the individual, this gap appears as the conflict between the normative prescriptions which religious and ethical knowledge provide and one's bodily desires which try to fulfill their own goal while disregarding these normative commandments. In this sense, as it is often said, man is half divine and half beast. In the midst of this inner conflict, a human being has the capacity to understand the normative dimension of life and to try to regulate himself according to it.

In Unification Thought, the Theory of Original Human Nature explains that the human being is a Being of Logos, which includes both norm and the rational expression of freedom within the norm.[7] This is the second primordial essence of the human being. From Plato onward, the conflict between the normative prescriptive dimension of being and the factual reality of being (which is often driven by excessive bodily desires) has been the underlying problem of moral philosophy. On one side, there is a cluster of terms such as mind, spirit, reason and soul, and on the other side, terms such as body, flesh and appetites. Although the sense of each term is slightly different due to its varied historical and philosophical contexts, taken together these terms can be seen as describing the two factors which constitute human beings. Unification Thought's Theory of Original Human Nature explicates the human being as a United Body of *sungsang* (internal nature) and *hyungsang* (external form). All kinds of mental, spiritual, conscious and unconscious activities belong to the former, and all kinds of bodily manifestations such as the physical desires belong to the latter.

Simply speaking, a human being is seen as the unity of the spiritual and the physical. The problem particular to humans is disunity, disharmony, conflict, and struggle between the two. One of the essential tasks of religious and ethical knowledge is to bring these conflicting elements into unity and harmony. Everyone desires to be good, but everyone cannot be truly good so easily. It is a fundamental fact that there is a huge discrepancy or conflict between what one truly wants to be and what one in fact is. On the spiritual or rational side, one understands, and even desires, to be what one "ought" to be. On the physical side, one is often driven or controlled by physical desires. The question of authenticity and inauthenticity can be seen, in the present context, as the question of unity or disunity between the spiritual and the physical, or the mind and the body.

c. The Reign of Good

Whether or not human beings desire to be good is a perennial question. Such moral concepts as good, just, and right lose their power and effectiveness unless one presupposes the fundamental propensity of human beings for goodness. If human beings did not have a fundamental orientation for good, moral teachings and religious doctrines would have no practical effect. However, it is a primordial fact that every human being always tries to be good or just. No matter what one does, one always tries to justify one's action. If a defensible reason is not available at the time of the action, one finds and creates a reason afterwards. We notice the bare fact that human beings look for a reason to justify even the most evil act. Every war in history was declared in the name of justice. Both sides give their own reasons to fight, their leaders appealing to the people's sense of justice. Human beings want and need a justifiable reason to kill others.

The question is this: Why do humans care about being good or just? The fact of justification discloses this primordial propensity of the human being. One necessarily cares about being good or just. As discussed previously, a human being is a Being of Heart and a Being of Norm. In this light, the desire to be just and right stems from the human being's primordial essence.

Many philosophers have recognized the human being's fundamental orientation towards the good. All human acts, whether they are good or bad, are performed within this fundamental orientation. The orientation towards the good is unshakable, regardless of particular acts. It transcends all particular instances. Plato recognized the transcendent character of the good and made it an integral foundation of his architecture of thought. From Plato onward, the call to the good, whether it be the voice coming from the inner depth of one's soul or the command of reason, has been recognized as transcending the experiential reality of human life.

Although under the reign of good, in the sense that everyone invariably tries to give justifiable reasons for their actions, human beings are immersed in a serious conflict between what one "ought" to be and what one in fact "is." We can easily have a conceptual understanding of higher ideals and all kinds of religious and ethical knowledge as pieces of information. In other words, we can understand the Word with the head. However, if someone asks you if you have truly understood it, you will hesitate to answer. Why?

d. Zen Understanding of Language

Let's go back to the phrase I quoted at the beginning of this essay: "Don't understand God's words only with your head, but know them in your heart and perceive them through your body." To move from "understand God's words only with your head" to "know them in your heart... and through your

body," it is not simply a matter of increasing one's degree of understanding in the sense of conceptual clarity and comprehensiveness. Rather, one must move from understanding in concept to understanding in one's being— embodiment. For example, "benevolence" can never be adequately understood without being benevolent. This is like the contrast between knowing and being/becoming. The radical difference between understanding a concept and understanding as being, becoming or embodiment has been clearly recognized by religious teachings such as Zen.

Zen is founded on the insight that conceptual understanding never leads one to the authentic realization of enlightenment. Zen, like other Far Eastern traditions, recognizes the limits of language and what language can do. Language can lead one to a certain point, but it can never be the final vehicle to the authentic realization of the Buddha's truth. Recognizing the inadequacy of language, Zen teaches that one can understand enlightenment only by being enlightened. Enlightenment can be known, but only when all attempts to conceptually understand enlightenment have given way. The Buddha's truth is accessible only by *being* the Buddha.[8]

In Zen, understanding is a matter of awakening or realization. One is awakened or opened up to truth. It is a change in one's most primordial way of being. It does not matter how many pieces of information one knows; it is a matter of one's mode of existence, or how one is. Since the shift from conceptual pursuit to ontological change is a radical step that one cannot easily recognize, Zen consciously tries to shut off the paths of conceptual pursuit. The ultimate goal is to realize the original experience of the Buddha himself. Unless one has the same original vivid experience of the Buddha's truth, which is not fully expressible by language,[9] one cannot have the slightest understanding of the essence of the Buddha's truth.

Zen's demand that one leave off from all conscious efforts at knowing extends to all ego-centered modes of self-knowledge. Therefore, Zen requires the elimination of all kinds of bodily drives, as these lead to a fixation on the ego. Our drives predispose us to a particular interpretation of the world. Western philosophers have explored this insight, which in its most radical form means that one's interpretation of the world is totally rooted in one's drives. For Nietzsche, understanding is essentially interpretation based upon the Will to Power—a drive to be stronger than and to dominate others. Freud interpreted the world based upon the sexual drive. For Marx, understanding arises when one takes the perspective that social reality is rooted in economic interests and material needs. Zen, on the other hand, teaches that we should eradicate ego-centered self-consciousness and bodily desires all together. By denying bodily desires, Zen undermines conceptual knowledge in a broad sense.

We have seen how Zen highlights the concept of knowing as embodiment; however, this concept is not limited to Zen. In order to fully explicate

the meaning of understanding as a matter of being or embodiment, I must take one more step.

e. Understanding as the Dis-covery of Truth

What does it exactly mean to say that one is awakened to truth or that one is enlightened to truth? To push the question further, what is understanding? What does it mean to say that one understands something? More precisely, what does it mean to say that one knows that the Word is true? One cannot convey this kind of understanding to someone else as if it were a thing. One can assist another person on the path to understanding, but understanding in itself is a happening which must take place within the person. Like a flash of light, understanding takes place suddenly. My understanding is not his understanding and his understanding is not my understanding. In this sense, each understanding is a particular event which belongs to each person.

If understanding is primarily an interior event, then perhaps the truth was *always* present within the self, or at least is always accessible to the self. This notion was captured by philosophers in a variety of ways. Augustine, for example, wrote of the "inner truth" or the "teacher within." When one hears words from outside, one consults with the inner truth within, and then says "Yes, it is true" or "Yes, I see." Teachers outside of oneself can assist one's understanding, but understanding itself happens when one consults the teacher within. The true teacher is not one who utters words to another, but is the inner truth within oneself. Augustine says, "But, referring now to all things which we understand, we consult, not the speaker who utters words, but the guarding truth within the mind itself, because we have perhaps been reminded by words to do so."[10] Due to his Christian background, Augustine identified the inner truth with Christ within. There is only one true teacher, who is Christ within. So he continues, "Moreover, He who is consulted teaches; for He who is said to reside in the interior man is Christ, that is, the unchangeable excellence of God and His everlasting wisdom, which every rational soul does indeed consult."[11]

One cannot understand something which is totally foreign to him. Here arises an age-old philosophical question concerning the possibility of philosophy. What is the locus of philosophical truth? If philosophical truth exists in some form within a person and the person has access to it, why does he have to seek it? If, on the contrary, truth does not exist within a person in any form, how and why can one make a judgment in deciding which philosophical claim is true? One must have a certain criterion for truth within oneself. The question is perplexing. It seems one has philosophical truth within oneself or at least has access to it, yet still is searching for it. Why should one have to seek something one already has?

One answer to this question is that although a person has truth or has

access to truth, that truth or access to truth is somehow covered up. Therefore, one must be opened up to truth. Here, understanding a truth is a "dis-covery," or in a sense, "taking off the cover."[12] The theme that understanding is essentially a process of uncovering is already implicit for Socrates. For Socrates, philosophical activity is limited to assisting the partner in the dialogue so that he is led to a certain awakening or enlightenment. The limited task of the philosopher is to be an assistant, which Socrates called "midwifery." A midwife is one who helps in the delivery of a baby from the mother's womb. Here, teaching is assistance, and understanding is a realization or awakening which takes place within the dialogue partner.

If we turn our attention to the 20th century, we can find a similar theme in Heidegger. Heidegger turns our attention to the notion of truth as disclosure or uncovering. Behind this lies his insight that man exists in untruth or in inauthenticity. Human beings must be opened up to truth and their inauthentic cover must be taken off in order to return to the authentic mode of being. The phenomena of truth emerges from this process of un-covering, by which we change from an inauthentic mode of being to an authentic mode of being. Truth, in religious and ethical knowledge, has this essential function of turning one from inauthenticity to authenticity. One meaning of truth is that which serves for the "restoration" of the authentic self and the world. Although I do not pursue this theme further, the phenomena of truth within oneself can be seen in the conscience. Reverend Moon's exposition of conscience as the teacher within, expressed in such phrases as "conscience is greater than teachers,"[13] has a direct bearing on this notion of truth.

3. Understanding as the Embodiment of the Word

Understanding truth in the sense of opening to truth is a kind of awakening or enlightenment. To be awakened to truth is very different from simply having knowledge as pieces of information. It is a change of one's whole being. For example, how does one understand humility? Knowing that humility is a virtue is radically different from being humble. Properly speaking, one cannot understand what it means to be humble without being humble. To be authentically virtuous is neither having a mere pretension of virtue nor knowing the definition of each virtue. It is to act and live as being such.

Let us take another example. How does one understand the ethical commandment which says, "Your mind and body must be united in such a manner that you can control your lust and listen and follow the voice of your conscience." This is a basic principle running through the major moral philosophies of East and West. You will find it in the West in Plato, Augustine, Kant and many others, and in the East in Confucianism and Buddhism. But how can one truly understand this commandment? Surely, understanding

comes by continued practice. Yet in the midst of our faltering efforts, can one truly understand what this state of unity entails? The only way to understand its true meaning is to be it. One notices that there are degrees of understanding here. To the extent that one embodies the unity of mind and body, one can understand what such unity means. The more united one is, the deeper its sense discloses itself. A person is opened up to the truth of the Word to the extent that he embodies the Word.

Understanding truth is experiential, but it is not the same as general experience. Truth has an indisputable and compelling quality. It simply demands us to accept it, whether we like it or not. Ordinary experience lacks this quality. No matter how profound and intense a particular experience may be, experience which lacks the understanding of truth is different from experience which involves the recognition of truth.

From this sense of understanding in the context of the authenticity and inauthenticity of human beings, we conclude that truth enlightens by turning a person's being from the inauthentic mode to the authentic mode. At the heart of understanding lies recovery or restoration of authentic being. Understanding here has the sense of ontological change. Using a religious vocabulary, we assert that understanding truth is salvation. God's Word is *for* human beings; it is something to be received gratefully; it is no mere object to be manipulated or subjected to scientific study. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the Chinese character for *chae-hyul*, which I took up at the beginning of this essay, includes as one element the sign for salvation.

4. Understanding and Being

Jesus said, "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."[14] Understanding the Word as embodiment is an experience of freedom. To the extent that ethical or religious knowledge is embodied, its prescriptive element is no longer experienced as obligatory. At that point, one can experience the unity of knowing and being.

An important philosophical discussion of this topic is the transformation of being in Nietzsche's Three Metamorphoses. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche describes three metamorphoses of spirit: from a camel, to a lion, to a child.[15] A camel carries a burden and follows all its master's commands of "Thou shalt." For Nietzsche, this is a metaphor of the Christian life. In the desert, the camel becomes a lion, which has a free spirit. A lion says "I will" and does as it wishes. A lion refuses to carry the burden of obligation or to follow the command "Thou shalt." It wants to think and act according to its own free spirit. The lion represents a thinker in modern times. But the lion is not the last stage. The lion becomes a child. Nietzsche says:

> He once loved "thou shalt" as most sacred: now he must find illusion and caprice even in the most sacred, that freedom from his love may become his prey: the lion is needed for such prey. But say, my brothers, what can the child do that even the lion could not do? Why must the preying lion still become a child? The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a fist movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world.[16]

Nietzsche's metaphorical language must be carefully interpreted as with all other parts of his writings. However, within the context of the current discussion, it suffices to note that Nietzsche posits a child as the final stage in the development of spirit. Needless to say, since Nietzsche does not give us a conceptually clear explanation for what he means by each image he presents, we must interpret each image. As it is often said, each has his own Nietzsche.

A Nietzschean child says "yes" to all, whatever destiny may come upon him. To be accurate, he makes the absolute affirmation that his being is his destiny.[17] The Nietzschean child exists; there is absolutely nothing this child must confront or try to overcome. At the stage of the camel, his being was denied under the ethical commandments. As the lion he was free, but not as free as one might think he is. Though a free spirit, a lion is still a seeker filled with ego-centered consciousness. A child exists as he is. His being is absolutely affirmed without any hindrance. Since there is no conscious attempt of overcoming something, a child has "forgetfulness." He does not have a self-conscious ego-centered self like a lion, whose ego is the center of his activities. A child simply "is" and plays. His activities are not a burden that one "must" achieve with conscious effort. A child acts and does things as play. The heart of this playfulness is the absence of ego-centered self-consciousness (i.e., in forgetfulness and joy). A child does things in joyful play. So the Nietzschean child "is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a fist movement, a sacred 'Yes.'"

We can see a specific parallel between the Nietzschean child and the unity of being and knowing. When ethical and religious knowledge is still a burden, one's mode of being falls behind one's conceptual understanding. One knows conceptually, but one's being is untouched by that knowledge. However, once ethical or religious knowledge is understood in the sense of embodiment, one's being is totally transformed. The knowledge is then no longer a burden to labor under, but is the articulation of one's being itself. One is free from self-conscious effort at overcoming. In this state, one is "forgetful" of the ego-centered self. One may find an example of this unity in the exercise of authentic love, which involves the element of forgetfulness.[18] Another example is Zen, which in aiming for the embodiment of knowledge,

trains one to leave off all conscious attempts at knowing. For this reason, Zen sees forgetfulness as an indispensable step towards enlightenment.

Finally, understanding of the Word in the ontological sense means its embodiment in the context of the structure of mind and body. Therefore, religious and ethical knowledge is invariably displayed by one's manner of presence and one's behavior. It is one's manner of presence and behavior that exhibits one's mastery of the essence of Zen. The extent of understanding is not measured by one's conceptual knowledge, but in being and doing.[19]

5. Truth and Embodiment

Embodying the Word can be seen as the process of transformation from an inauthentic mode of being to the authentic mode of being. There remains, however, a decisive question for which none of the philosophies discussed above give an adequate answer. How is such a movement from inauthenticity to authenticity possible? In other words, how is it possible for a person to return to his or her authentic mode of being? To put the question in a different manner, why should a human being be able to understand truth or to be enlightened by truth? This question concerns the possibility of being open to truth.

If one's being were not already in some manner connected to truth, understanding of truth or returning to authenticity would be impossible. One would not bother with the constant quest for self-justification. One probably would not even care about the truth at all. The fact of one's fundamental concern for truth is what allows the movement from inauthenticity to authenticity to occur. This concern is always present, regardless of one's particular situation. To judge something as untrue, evil, false or unjust is possible only because one has a prior engagement with truth. Otherwise, one would not even care about such matters. Where does this fundamental concern or orientation come from? One what grounds can we assert that human beings have a primordial engagement with truth?

For this decisive question, Unification Thought gives a definitive answer. Unification Thought understands beings as "individual embodiments of truth."[20] More than anything else, this conception defines the primary sense of being in Unification Thought. All beings are understood as manifestations of truth, and each being is the manifestation of truth in its particular manner.

This conception of being as manifestation of truth is a decisive insight. If all beings are manifestations of truth, the world in which we live and are a part is also nothing less than a manifestation of truth. The world can be portrayed as the world as truth. If we speak in a dynamic mode, the world is a series of events which which occur as the work of truth.

For human beings who in fact exist in an inauthentic mode, the restora-

tion of authentic being means becoming an embodiment of truth. The restoration of one's authentic being is the process of manifesting truth or embodying truth. One authentically exists to the extent that one makes oneself a being which manifests or embodies truth.

We have said that prior engagement to truth explains why people are necessarily concerned about truth. Distance from one's own authentic being is at the same time one's distance from truth. The conception of being as individual embodiment of truth naturally implies that to the extent one authentically exists, one exists in truth and as truth. The more one tries to truly exist, the more one must exist truthfully, and vice versa.

Notice that the conception of being as individual embodiment of truth includes the notion of authentic individual selfhood. The more one tries to exist in authenticity, the more one can find one's authentic and unique self. Every human being is a unique individual. The restoration of authentic being is at the same time the restoration of the self's own uniqueness.

In this essay, I have focused on the question of embodying the Word as it concerns human beings. However, the conception of being as individual embodiment of truth extends to all beings, human and non-human. The world this conception presents us is marvelous. The world in which we live and of which we are constitutive parts is nothing but the manifestation and the embodiment of truth. Truth manifests itself as the world.

Please note, however, that the popular conception of being which we take for granted as an unexamined assumption of everyday thinking is quite different from this notion of being in Unification Thought. Today, the primary model from which we take our conception of being is the material object existing within the space-time continuum. Being in its primary sense is understood in its materiality without any intrinsic values. Material existence is presupposed prior to our existence, and we come to "add on" or "impose" values upon it as our "subjective" coloring. Accordingly, reality is identified with materiality while values are locked up in the sphere of "subjectivity," with the implication that they are unreal. Truth means nothing more than the regularity observed of physical phenomena. This narrow conception of truth cannot begin to approach the meaning of truth as understood in most religious and ethical traditions.

What is wrong with this popular view? The heart of the problem lies in its conception of being. This popular view fails to see the essential tie between truth and being. A complete critique of this view, which is beyond the scope of this essay, would require examining the conception of time and space together with the conception of being. Unification Thought's conception of being as the embodiment of truth radically (from its root) overcomes this popular conception of being. It exhibits the primordial tie between being and truth, and thereby explains the phenomena of understanding as the process of embodiment of the Word.

Understanding as embodiment is endless in its depth and extent. For religious knowledge in particular, where understanding God's Word is a matter of life and death, the way to understanding requires that we embody the Word in our being. While conceptual knowledge exposes our inner conflict and leaves us burdened by the Word as prescriptive commandments, embodying the Word means that our entire being is transformed. We have also noted how this understanding of truth is distinct from mere experience, no matter how intense. Other kinds of experience lack truth and permanence. The permanence and compelling quality of embodied knowledge is not revealed in the testimony of others; it is only realized by discovering the authentic self within. It is a mode of knowing where knowing and being are one and the same.

Notes

1. *The Way of God's Will* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980), p. 193.
2. *Exposition of the Divine Principle* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1996), pp. 179, 181.
3. For example, we can find the use of the word in the Korean text *Wolli Kangron* (1970), p. 552, and the Japanese *Genri Koron* (1995), p. 599. In the English *Exposition of the Divine Principle* (1996), p. 407, this word was not translated as an independent term; rather its meaning was incorporated into the English phrase as a whole. An old version of *Divine Principle* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1973), p. 532, translated this word as "experience."
4. For example, *tai toku* (in Japanese pronunciation), which is usually translated as "experience," means "embodiment" or "knowing through embodiment." *Tai toku* consists of two Chinese characters: *tai* means "body" and *toku* means "gain" or "obtain." This term is also often used in the Korean text of *Exposition of the Divine Principle*. Another example is *tai ken* (Japanese pronunciation), which means "bodily experience."
5. *Exposition of the Divine Principle*, pp. 3-6, 103.
6. *Essentials of Unification Thought, the Head-Wing Thought* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1992), p. 17.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-3.
8. This ontological reading of Zen Buddhism is most evident in Dôgen, a 12th-century Zen master and founder of Soto Zen school in Japan. In his major work *Shôbôgenzô*, one of the most philosophically rich works of Zen literature, one can see Dôgen's ontological reading of Buddhist teaching. For example, he reads a classical teaching "Mountains, rivers, grasses, trees all *have* Buddha nature" as "Mountains, rivers, grasses, trees all *are* Buddha nature." Here, the Buddha's truth is understood not as something one can have or lose as if it were a possession. Existence itself is possible by Buddha's truth. There is no being whatsoever without the Buddha's truth. All sentient beings are nothing but the disclosure of the Buddha's truth and their existence exhibits it.

9. Language has an explanatory function which is fully exhibited in the sciences. But language also has a suggestive function which is exercised in art such as poetry. Both science and poetry convey truth in a certain sense, but they do so in a different manner. Zen stands on the awareness that the original experience of the Buddha's truth is expressible only by suggestive use of language. Beyond that, language cannot convey its authentic meaning.

10. Augustine, *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine*, vol. 1, ed. by Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1948), p. 390. In *On the Teacher*, Chapter XI "We do not learn through the words which sound outwardly, but through the truth which teaches within us," and in Chapter XII "Christ the Teacher within," Augustine gives insightful analysis on the phenomena of understanding within the context of analysis of language.

11. *Ibid.*

12. For Heidegger's analysis of truth as disclosedness or uncoveredness, see section 44 "Dasein, disclosedness, and truth" of *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 256-273.

13. HSA-UWC Dendo Shuppan Kyoku, *Hokan Shurenkai Mikotoba Shyu* (Tokyo: Kogensha, 1994), p. 81. Chapter 1 "Let's Discover the Authentic Self" has rich philosophical insights including the theme of conscience as the teacher within.

14. John 8:32

15. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part I, chapter 1, "On the Three Metamorphoses."

16. *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. & transl. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 139.

17. The "holy yes" is linked to another key concept of Nietzsche's, "love of destiny." The primary sense of destiny for Nietzsche is not some predetermined fate imposed by God or powers from outside. One's being is already a destiny. When this affirmation of being is discussed in a temporal context, it is linked to Nietzsche's other enigmatic concept of "eternal recurrence of the same," where his idea of eternity emerges.

18. Authentic love is said to be absolute giving without a trace of self-interest. Disguised altruism has a hidden self-interest at its core. The forgetfulness of the self characterizes and distinguishes authentic love from disguised love.

19. This is also true for Confucianism. In Confucianism, the active presence of the teaching is measured by one's being and doing.

20. *Exposition of the Divine Principle*, p. 28.

A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON JOHN THE BAPTIST'S FAILURE TO SUPPORT JESUS

Laurent Guyénot

> At the heart of all dialogues between Christians and Jews there is, inevitably, the question of the Messiah: "Are you he who is to come, or shall we wait for another?"
> —Jürgen Moltmann

A pplied to the New Testament, some of the tasks of the historical-critical method are to separate layers of redaction work in the Gospels, to determine the oldest strata of tradition, and to present the most probably authentic words of Jesus and the events of his life. Conservative evangelical Christians are generally hostile to such an approach and insist that the complete New Testament is inspired and historically true. One possible meeting point between conservatives and historically-minded liberals which has gained some recent support is to assert that since Christianity is founded on the resurrected Jesus, it need not be threatened by historical inquiry into Jesus' earthly ministry.

One reason is sufficient, in my eyes, to justify the historical-critical method as part of Unificationist studies. Unificationism claims to rely not only on revelation but also on science, and it cannot be denied that archeology and critical exegesis, the basic tools of historical research, are scientific in nature. Beyond the polemic that they generate, most scholars involved in the "quest

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for the historical Jesus" are honest and skilled historians using the same meth-
ods that have enabled history to make tremendous progress in other areas.
Moreover, many churches are already welcoming and practicing this approach
and dealing with its challenges. This is the case of the Catholic Church since
Vatican II. Indeed, the best of today's Catholic exegetes do not hesitate to
question the historicity of many words and deeds of Jesus, even in Bible
commentaries addressed to a large public.

Moreover, the historical-critical approach has proved to be key to the dia-
logue between Jews and Christians. Indeed, the providential pressure of this
dialogue has done much to encourage it. The reason is obvious: only through
historical rather than theological eyes, can Christians rediscover the
Jewishness of Jesus, reflect on the tragedy of the rupture between Jews and
Christians and perhaps solve it. Since interreligious dialogue is a priority of
Unificationist ministry, critical exegesis cannot be ignored. As a general rule,
I would say that Unificationists can hardly dialogue with Catholic, Jewish or
liberal Protestant leaders while ignoring the findings of historical criticism.

Finally, as this article will show, Unificationism has nothing to fear from
critical exegesis. Here I apply it to the relationship between Jesus and John
the Baptist, which happens to be a crucial part of the Divine Principle's argu-
ment about the partial failure of Jesus' mission. Unificationist readers can
judge for themselves that, on this point at least, objective historical investi-
gation confirms the view of the Divine Principle, even going beyond the clas-
sical Divine Principle arguments.

To be more precise: most biblical exegetes agree that John the Baptist
did not support Jesus. It is also widely known that Christian scriptures and tra-
ditions were shaped in part by a persisting conflict with the sect initiated by
John. Few scholars, however, have found in these findings any special sig-
nificance for Jesus' fate; after all, no other known saintly men of his time even
recognized Jesus. The question therefore needed to be researched, that of
Jesus' expectation and possible disappointment concerning John.

1. The Post-Mortem Christianization of John the Baptist

The Christian tradition based on the Gospels presents John as the prophet cho-
sen by God to prepare Israel for the coming of the Messiah and, in addition,
for blessing and revealing the Messiah to Israel. This same tradition affirms
that he did in fact recognize and point Jesus out as the Messiah, thus being
the first witness to Christ, after which he was imprisoned and beheaded by
Herod Antipas, thus becoming the first Christian martyr. For the last two cen-
turies, this traditional view of John has been ruthlessly submitted to histori-
cal-critical analysis, which has shown that it is, at best, an exaggeration on the
part of the authors of the Gospels (specifically Matthew and John).[1]

To understand the historical reality of the relationship between Jesus and John the Baptist, we must start from the following observation: whereas we find in the New Testament a reliable historical tradition according to which Jesus testified to the importance of John the Baptist, calling him the greatest prophet of all times, there is no reliable historical tradition according to which John the Baptist testified in favor of Jesus (relevant passages from the first and fourth Gospels being highly suspicious).

In order to explain the "post-mortem Christianization" of John the Baptist, we must consider the fact that Jesus' first disciples, for the most part, came from the followers of John. They were convinced that their former master was truly the precursor of Jesus, in the sense that God had led them to John only to lead them eventually to Jesus. Matthew and John writing many decades after the events, transformed that subjective interpretation into an objective story, telling that John had voluntarily and explicitly directed his disciples to Jesus.

Certainly, this shift answered a missionary need. First of all, it was embarrassing that John, although he had baptized Jesus, had not recognized him as the Messiah. Secondly, to claim that, in spite of his infamous death and the non-realization of the Kingdom of God he had proclaimed, Jesus was indeed the Messiah (a "scandal" for the Jews, noted Paul), the opinion of a prophetic figure of such national renown as John the Baptist was a weighty argument. John's influence on the nation is confirmed by all sources, including and especially Flavius Josephus. The fact that Josephus, of priestly stock and Pharisaic tradition, expressed sympathy for John, whereas he shows only contempt for other desert and apocalyptic prophets, is a strong indication that the prophetic authority of John was not accepted uniquely by the lower classes, as Luke seems to indicate in Luke 7:29-30. Claiming John as precursor of Jesus, and inventing John's testimony in favor of Jesus, was surely intended toward all those who had believed in John or who respected his memory. Justin still used this argument in his *Dialogue with Trypho* (8.3).[2]

This Christianization of John the Baptist is found in Matthew, but it is most characteristic of the Fourth Gospel. It is possible that this Gospel was written in part because of the challenge that the persistence of the Baptist's movement represented for Christianity. Confronted with these hard-line "Baptists" who were reluctant to accept Jesus and probably thought of the Church as a dissident movement, the Evangelist's motivation was not only evangelical, but also, it would seem, polemical. He tried to enlist the Baptist as a Christian in order to counteract the claims of the movement which saw him as its founder.

Of course, creating the Christian image of John the Baptist giving loyal testimony to Jesus was only possible because John was dead, years had gone by, and the story was being circulated far from Palestine. However, I wonder if the Evangelists would have felt the need to convert John the Baptist posthu-

mously had the issue not come from Jesus' disciples, that is, those who had
known both Jesus and John. In effect, traces of a controversy between the
movements of John and of Jesus during their lifetime suggest that the fact that
John did not recognize Jesus represented, for Jesus' ministry, a serious hand-
icap. Was not Jesus himself, in regards to John, in the same situation as were
the first Jewish Christians after his death? To advocate to Israel his divine elec-
tion and his national mission (whether or not one qualifies that mission as
"messianic," it remains indisputable that Jesus hoped to win the loyalty of
Israel), did Jesus not hope to benefit from the influential testimony of John?[3]

In this article, I shall propose an affirmative answer to that question. The
hypothesis that I will defend is that Jesus was not only disappointed by John's
indifference or hostility, but saw in it a failure—a "scandal"—hindering the
divine strategy for the emergence of the Kingdom of God.

2. Preliminary Remarks

To my knowledge, Jesus' expectations concerning John have not yet been the
subject of thorough research.[4] This is probably due to the simple and indis-
putable fact that it was Jesus who left John's movement and not the opposite.
From this, historians assume too quickly that the rupture between the two
men—and between the two movements—was the will of Jesus. The histori-
cal scenario generally offered can be summarized as follows: during an unde-
termined period and until his baptism, Jesus had been nothing but a simple
disciple of John. Afterwards he realized, either suddenly or progressively,
the superiority and specificity of his own mission compared to John's, and at
the same time, the shortcomings of John's ministry. At that point, Jesus vol-
untarily separated himself from John, the desert and asceticism. According to
another version, based on Mark only, Jesus decided to take up John's mis-
sion—only with a different style—after he heard of John's death.

In my opinion, this theory has too many psychological overtones. It tries
to interpret the chain of events as being the result of an evolution in Jesus'
thinking, in his self-consciousness, and in his view of John. But Jesus' words
concerning John do not support that hypothesis. While developing his min-
istry separately from John, Jesus had only admiring praise for him (Matt 11:7-
10). If he had founded an independent mission, this was not in any case
because he doubted the divine legitimacy of John's ministry. (Matt 21:24-25)
Moreover, Matt 11:11, which fulfills most criteria of authenticity, shows that
in Jesus' mind, it was not he who left John, but rather John who did not fol-
low him into the Kingdom of God. And it is clear that, in the relation between
John and Jesus, it was John who did not believe in Jesus and not the contrary.
It is from that base that we should start.

There might be another reason why historical research on Jesus has

scarcely questioned what Jesus expected of John: the considerable influence since Weiss, Schweitzer and Bultmann of the theory of "the eschatological Jesus." If Jesus was waiting for the imminent and supernatural end and renewal of the world, then his quest for influence, just as his code of ethics, was only secondary and temporary. In that case, John's response to him made no real difference. In this paper, I follow the recent trend of American scholarship which rejects this "pan-eschatologism,"[5] and I even consider that Jesus had openly criticized apocalyptic expectations (e.g. *Gos.Thom.* 3, found in shorter form in Luke 17:20-21). The rediscovery of the non-eschatological Jesus happens to be an important key for understanding the divergence between Jesus and John the Baptist, for: "John the Baptist, not Jesus, was the chief advocate of an impending cataclysm, a view that Jesus' first disciples had acquired from the Baptist movement."[6]

3. Clarifying the Chronology

Before launching into an analysis of what we can know about Jesus' expectations regarding John, we must clarify the chronology of their relationship. In order to do that, let us first look at the episode of the Baptist delegation which came to Jesus. "Now when John heard in prison about the deeds of the Christ, he sent word by his disciples and said to him, 'Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another?'" (Matt 11:2-3) We are in the presence here of a tradition which has a good probability of being historical, as Charles Scobie sums up:

> The fact that it is a Q passage favors its authenticity; the terms of the question agree with John's messianic expectation; Jesus' refusal to give a direct answer, and the way he leaves John to make the leap of faith bears all the marks of authenticity; and the very fact that the passage appears to contradict the general New Testament view suggests that it is not an invention.[7]

Many exegetes, however, rightly question whether John could have communicated with his disciples from his prison (in the fortress of Macharerus in Perea, according to Josephus), since Antipas had arrested him in order to defuse his movement (again, according to Josephus). The solution of this problem is surely that the mention "in prison," which is absent in Luke (7:18) did not exist in the original Q document. Matthew probably added it out of a concern for consistency, because he had already mentioned John's arrest in 4:8. Most probably, this passage from Q actually referred to a period in which John's and Jesus' ministries were developing separately, with a certain tension between them. The Johannine account on the parallel and rival ministries of Jesus and John (John 3:22-4:3) thus gains credibility.

Now let us look at the chronology of Mark. According to him, Jesus went to Galilee "after John was arrested." (Mark 1:14) If we read his account well, it is clear that, for Mark, John disappeared completely from the scene from his imprisonment onwards. The account of John's execution, which is found further on (Mark 6:17-29), is only a flashback. This appears clearly from the sequence:

1.   Mark 6:7-13: Jesus sends out the Twelve across Galilee.
2.   Mark 6:14-16: Having heard of Jesus' reputation, caused by the missionary activity of his disciples, Herod thought: "John, whom I beheaded, has been raised!"
3.   Mark 6:17-29: A long explanatory digression, starting from John's arrest ("For Herod had sent and seized John, and bound him in prison...") and ending with his burial ("When his disciples heard of it, they came and took his body, and laid it in a tomb").
4.   Mark 6:30: Return to the main account, interrupted by the above digression, and continuing with the meeting of disciples, just returned from their mission: "The apostles returned to Jesus, and told him all that they had done and taught."

It is clear that the detailed report in Mark 6:17-29 is only an explanatory flashback which points back to Mark 1:14. We cannot, under the pretext that John's death is reported between the sending out of the twelve disciples and their coming back together again, suppose that it happened during that interval.

It is Matthew, and Matthew only, who modified this. In Matthew, the story of John the Baptist's execution is no longer a digression inserted in the middle of the main story, but part of the main story. First of all, Matthew transfers the sending out of the twelve disciples four chapters earlier than its corresponding place in Mark (in Matt 10:1-16). Then, after the passage concerning John's execution (Matt 14:3-12), Matthew continues by "Now when Jesus heard this...," which leads us to believe that the withdrawal into a "lonely place" just followed, and was even motivated by, John's execution. By this subtle alteration, Matthew introduces a long interval between the arrest and execution of John. It is in that interval that he inserts the episode of the delegation sent by John to Jesus, which he borrowed from Q (here, Luke did the same). At the same time, Matthew supplies John with an excuse for not going himself to question Jesus: he was in prison.

To sum up, the most probable chronology can be established based on the following points:

1. For the chronology, we must rely primarily on Mark, since Q gives very little chronological references.

2. According to Mark's chronology, Jesus did not leave Judea to go to Galilee until after John's arrest.

3. When he says that John had been "arrested" (Mark 1:14), Mark means that he disappeared from the public scene and probably that he was executed shortly after. (In the discussion about fasting in Mark 2:18-22, when John's disciples clashed with Jesus, nothing indicates that John was still alive.)

4. We must therefore date the Q story of the Baptist delegation to Jesus *before* the arrest of John. This indicates a period when Jesus and John both worked in Judea independently of each other.

5. We conclude that Mark skips completely that first Judean period of Jesus. Obviously, apart from his baptism and retreat into the desert, Mark only knows about Jesus' mission from the time of Galilee, where he assumes Jesus gathered his first disciples. (Here the fourth Evangelist may use some better information, when he tells about the first disciples coming from John's group, before the departure to Galilee.)

John 3:22-4:2 confirms this chronology, deduced from a more reasonable combination of Q and Mark than the one supposed by Matthew. Of course, provided this story has any historical foundation, John's praise for Jesus (John 3:27-30) must be eliminated as the Evangelist's own composition, no doubt inspired by Mark 2:19-20 with its theme of the "bridegroom" and meant to turn the situation in favor of John.[8] Concerning the mention of the baptism given by Jesus or his disciples, it is difficult to evaluate its historical value. Nevertheless, in this passage there may be the memory of a rivalry between John's movement and Jesus' while both masters were alive on the question of "purification"—that is to say, on the necessity of the ablutions as practiced by the Baptists (which recalls the discussion on the value of fasting found in Mark 2:18-22).[9]

4. Jesus' Baptism and the Question of John's Testimony in Favor of Jesus

Numerous details strongly suggest that Jesus' movement was, at the beginning at least, "an outgrowth of the Baptist movement."[10] For example, when Jesus asked, "What did you go out into the wilderness to behold?" (Matt 11:7), he was speaking to a crowd that had previously responded to John's call. When his disciples asked him to teach them to pray "like John taught his disciples to pray" (Luke 11:1), we can suppose that they were speaking from experience. Clearer still, Acts 1:22 indicates that the Twelve had all received the baptism of John. Furthermore, the possible Baptist origin of some of the traditions recorded in the first chapter of Luke,[11] and the persistence of the rite of baptism in the early Church are convincing indications. The Fourth Gospel supports the hypothesis of the Baptist origins of the first disciples (which does not mean that they were not also Galileans, as Mark indicates).

If Jesus attracted his first disciples from the Baptist movement, we naturally

conclude that he himself was a member for a period of time.[12] That is of course also suggested by his receiving the baptism of John, which is one of the most certain historical facts in the New Testament. Actually, that Jesus put himself in an inferior position to John was so greatly embarrassing to the Evangelists—and the Church Fathers—that we can exclude the possibility that they invented this idea. The only question is: what importance and significance did this baptism have in the minds of the two men?

In order to make a preliminary evaluation, we need to rely on Mark's narrative. According to Mark 1:9-11, the vision and heavenly voice manifested at the moment when Jesus "came out of the water" were meant for Jesus only. They were heard and seen internally. There are two possibilities: either that interior experience was part of a legend invented by the Church, or it was Jesus himself who spoke to his disciples about it and it became part of the oral tradition. I prefer the second solution for the simple reason that the narrative shows none of the characteristics of a legend; legends usually emphasize miracles and supernatural events, not internal realizations.[13] Regardless of the origin of this theophany, the important point is this: Mark leaves no room for us to think that John witnessed it. Basically, John the Baptist is only the unconscious and involuntary instrument of God's blessing and anointing on Jesus.

Matthew does not add any reliable historical precision on Jesus' baptism. He only transforms Mark's narrative in three ways:

1.   He omits that John's baptism was "for the remission of sins" (Mark 1:4), a formula which, for obvious theological reasons, he transfers to the Last Supper (Matt 26:28). Instead, he puts in the Baptist's mouth the exact same message that Jesus will later proclaim: "Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand" (Matt 3:2, see Matt 4:17), thus presenting John as the forerunner of Jesus.
2.   He inserts a short and rather theatrical dialogue between John and Jesus (Matt 3:14-15), which serves to invert the impression of Jesus' humility toward John and to change John into a willing witness to Jesus' messiahship.
3.   He turns the heavenly voice from a subjective and internal experience into an objective phenomenon, witnessed by all.

In the Fourth Gospel (John 1:29-34), the change is complete: John's baptism is reduced to "a screening process by means of which he was able to recognize Jesus among all the candidates for baptism," as Hendrikus Boer puts it.[14] "It is so that he could be manifested to Israel that I have come, baptizing with water."[15] Here, the baptism is not the occasion for a messianic experience of Jesus, as it is in the synoptic Gospels, but the occasion for a prophetic experience of John.

In the case of Luke, things are more complex. If the theological motivations of Matthew and John are clear in their handling of the baptism narrative, the motivation of Luke is less clear. Since Luke gives great importance to John in his first chapter and creates a legend around his prenatal testimony to the equally unborn Jesus, why does he eliminate John from his brief baptism narrative, instead of adding more legend, as Matthew does? The only reason I can adduce is this: the fact that John had not testified in favor of Jesus while alive was too well known in the circles around Luke to be contradicted. (If Luke incorporated Baptist materials in his first chapter, as many scholars believe, this tends to confirm that he was in contact with Baptists or former Baptist Christians.) Such a situation can explain why Luke never says that John recognized Jesus as "the one who is to come," even when it would have been convenient to do so. For example, in Acts 19:4, a sentence attributed to Paul, Luke writes: "John baptized with the baptism of repentance, telling the people to believe in the one who was to come after him, that is, Jesus." The "that is" here is important: it makes it clear that John merely announced the coming of "the one" and that it was Paul, speaking in the name of all Christians, who interpreted this prophetic announcement as fulfilled in Jesus.[16] The way in which Luke treats the episode of the Baptist delegation (Luke 7:17-19) confirms that this is clearly his view of things: it was only in hearing about the miracles of Jesus that John considered, for the first time, Jesus as a possible candidate for the role of "the one who is to come." Obviously, Luke's sources did not tell him of the slightest testimony of John in favor of Jesus, and Luke did not dare to invent one. This is probably what explains, at least in part, two elements of the first chapter of Luke:

1.   By the prenatal meeting between John and Jesus, through their pregnant mothers, Luke creates in legendary time what did not happen in historical time. He invents, before his birth, the testimony that John did not give while he was alive.
2.   Luke places Anna and Simeon, two seers who were present at the time of Jesus' circumcision, in the position of prophets recognizing the messianic child—the role that John did not fulfill.[17]

One more aspect of Luke's baptism account deserves to be underlined. An independent reading of Luke does not allow us to conclude that Jesus heard the voice of God and saw the Holy Spirit at the moment of his baptism. All that we can learn is that this theophany was given *after* he was baptized. It could have been a few days after, or even weeks after. This is also the impression we get from Acts 10:38. In addition, the precision given that Jesus was in prayer is important: it suggests that God's appearance was an answer to his prayer and not to his being baptized. If we read Mark now, we can see that it does not necessarily contradict Luke. We know that Mark has a strong

tendency to contract history. He repeats nine times the word "immediately" in the first chapter (in verses 10, 12, 18, 20, 21, 23, 29, 30, and 42). We are not expected to take this word literally in "and immediately, when he came up out of the water," any more than in the scene showing his first disciples responding instantaneously to his call (Mark 1:18) or in the description of his quick visit to the synagogue of Capernäum (Mark 1:21 and 1:29). It is quite possible that, in the oral tradition before Mark, the baptism and the theophany were not considered simultaneous, and that they were later united under the theme of the messianic anointing.

5. The Baptist Delegation to Jesus

Having dealt with the question of its chronological place, we shall now analyze the narrative of the Baptist delegation, starting from the content of John's question. If Scobie supports its authenticity, Carl Kraeling rejects it under the assumption that John was not waiting for a Messiah in human form.[18] Based on extensive comparative studies, the judgment of Robert Webb is probably the best we can attain:

> John's expected figure is described in terms of the coming of Yahweh him-
> self to judge and restore his people. But John did not actually expect
> Yahweh himself, but rather, he expected an agent of Yahweh who, acting
> with God's authority and power, would come to judge and restore.[19]

Along the same line of thought is the thesis of J.A.T. Robinson, who suggests that John awaited Elijah.[20] Although Elijah had been taken into heaven alive, it is clear that many people thought that Jesus was Elijah (Mark 6:14 and Mark 8:28). To oppose human and supernatural categories is a modern rationalist attitude foreign to the mentality of the time.

Traditional interpretations concerning John's intention in sending this delegation to Jesus are of three kinds, which I call *feigned doubt, real doubt,* and *sincere questioning.*[21]

Feigned doubt is the most common interpretation among the Church Fathers. It was Augustine's interpretation and was taken up by Luther and Calvin. It is the idea that John knew perfectly well that Jesus was "he who is to come," but that he pretended ignorance in order to give his dubious followers the chance to realize Jesus' messianic identity for themselves. This interpretation is in total contradiction with the Gospel narratives; for example, it is clearly to John that Jesus answers: "Go and tell John..."

Real doubt is the interpretation of most conservative modern exegetes. It says that John had already recognized Jesus as the Messiah, but he was disappointed, astonished, impatient or disturbed by the way in which Jesus man-

ifested his divine authority. *Real doubt* is the picture we get from reading Matthew.

Sincere questioning was the interpretation put forth by David Strauss. It assumes that in hearing Jesus speak, John considers, for the first time, the possibility that Jesus was the one he had been waiting for. As we have seen, that is certainly the interpretation that Luke had in mind.

But neither *real doubt* nor *sincere questioning* are possible interpretations when we realize that, in all probability, John the Baptist was still free when he sent the delegation to Jesus. The fact that he sent a delegation rather than sought to meet him personally is revealing: if he had seriously considered Jesus as a possible messianic candidate, it is hard to imagine that he would have been reassured or convinced simply by an affirmative answer from Jesus through his disciples.

We must therefore go further and offer a fourth interpretation, which I call *skeptical challenge*. John sent messengers to Jesus because he wanted to be informed, not as to who he was, but as to who he pretended to be: did Jesus consider himself as a messianic or eschatological character, or was he waiting, like John, for such a figure? This fourth interpretation fits well with what the sources report about the secrecy (Mark) and the ambiguity (Q) often fostered by Jesus concerning his claim to messianic identity.

But it is especially Jesus' answer to John which confirms this interpretation. It can be explained only if John's attitude was skeptical or even hostile.

> Go and tell John what you hear and see; the blind receive their sight and
> the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised
> up, and the poor have good news preached to them. And blessed is he who
> takes no offense at me. (Matt 11:4-6)

Jesus here quotes freely from the prophet Isaiah.[22] We recognize in this logion the ambiguous and indirect manner in which Jesus often answers those who put in question his authority. This style is characteristic of Jesus and "bears all the marks of authenticity."[23] The similarity of style—ambiguity, refusal to answer directly, challenge turned against the one who doubts—between that answer of Jesus to the Baptist's question, "Are you the one who is to come?" and his answer to the priests' question in Mark 11:27-33, "By what authority are you doing these things...?" is striking. It leads us to believe that the attitude of John regarding Jesus was scarcely different from that of the priests.

We should now turn our attention to the conclusion in Jesus' answer, "blessed is he who takes no offense at me." The Greek verb *skandalizo* (from the noun *skandalon*) is a Greek translation of a Hebrew verb which means "to stagger" or, in a figurative sense, "to be induced to sin" or "to be mistaken in the understanding of God's will."[24] These words were often used by Jesus, sometimes in the strongest meaning of "to betray" or "betrayal":

— Matt 13:21: In the Parable of the Sower, Jesus speaks about the man in whom God's Word cannot take root, "when tribulation or persecution arises on account of the word, immediately he *falls away.*"

— Matt 5:29: "If your right eye *causes you to sin,* pluck it out and throw it away."

— Mark 14:27-29: "This very night you will all *fall away...*" Jesus spoke to his disciples, foreseeing that they would all flee when he would be arrested.

— Matt 18:6-7: "But whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be better for him to have a great millstone fastened round his neck and to be drowned in the depth of the sea."

— Matt 13:57 and Matt 15:12: The people and the Pharisees "were offended" in hearing what Jesus had to say.

Paul also used the term *skandalon,* in the same way as Jesus.[25] All this leaves little doubt as to what Jesus meant when indicating that John was "scandalized" at him.

6. John the Baptist Not in the Kingdom

What follows Jesus' answer to John is a collection of declarations, drawn from Q by Matthew and Luke as they were, but which were in all probability pronounced independently. Verses 7 to 10 are praises of John; their superlative character excludes any possibility that they had been invented by the early Church (for whom John was *not* more than a prophet). We can note in passing that, in the last phrase, the quote from Malachi 3:1 has been altered for the needs of Christians: there is not anymore God and his messenger, but God, his messenger *and* the Messiah.

The logic of verse 11 is clear: Jesus explicitly declares that John has not entered into the Kingdom of God. "Truly, I say to you, among those born of women there has risen no one greater than John the Baptist; yet he who is least in the Kingdom of heaven is greater than he." Theologians are generally not inclined to read into this any kind of judgment. They understand that John is outside the Kingdom by the very nature of his mission, because he was called to close the Law and the prophets. On the side of critical exegesis, opinion is divided. Some, like Wink, think that the second part of the verse had been added by a writer to soften the first part, which was too laudatory for the Church. That is, Jesus also being born of a woman,[26] the first part could lead one to consider Jesus as being inferior to John. This is exactly what anti-Christian Baptists did claim, if we are to believe the *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions* 1:60. But this solution poses more problems that it resolves, because we must still explain why the Church would have gone as far as to

exclude John from the Kingdom, that is to say, to excommunicate him. I believe that on the contrary we have here an authentic statement by Jesus, characteristic of his enigmatic style of speaking. And there is only one way to interpret his words: by his faith in God, his moral strictness and his prophetic charisma, John was the greatest; however, he did not enter into the Kingdom of God, of which Jesus had opened the door, *was* the door.

In order to understand this remark, we must consider two things. First of all, according to Jesus, being privileged enough to enter into the Kingdom did not depend on religious merit primarily, but in one's faith in him (Matt 13:16; Matt 21:31). Secondly, no Jew was *a priori* excluded from the Kingdom of God, which was the fruit both of God's grace and of human effort. The Kingdom could only be won by a total, unconditional decision made by all of one's being. Jesus insists on everyone's responsibility to "seek first his Kingdom" at the sacrifice of everything else (Matt 6:33). The urgency of establishing the Kingdom of God means that one cannot even take the time to bury the dead (Matt 8:22). Moreover, "No one who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the Kingdom of God." (Luke 9:62) In his parables, particularly the shortest ones which have the least chance of having been edited by the Church, Jesus often emphasizes human responsibility in creating the Kingdom. The Kingdom is like a treasure which one should buy by selling all that one owns (Matt 13:45-46). To enter the Kingdom one must make a change of attitude, for "unless you turn and become like children, you will never enter the Kingdom of heaven." (Matt 18:3) It is difficult, but not impossible, for a rich man to enter it (Matt 19:23-24). To the person who understood that the two most important commandments were to love God and love one's neighbor as oneself, Jesus said, "You are not far from the Kingdom of God." (Mark 12:34) To those who welcomed his disciples, Jesus said, "The Kingdom of God has come near to you." (Luke 10:9) In his attacks against the Pharisees, he made it clear that man had the power to close the doors to the Kingdom as well: "But woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because you shut the Kingdom of heaven against men...." (Matt 23:13)

All of these declarations by Jesus are in direct contradiction to the eschatological theory of Weiss and Schweitzer. The Kingdom that Jesus was waiting for is not to come down from heaven. Certainly it is given by God, but it can only be established by people's total response to God's invitation. This conforms with the notion of the Covenant, the axis of the Jewish religion which has remained unchanged across the centuries. From Jesus' point of view, the relation between John and the Kingdom followed this same principle of human responsibility. We must conclude that John was not excluded from the Kingdom by divine decree, but that he excluded himself by his own initiative. It was John who kept himself out of the Kingdom, not the Kingdom which was closed to him. Charles-Harold Dodd saw clearly here (even though

he retreated somewhat a few lines later):

> To be in the Kingdom, to receive it, to receive Christ, to confess to him,
> are concepts, if not identical, at least so tightly linked that it would be
> impossible to say of someone who confesses Christ that he is outside the
> Kingdom. Now, John is outside the Kingdom. There can be only two solu-
> tions: either he never confessed Christ, or, having confessed him, he then
> denied him.[27]

It is instructive to compare Matt 11:11 with Matt 18:3: "Truly, I say to
you, unless you turn and become like children, you will never enter the
Kingdom of heaven." The ideas of these two verses are combined into one in
the Gospel of Thomas 46:

> From Adam until John the Baptist, among those born of woman, no one is
> greater that John the Baptist to the point of not lowering their eyes before
> him. But I say to you, the smallest among you will know the Kingdom and
> will be higher than John.[28]

Was Jesus suggesting that it was John's lack of humility that kept him out of
the Kingdom? What we know about the importance of purification rituals in
the conflict which opposed Jesus to the Baptists (Mark 2:18) could lead us to
assume, as did David F. Strauss, that John "must assuredly, with his disciples,
have stumbled at the liberal manners of Jesus, and have been hindered by them
from recognizing him as the Messiah. Nothing is more unbending than ascetic
prejudice."[29] Certainly, Jesus taught that when they become ends in them-
selves, ritualism (Mark 7:1-23) and asceticism (Mark 2:18-22) were perver-
sions of the true religion. The contrast between "fasting John" and "feasting
Jesus" has been well expressed by John Dominic Crossan.[30]

7. John the Baptist and Those Who Take the Kingdom by Force

Special attention must be given to Matt 11:12, "From the days of John the
Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven has suffered violence, and men of
violence take it by force." The question of its authenticity is difficult to answer,
notably because it exists in a very different form in Luke 16:16. But we can
see in this variation a sign that "we are dealing with a very primitive tradi-
tion, already unintelligible by the time of the Evangelists."[31] Originally, this
verse was probably an independent logion in the Q document. While incor-
porating it in a speech, Matthew rendered it incomprehensible by its juxta-
position with the following verse, "For all the prophets and the law prophesied
until John." As for Luke, he rephrased these two verses, combining them to
give a new meaning in conformity with his Pauline theology in which the Law

was abolished by Jesus: "The law and the prophets were until John, since then the good news of the Kingdom of God is preached, and every one enters it violently." (Luke 16:16) Apart from the fact that the change from Matt 11:12-13 to Luke 16:16 (combining two sentences into one) is more natural than the opposite, the version in Matthew seems more authentic because the theme of violence, which represents the most obscure and embarrassing aspect, has been greatly softened in Luke.

In Matthew, the union of the terms *biazetai* (assailed), *biastai* (violent people) and *arpazousin* (plundering or looting) in the same sentence "surely denotes an act of violence in a negative sense,"[32] and it would be quite a feat to give this verse a positive meaning. According to the most natural reading of Matt 11:12, Jesus did not rejoice in the fact that the Kingdom was taken by force; he complained bitterly about it. A possible interpretation would be that Jesus was making reference to the violence which came against John the Baptist. There is, however, no certainty that John was already dead nor even in prison when Jesus spoke thus, since that phrase is found in Matthew and in Luke (and probably in Q) in the context of the Baptist delegation. Also, the plural, "men of violence," does not fit John's death, which was due to one man.

A more natural interpretation would be to attribute that word to the political-messianic violence which was ever in the background of the time. Let us not forget that Jesus' ministry took place between two particularly bloody periods: the massive popular revolts which followed the death of the tyrant Herod the Great in 4 A.D. and the Jewish war against Rome in 66-70 A.D. It is scarcely imaginable that Jesus would have spoken about violence without wanting to evoke armed struggle against Rome, which was an ever-present possibility during his lifetime.

In addition, we know that Jesus openly opposed nationalistic, anti-Roman tendencies. It is remarkable that he did not blame the Romans even once for his own tragic end, when he clearly accused the Pharisees and the Sadducees of preventing the realization of God's will (although it is true that any words of Jesus against the Romans might have been censored). But even more characteristic of Jesus is that he commanded his fellow citizens to love their enemies (Matt 5:43-45), which obviously applied first to the Romans: like the word "violence," the word "enemy" needed no explanation in the political context of the time. What also separated Jesus radically from the Zealot movement was his position regarding the tax due to Rome, the supreme vexation for nationalistic Jews (Matt 22:21).

But what, in Jesus' mind, did political-religious violence have to do with John the Baptist? Certainly, Matt 11:12 does not say, "because of John the Baptist" but "since the days of John the Baptist." Jesus did not blame John the Baptist for the political violence. However, he pointed out a connection

between the two. This connection has some historical basis. As John Dominic Crossan has shown, John was "dangerously close to certain millennial prophets" described by Flavius Josephus, and whose movements (often attracted by the desert and the Jordan) caused popular revolts ending in bloody repression.[33] In addition, what Josephus tells us about John the Baptist shows that he had indeed been arrested because he posed a threat to public order.

> Herod [Antipas] feared that John's so extensive influence over the people might lead to an uprising (for the people seemed likely to do everything he might counsel). He thought it much better, under the circumstances, to get John out of the way in advance, before any insurrection might develop.[34]

Josephus' explanation is certainly more credible than the "bazaar gossip" (says Walter Wink)[35] told by the Gospels, according to which Antipas would have executed John only to satisfy a promise, made while drunk, to the daughter of Herodias who had charmed him by her dancing.[36] In the light of John's apocalyptic style (obvious in Q), Crossan concludes: "Antipas was not paranoid to consider a conjunction of prophet and crowds, desert and Jordan, dangerously volatile."[37] It is a permanent feature in history that apocalyptic faith, which hopes for God to destroy the wicked, easily calls forth social violence. Nothing illustrates this better that this phrase, drawn from the *Commentary of Habakkuk* found in the Qumran library: "From the hand of his chosen ones, God will judge all the nations." (1QpHab 5:4) In other words, the final judgment will indeed come from God, but man will participate in its fulfillment.

With these elements, I think we hold the most probable interpretation of Matt 11:12: Jesus, who we know disapproved of apocalyptic expectations and revolutionary endeavors, felt that John's ministry had deviated from its original vocation by contributing to a climate which could soon degenerate into an open war and lead the country to its downfall.

We are encouraged in this interpretation by the fact that among the first disciples of Jesus, the brothers James and John, sons of Zebedee, most certainly came from John the Baptist's circle, as is explicit in the Fourth Gospel. They were reprimanded twice by Jesus for their views: once because of their obsession to bring fire down from heaven to consume the ungodly (Luke 9:54), a theme directly inspired from a speech by the Baptist; and another time by their self-seeking political preoccupations (Mark 10:35-37).

8. John the Baptist, A Missing Link and Stumbling Block for Jesus

Jesus saw John the Baptist as the greatest of prophets, perhaps even as the Elijah announced by Malachi. There is no doubt that for Jesus, John was the key person, after himself, in the divine strategy for the establishment of the

Kingdom of God. Jesus thought in this manner not only while he was a disciple of John, but up to his last days in Jerusalem; that is proven by his answer to the question about his authority in Mark 11:27-33.

Moreover, when we recognize that for Jesus, the Kingdom of God would not come down from Heaven but would be established through people's response to God's will (and particularly, to Jesus' call), it becomes necessary to ask about the cooperation Jesus expected from John the Baptist. I will present here the hypothesis which seems the most probable to me, based on the factors I have already assembled.

In my opinion, Jesus' strategy for leading Israel to seek the Kingdom of God is revealed entirely in Matt 9:35-38, when Jesus, seeing the crowd come towards him, remarked: "The harvest is plentiful, but the laborers are few; pray therefore the Lord of the harvest to send out laborers into his harvest." (Matt 9:35-38) He also compared the Pharisees to tenants responsible for God's vineyard, i.e. the people of Israel (Mark 12:1-12), and he accused them of preventing God's harvest by rejecting his Son. Other passages confirm that Jesus distrusted mass movements (John 2:23; Mark 1:44; Mark 8:26). He was primarily concerned with gathering around him a spiritual elite.

For Jesus, John the Baptist represented the supreme reaper—the same metaphor that John used to describe his role in Matt 3:12. John not only mobilized the people to wait for the Kingdom, but he was, if not accepted, at least respected by the religious elite of Jerusalem. It is important to put in perspective the Evangelists' view (especially Luke's) of the Pharisees unanimously rejecting John. As I have already said, Josephus' sympathy for John contradicts this idea. The fact that the rabbinic Judaism of Jamnia rejected John's heterodox Judaism should not make us presume this to be true of the situation before 70 A.D. There is much that leads us to believe that John's spirituality was quite close to that of the Pharisees (whose name meant "the separated ones"). He shared their legalism and their emphasis on ablutions and ritual purification. John's movement should be regarded as a fundamentalist branch of the Pharisees. From this point of view, the situation described in Mark 2:18-22, showing the Baptists and the Pharisees united against Jesus' apparent liberalism, is entirely credible.

For this reason, John's support of Jesus would have greatly influenced the way the Pharisees regarded Jesus. It would be surprising if Jesus had not thought of that. In John 7:49, the Pharisees rejected Jesus under the pretext that none of the "authorities" believed in him, but only the "crowd" of "accursed." This situation, which may correspond to the period of the Evangelist, was certainly also real during the lifetime of Jesus. With John's public support, Jesus would surely have been received more favorably by the Pharisees. And with more support from the Pharisees, Jesus would obviously have been better protected against the Sanhedrin. Compare with the situa-

tion described in Acts 5:34-42, where Gamaliel, "a teacher of the law, held in honor by all the people," stood up in the Sanhedrin and saved the lives of the apostles. To sum up, John's support was a necessary condition for Jesus, a Galilean peasant, to have the least chance of being taken seriously in Judah and of gaining influence on a national level, which was most likely his goal.

On the contrary, the lack of unity between John and Jesus had a disastrous effect on Jesus' public image. In the eyes of many, starting with the Baptists, Jesus appeared to be no more than a dissident disciple of John. This is what made David Strauss say that instead of leading the Jews to Jesus, John the Baptist "detained a circle of individuals on the borders of the Messiah's kingdom, and retarded or hindered their going over to Jesus."[38] The polemical anti-Baptist themes in the Fourth Gospel, the signs of the persistence of the Baptist movement in Acts 18 and 19, as well as traces of hostility on the part of the Baptists against the Christians in the *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions* show a situation which may have its roots in the lifetime of John and Jesus: while John's movement was supposed to clear the ground for Jesus—this was the opinion of Jesus' disciples and, I believe, the opinion of Jesus himself—he had actually become an obstacle.

9. Conclusion

Today, a majority of exegetes agree on the following two points:

1. Jesus was driven, up until the last days of his life, by a national mission which involved, in his mind, neither his rejection and death, nor the exclusion of Israel from the Kingdom of God which he announced, but rather Israel's faith in him.
2. John the Baptist, a nationally renowned apocalyptic prophet and Jesus' contemporary, did not recognize Jesus' authority or support his project.

Between these two facts established by modern historical research, I am drawn to propose the following link: by not testifying to Jesus, John hindered Jesus' mission and was in part responsible for the failure of his project.

In order to presume that Jesus saw things in this way, we need a proof that Jesus was really waiting for the support of John which he did not receive. This proof exists, in my opinion, in Jesus' words which, by their ambivalence, indicate both John's irreplaceable role in God's providence and his failure to enter the Kingdom.

Against this thesis of John the Baptist's failure, one could object that even if there had been a parallel period of activity and rivalry between John and Jesus, John was dead long before Jesus came up against the most violent opposition in Jerusalem, and John was even in prison, if not dead, during

Jesus' entire mission in Galilee. This cannot be denied, but we must also rec-
ognize two things: first of all, Jesus would have started his public mission on
a totally different foundation if he had received public legitimacy from John
the Baptist. Even after John's death, Jesus would have kept such an aura,
which would have changed everything in his life, starting with, of course, his
relationship with the Baptists.

　　　Hearing him preach in the synagogue, people were astonished: "Is not
this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James and Joses and Judas
and Simon, and are not his sisters here with us?" (Mark 6:3) Soon after, "they
took offense at him" and, according to Luke 4:28-30, tried to assassinate him.
Imagine what Jesus' life would have been if instead, people had said about
Jesus: "Is not this the one John anointed as the Messiah?" or simply: "Is not
this the one John said we must listen to?"[39]

Notes

1.　Such was the conclusion of David F. Strauss as early as 1853; see David Friedrich
Strauss, *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined* (repr. Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1972). This view has been affirmed even by rather moderate exegetes such as the
French scholar Charles Guignebert (1933), who spoke of a "complete annexation
of John by the Christian sect." Recent authors on the Baptist who accept this view
include Charles H.H. Scobie, *John the Baptist* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1964);
Walter Wink, *John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition* (Cambridge University
Press, 1968); and Robert L. Webb, *John the Baptizer and Prophet: A Socio-
Historical Study*, Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series
62 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991).

2.　The method was somewhat similar to the attempt of making the ancient prophets
of the Scriptures speak in favor of Jesus, which was more difficult since their
words were recorded and they had never spoken of a defeated Messiah.

3.　In this case, the Church's interest in John the Baptist would have been in line with
Jesus' own interest, the main difference being that Jesus could not act as if John
had testified in his favor, whereas the Church, fifty years later, could do just this—
and even make Jesus say, regarding John, "If I bear witness to myself, my testi-
mony is not true; there is another who bears witness to me, and I know that the
testimony which he bears to me is true. You sent to John, and he has born witness
to the truth." (John 5:31-33)

4.　Strauss had hinted that Jesus might have been disappointed that John did not send
his own disciples to Jesus.

5.　"The liberation of the non-eschatological Jesus of the aphorisms and parables from
Schweitzer's eschatological Jesus is the fifth pillar of contemporary scholarship."
Robert W. Funk, Roy W. Hoover and the Jesus Seminar, *The Five Gospels: The
Search for the Authentic Words of Jesus* (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p. 4. See

also Marcus Borg, *Jesus: A New Vision* (San Francisco: Harper, 1987), pp. 8-17, and the good critique of the eschatological theory of Schweitzer by T. Francis Glasson, "Schweitzer's influence: Blessing or Bane?" in *The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus,* edited by Bruce Chilton (Philadelphia: Fortress).

6.   Funk, Hoover and the Jesus Seminar, *The Five Gospels,* p. 4.

7.   Charles Scobie, *John the Baptist,* p. 143.

8.   Willingly or not, the Fourth Evangelist here reverses the situation of the delegation sent by John to Jesus. "It is no longer Jesus who sends the explanation demanded by John, but it is John himself who gives it to his disciples." David F. Strauss, *New Life of Jesus,* Book 2 (1864), p. 115.

9.   Taking up a theory of Baldensperger, Maurice Goguel, in *Au seuil de l'Evangile: Jean-Baptiste* (1928) identified two editorial changes in this narrative: to establish a coherent account, he suggests, one must replace "a Jew" with "Jesus" in John 3:25; and "the Pharisees" with "John's disciples" in John 4:1. That would place Jesus directly in opposition to John's disciples on the subject of the value of purification rites and baptism, and on the rival baptismal activities of Jesus. Goguel goes further still: supposing that Jesus' departure was not caused only by the Baptists' hostility, he concludes that John himself "had a very reserved and perhaps even frankly hostile attitude toward Jesus." (p. 250) John's genuine answer to his disciples, he suggests, "meant a disavowal of Jesus by John the Baptist, and Jesus came to the logical conclusion that he had to go elsewhere to continue his mission." (p. 91) This thesis is based on much speculation, and presents at most one possibility.

10. Walter Wink, *John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition,* p. 81. On the other hand, it is much less certain that "the major part of the Baptist movement was absorbed into the Christian church," as Wink also argues (p. 107).

11. Cf. Walter Wink, *John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition,* p. 71.

12. Cf. William B. Badke, "Was Jesus a Disciple of John?" *Evangelical Quarterly* 62 (1990), pp. 195-204.

13. As for the dove, Stevan L. Davies has rightly argued that this image has no special theological meaning. I therefore completely agree with his statement: "Most likely, Christians believed Jesus saw the spirit descend in the form of a dove because that was what Jesus saw and he told them about it; why someone would make this up I cannot imagine." *Jesus the Healer* (New York: Continuum, 1995), p. 61.

14. Hendrikus Boers, *Who Was Jesus? The Historical Jesus and the Synoptic Gospels* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), p. 39.

15. Morton S. Enslin is correct to add that, in the Fourth Gospel, "the baptism of Jesus is deprived of any significance for Jesus—not surprising since the latter has just been introduced as the preexistent Christ, who has been the effective agent responsible for the world's creation." Under these conditions, he does not need God to reveal himself to him. Morton S. Enslin, "John and Jesus," *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 66 (1975), pp. 1-18.

16. See also Acts 13:24-25, where Paul does not say that John explicitly pointed to Jesus.

17. By the way, circumcision for the Jews is what baptism is for the newborn today among Christians.

18. Carl H. Kraeling, *John the Baptist* (New York: Scribners, 1951), p. 130. In the same direction, see P. G. Bretsher's very interesting article, "Whose Sandals? (Matt 3:11)," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 86 (1967), pp. 81-87, as well as John H. Hughes, "John the Baptist: The Forerunner of God Himself," *Novum Testamentum* 14 (1972), pp. 191-218.

19. Webb, *John the Baptizer and Prophet*, p. 286.

20. John A.T. Robinson, "Elijah, John and Jesus: An Essay in Detection," *New Testament Studies* 4 (1958), pp. 263-281.

21. This classification is inspired from an article by Jacques Dupont, "L'ambassade de Jean-Baptiste," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 83 (1961), pp. 805-21, 943-59.

22. Isa 35:5-6; 29:18-19; 26:19; 61:1.

23. Charles Scobie, *John the Baptist*, p. 143. In "Jesus' Reply to John (Matt. 11:2-6/Luke 7:18-23)," *Forum* 5 (1989), p. 122, Walter Wink adds that Jesus' answer to John has kept a trace of the Aramaic in which it was originally written. About verse 5, he says, a comparison between different manuscripts brings "virtual proof that this verse existed in Aramaic form."

24. David Flusser, *Jesus*, p. 45.

25. 1 Cor 1:23; 1 Cor 10:32; 2 Cor 6:3: Rom 9:32; Rom 14:21; Rom 16:17.

26. "Born of a woman" is certainly a Jewish expression which simply means "born on earth," "fully human" or "mortal." Paul uses it in speaking about Jesus in Gal 4:4: "God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law..."

27. Charles-Harold Dodd, *The Historical Tradition of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 373.

28. We can also draw a comparison between this verse and Thomas 99 (parallel to Mark 3:34-35) where Jesus contrasts his parents, who do not believe in him, to his disciples who "will enter into the Kingdom of my Father."

29. David Strauss, *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, pp. 226-227.

30. John Dominic Crossan, *Jesus, a Revolutionary Biography* (San Francisco: Harper, 1994), p. 48. Jesus developed his ministry in the villages, not in the desert. Matt 24:26, "So if they say to you, 'Lo, he is in the wilderness,' do not go out" reflects perhaps opposition to the desert tradition. Cf. John A.T. Robinson, "The Baptism of John and the Qumran Community," *Harvard Theological Review* 50 (1967), pp. 175-91.

31. Walter Wink, *John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition*, p. 20.

32. Loc. cit.

33. John Dominic Crossan, *The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), p. 231.

34. *Jewish Antiquities* 18:116-19.

35. Walter Wink, *John the Baptist in the Gospel Tradition*, p. 28.

36. It is pro-Roman and anti-messianic propaganda: the idea is that the tetrarch Herod,

ally of the Romans, had been forced by a woman to kill John, whom he liked, exactly as the procurator Pilate had been pushed by the Jews to kill Jesus, even though he could not find him guilty of anything.

37. John Dominic Crossan, *The Historical Jesus*, pp. 231-32.
38. David Strauss, *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, pp. 226-227.
39. Finally, we can imagine that, if he had united with Jesus and his vision, John himself might not have died prematurely. For Jesus did not call forth popular resentment against Antipas, whom he only called "that fox" (Luke 13:32), a friendly adjective compared to "dog" or "pig." Jesus' target was elsewhere.

FROM DEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENCE TOWARDS INTERDEPENDENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL TRENDS IN THE FAMILY AND IN THE WORLD

Yoshihiko Masuda

In this paper, we will discuss certain cultural trends by examining paradigm changes of the way relationships are conceived in the family and in the world. We will attempt not only to describe these cultural trends but also to prescribe the desirable changes in culture. Scholars have discussed "culture" from a number of different perspectives.[1] In this paper, we use the term "culture" to mean "shared values." In other words, its meaning is not so different from a common-sense use of the term.

Looking from the perspective of Unification Thought, we affirm with an increasingly large consensus of scholars that the family is the most important place for inheriting and creating a culture of shared values. Therefore, in the first section of this paper we will discuss cultural trends in families by focusing on the relationship between husband and wife. We will illuminate paradigm shifts in the relationship between men and women, in large part through examining the rise and transformation of the feminist movement in the United

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States. On that basis, we will present as our thesis that the general flow of the paradigm shifts in the relationship between men and women has been from *dependence* to *independence* to *interdependence*.

In the second section, we will further elaborate the meaning and implications of interdependent relations, utilizing a story by Sundar Singh and discussing the Unification Thought teaching about conjugal love. We will point out a gradual rise in such interdependent relations in various fields throughout the world, especially in the 1990s.

In the third section, we will briefly discuss the question of what has caused the paradigm shift from independence towards interdependence in the 1990s and argue that the demise of Marxism has played the most decisive role in facilitating the rise of this new paradigm. In the conclusion, in addition to summarizing our observations, we will offer some additional comments on what kind of culture we should encourage and on how we can facilitate its dawning. I hope this paper will be of help in creating and facilitating a new culture fit for the emerging age of the global village.

1. Paradigm Shifts in Male-Female Relations: The Rise and Transformation of the Feminist Movement in the United States

Needless to say, the family is the most important locus for inheriting cultures and shared values. Sociologists usually explain the process of inheriting values by the term "socialization." We can regard socialization as a process of internalizing values; therefore, we can generally state that culture is transmitted through socialization. In discussing socialization, many sociologists refer to socialization in the family as "primary socialization" and emphasize its importance in comparison to "secondary socialization" through schools, friends, mass media and other agents of socialization in the larger community.

In focusing on the paradigm shifts in the relationship between man and woman, we will discuss cultural trends of families in the United States. We will attempt to illuminate the shifts in the male-female relationship in large part through examining the rise and transformation of the feminist movement in the United States during the last forty years or so. We will focus on trends in the United States, partly because it is the most influential nation in the world in terms of culture, and partly because I continuously lived in America and observed American life for over two decades from 1973 until 1994.[2]

In general, if we view the paradigm shifts in male-female relations in the United States from a perspective of women, we can call the first paradigm shift *from dependence to independence* and the second paradigm shift *from independence to interdependence*. On the other hand, if we summarize these changes from the perspective of men, we may well call the first paradigm shift

from domination to alienation and the second paradigm shift *from alienation to interdependence*. I selected the women's perspective, "from dependence and independence towards interdependence," for the title of this paper because the terms are meaningful and because of the paper's focus on the feminist literature.

Now let me elaborate these paradigm shifts in husband-wife relations. It is clear that women were dominated by men for thousands of years. Women were generally viewed as somewhat defective and inferior to men; Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas's description of women as "misbegotten males" is notorious among feminists and indicative of this view.[3] Wives were treated as if they were the husbands' property throughout most of human history, not only in the Old Testament but also in many societies' civil laws. Furthermore, there have been many societies whose laws legitimated polygyny, a man's having multiple wives. In short, throughout history women were generally dependent on men.

Consequently, many feminists describe the typical pattern of husband-wife relations in the United States in the 1950s as the wife's dependence upon her husband. In particular, wives were not financially free. Lacking special skills and education, few women had their own careers. In many cases, women could not borrow money from banks without a man's (i.e., their husband's or father's) permission, even if they wanted to start a small business of their own. As a result, many wives were financially dependent on their husbands in the 1950s.

The latter part of the 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of the radical feminist movement in the United States. As the rise of the nineteenth-century American feminist movement was closely related with the antislavery movement, so the rise of the 1960s feminist movement was considerably inspired by the success of the civil-rights movement, which struggled to eliminate racial injustice and discrimination. The leaders of the feminist movement expanded the interpretation of the civil rights and struggled to eliminate what they regarded as sexual injustice and discrimination. They attempted to abolish "sexism" in a very similar way as the civil-rights movement struggled to abolish racism. As the idea of the innate racial differences (e.g., the innate inferiority of the black race) was severely criticized in the civil-rights movement, so too was the idea of the innate sexual differences (e.g., the innate inferiority of females) severely criticized in the feminist movement, especially in the 1960s.

Many leaders of the feminist movement in those years promoted equal opportunities between men and women; they spoke up criticizing discrimination against women in education, employment, job promotions and so forth. By emphasizing the innate equality between men and women, feminist leaders in the 1960s and 1970s attempted to bring about external equality—or

equality of results—by eliminating the discrimination against women in society. In other words, they emphasized the exact sameness between males and females and de-emphasized the difference, which the Unification Thought perspective regards as complementarity, between them. Consequently, outstanding leaders of the feminist movement who spoke up for women with a strident voice in the 1960s and 1970s promoted women's striving for independence and self-realization without any sense of appreciation for men.[4] In many cases, they regarded men as women's enemy and the obstacle to their own self-realization as blocking the gate of equal opportunity for women.

We may well describe the main goal of the feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s as the strong independent woman or the self-realized woman. As a result of the feminist movement in those years, more women gained opportunities to study at distinguished colleges, to work for big business corporations in leadership roles, and to earn as much money as men.

Were American women enjoying the fruits of feminism in the 1980s happier than women in the 1950s? It is difficult to compare the subjective feelings of people from two different generations. It turned out, however, that many American feminist women were not really happy, even though the social environment gave them equal opportunities to work just like men, to earn as much money as men, and to wield power just like men. Women could not become happy by becoming just like men and behaving just like men—without their own men (i.e., husbands) and family (i.e., children). This was the honest assessment by none other than Betty Friedan, author of *The Feminine Mystique*, the founder and the first president of the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the so-called mother of the modern feminist movement. Although in the 1960s she had championed the goal of the self-realization of women totally independent of men, Friedan presented the above sober assessment as in her book *The Second Stage*.[5] She came to have second thoughts about the goals of the feminist movement.

Friedan in *The Second Stage* advocated a new feminist movement that should transcend the radical feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s. She referred to the new challenge that the feminist movement must undertake after winning the equal opportunities in many fields as the "second stage" of the movement. She proclaimed the important characteristics of the second stage as follows:

> The second stage cannot be seen in terms of women alone, our separate personhood or equality with men.
>
> The second stage involves coming to new terms with the family—new terms with love and with work.
>
> The second stage may not even be a women's movement. Men may be at the cutting edge of the second stage.

The second stage has to transcend the battle for equal power in institutions. The second stage will restructure institutions and transform the nature of power itself.

The second stage may even now be evolving, out of or even aside from what we have thought of as our battle.[6]

After Friedan's bold reassessment of the feminist movement's goals, similar critiques of the feminist movement appeared one after another in the 1980s and gained increasing popularity among contemporary American women. Connel Cowan and Melvyn Kinder in their book *Smart Women/Foolish Choices* blamed the radical feminist movement for the current women's malaise, because in their view "it created a myth among women that the apex of self-realization could be achieved only through autonomy, independence and career."[7] Soon there appeared a flood of critiques of radical feminism in the American mass media, as documented by Susan Faludi in *Backlash*. Here, for example, is her summary of the confessional account of Megan Marshall, a "recovering Superwoman":

In *The Cost of Loving: Women and the New Fear of Intimacy*, Megan Marshall, a Harvard-pedigreed writer, asserts that the feminist "Myth of Independence" has turned her generation into unloved and unhappy fast trackers, "dehumanized" by careers and "uncertain of their gender identity."[8]

Faludi went on to summarize the backlash against radical feminism as follows:

Other diaries of mad Superwomen charge that "the hard-core feminist viewpoint," as one of them puts it, has relegated educated executive achievers to solitary nights of frozen dinners and closet drinking. The triumph of equality, they report, has merely given women hives, stomach cramps, eye-twitching disorders, even comas.[9]

Although Faludi apparently disliked and criticized the anti-feminists' claim that "they can chart a path from rising female independence to rising female pathology," it is noteworthy that Friedan in large part agreed with such a claim. The fact that unmarried single men over thirty who may well be described as independent men have more severe psychological and social problems than do independent women does not nullify the anti-feminists' description of the distress of independent women who remain single into their thirties and beyond.

Carol Gilligan's book *In a Different Voice* also contributed significantly to debunking the cause of the radical feminists who struggled for equality of opportunity and results for women on the postulate that men and women have equal innate ability.[10] These radical feminists of the 60s and 70s are sometimes referred to as "equal opportunity feminists" by the new generation

of feminists who are sometimes called "relational feminists." Pointing out the differences between men and women in terms of their moral reasoning and behavior, Gilligan illuminated women's caring and relational way of moral thinking and behavior in contrast to men's rational and subjective way of thinking and behavior. Gilligan's book reminded many women of the presence of women's special nature that can be regarded as in many ways superior to men's. At the same time, it reminded many women of the physiological and psychological differences between the sexes. Gilligan's book was all the more influential because she was a professor at prestigious Harvard University. Her credentials as an intelligent feminist also contributed to the acceptance of her views by many of her fellow feminists.

What is the new paradigm of the male-female relationship emerging in the 1980s and 1990s? It is being promoted both by many critics of radical feminism and by the new generation of feminists.[11] I call this paradigm *interdependence.* Many women have come to disagree with the paradigm of independence promoted by radical feminism, and at the same time they are dissatisfied with the old paradigm of one-sided dependence. Thus, according to my observation, we can discern two paradigm shifts in male-female relations in the United States during the last forty years: from dependence to independence and from independence to interdependence. In my view, the age of interdependence is now dawning throughout the world, not only between men and women but also in many other fields.

Finally, I would like to make it clear that our mentioning of the three paradigms of dependence, independence and interdependence does not completely correspond with the empirical situation of male-female relations in the United States. For example, the paradigm of independence was fashionable and influential especially among highly educated women in the radical 1960s and 1970s, but it never prevailed in the relations between ordinary American husbands and wives of that era. Nevertheless, the main goal of feminist thought about husband-wife relations was firmly in that direction. Similarly, since the 1980s the paradigm among the most influential women has moved from pursuing the goal of the self-realized independent woman towards the realization of genuine interdependent relations between men and women.

2. The Rise of Interdependent Relations throughout the World

Since the 1990s, the entire world has seen the gradual rise of the paradigm of interdependent relations. It is my conviction that we are heading for the age of interdependence, not only in husband-wife relations but also in many other fields, especially in this new age of the global village. To explain this, I must elaborate on the meaning of interdependence and its social implications.

Interdependent relations means symbiotic relations. Symbiosis is a bio-

logical term that refers to the relationship between two or more different organisms living together in close association, especially when the relationship is mutually beneficial. To vividly present the meaning of interdependent or symbiotic relations, I will present a story. I have long been struck by the value of narrative theology, which attempts to present the meaning of important concepts through touching stories, stories that move not just our intellect but primarily our heart. Here I apply the narrative method to the exposition of Unification Thought.[12] This story was originally delivered in a sermon by Sundar Singh, a famous Indian Christian mystic in the first part of this century.

> It was an extremely cold afternoon in the midst of winter. On a rugged path in the Himalaya Mountains, two friends were walking together on the way to their home village. It was sometimes snowing hard, and the severely cold north wind was blowing. They were walking in a near blizzard!

> Walking against the harsh cold wind and blinding snow, they did not at first realize that a man lay on the snowy ground. His body was covered with light snow. He was alive but nearly frozen to death; he was nearly unconscious. One of the two friends felt very sorry for this suffering man. Eager to help him, he would not walk away from this almost frozen man.

> The other friend also felt sorry for this frozen man. Nonetheless, he said to his friend, "We must get to our village before dark. We have to hurry up to reach our home before dark. I'm sorry for this man, but let's leave him here and go quickly." The first friend, however, could not abandon the almost dead man and refused to walk away from the scene. Then, the second friend again said to the first friend, "All right, I am going on ahead of you," and hurriedly walked away alone, heading for the village.

> The first friend put the almost frozen man on his back and slowly walked in the direction of his village against the harsh cold wind. Not far from the village, in the dusk he saw a dark object on the path. When he came close to the object, much to his surprise, it turned out to be the frozen body of his friend who had hurriedly gone ahead alone and had left him and the almost dead traveler behind. His heart was not beating any longer; he was already frozen, dead.

> The first friend felt very sad at the death of his friend. He realized that his friend had frozen to death on the way home because he had walked alone in the severely cold wind. He whispered to himself in his heart, "How about me? Because I've carried this nearly frozen man on my back, his body has kept me warm on my way here. That's why I could reach here while sweating under his warm body. Come to think of it, I was saved by this nearly dead traveler frozen on the path! I thought I was saving this frozen traveler, but on the contrary, it was indeed this traveler who saved me!"[13]

In this story, the relationship between the first friend and the nearly dead traveler is an example of interdependent relations. The first friend was saved by the suffering traveler whom he saved. Walking alone, one died; walking together, two survived—thanks to their mutually beneficial interdependent relations.

In my view, it is important to distinguish between relations of "coexistence" and those of interdependence.[14] The connotation of coexistence is that one merely tolerates the existence of others, even though one might prefer that they didn't exist or disappear. One allows others to exist, but one does not benefit from their existence. A typical case of a coexistent relationship was that of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. On the contrary, interdependent relations are not cold but warm, not bellicose but peaceful, and not apathetic but full of a loving heart. One welcomes others to exist because of the mutually beneficial or complementary relationships one enjoys with them.

In the case of husband-wife relations, even the word "welcome" in the above sentence sounds too weak. According to the perspective of Unification Thought, in a "true family" the husband needs his wife absolutely and the wife needs her husband absolutely, because they absolutely complement each other. Expounding Reverend Sun Myung Moon's words on the "Four Great Realms of Heart," Dr. Sang Hun Lee described the significance of conjugal love between a husband and a wife as follows:

> Among the four kinds of love... namely, children's love, brothers' and sisters' love, conjugal love and parental love, the love that becomes the representative of all of them is conjugal love. This is so because... the husband represents all the males within a family, and the wife represents all the females within a family; moreover each represents one of God's dual characteristics. Another reason is that the husband is the position to represent all men, who constitute half of humankind, and the wife is the position to represent all women, who constitute the other half of humankind; moreover, the husband represents the yang aspect of the whole universe, and the wife represents the yin aspect of the whole universe.[15]

Considering this, the Unification Thought view of husband-wife relations is quite different from relations where the husband dominates his wife and the wife is totally dependent on her husband. It is also poles apart from the relationship which the self-realized independent woman has with her alienated husband. It clearly fits the model of interdependent and complementary relations between husband and wife.

Interdependent relations exist not only between husband and wife, but also between parents and children, between brothers and sisters, and between the different generations in a family. Our interdependent relations in the fam-

ily mean that we are in a position to live together, to help each other, and to love each other. According to Unification Thought, the family is the most important place to learn and to practice true love. Therefore, we can also assert that the family is the most important place to learn interdependent relations. It is noteworthy that Reverend Moon has repeatedly and harshly criticized atomistic individualism; extreme individualism is antithetical to the idea of interdependence and prevents us from establishing interdependent relations.

We can now find numerous attempts to facilitate the rise of interdependent relations throughout the world. In a previous paper, I described the recent historical trend of the rise of regional economic communities that transcend national barriers.[16] It is important to realize that creation of regional economic communities such as the European Community, the North American Free Trade Zone by NAFTA, as well as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference), are attempts to facilitate the rise of the interdependent relations among nations in their respective regions. In general we can see the following fact: the regions that have established wide and deep interdependent relations among their nations are now economically prosperous, whereas those regions (e.g., Africa) that failed to establish such interdependent relations among their nations are economically stagnant.

It is also noteworthy that many nations that were former colonies have gone through a similar course of paradigm shifts in relations with their former colonial masters: from dependence and independence towards interdependence. They were once dependent on their imperialist patron; then they became independent of the imperialist powers; recently, forgiving their former enemies, many have striven to establish interdependent relations with them. When comparing formerly colonized nations, we can generally see more prosperity in the nations that have established interdependent relations with the former imperialist nations of the West and Japan than in such nations (e.g., Cuba, North Korea) that have isolated or were forced to isolate themselves from the former imperialist nations. This is because economic development is facilitated not by isolation but by give-and-receive actions.[17] It is also suggestive that formerly colonized nations still under the influence of doctrinaire Marxist views have failed to establish interdependent relations with the former imperialist nations. The more Marxist influence, the less interdependent relations.

Moreover, in recent years there has emerged not only regional economic communities but also a global economic community, which some economists call a "borderless economic market." The global economic community is emerging largely as a result of the elimination of national trade barriers, which are carefully watched by the new World Trade Organization (WTO). The

explosive development of the personal computer and communication tech-
nology has also contributed to the emergence of interdependent economic net-
works, not only in certain regions but throughout the world.

Deep awareness and appreciation of interdependent relations is the pre-
requisite for unification or unity, as well as for peace, among the constituent
members of such relations. Seeing the gradual rise of interdependent relations
throughout the world, we can generally discern that the whole world is grad-
ually becoming more unified as well as more peaceful than ever before.

We can also easily find the cultural trend towards interdependence
among many business corporations throughout the world. We can clearly see
that many successful and prosperous companies have seriously promoted
interdependent relations between management and the labor. Companies and
their counterparts in organized labor which are lacking in a culture of inter-
dependence are, in many cases, in trouble. Put differently, companies and
labor unions still somehow under the influence of the old Marxist culture of
conflict and hatred have not thrived but declined in the new borderless eco-
nomic market.

Interdependent relations exist not only among human beings, but also
between human beings and all things in our environment. Pollution of natur-
al resources and other environmental problems were caused by our lack of
awareness and appreciation of our interdependent relations with the environ-
ment. It is encouraging, however, that there has been a rising awareness of our
interdependent relations with our environment, as we can see in the growing
interest in environmental ethics among scholars and religious leaders in recent
years.

Finally, we can also describe the relationship between human beings and
God as having gone through the paradigm shifts from dependence and inde-
pendence towards interdependence. I will not go into detail here, but just sum
up my general observation of the human relationship with God, as this is not
a theological paper.

In the past, there had been a long age of human beings' dependence on
God, as God was considered to be omnipotent and omniscient. Then, there
came the age of human beings' attempts to become independent of God.
Unification Thought discerns the existence of three cultural waves or move-
ments during the last 400 years which were human attempts to become inde-
pendent of God. The first wave was the Renaissance; the second wave was
the Enlightenment; and the third and final wave was the Communist move-
ment based on Marxism-Leninism. Nonetheless, when the Soviet Union col-
lapsed and the nations of Eastern Europe abandoned Communism, this
militantly atheistic ideology completely lost credibility. The era of human
beings' rebellion against God had ended.

In my view, today throughout the world we see a gradual rise of human

beings' awareness of our interdependent relationship with God. This new understanding of our human relationship with God is now emerging in the religious world, as typified by the rise of Unification Theology. It acknowledges the existence of human freedom and responsibility with which even God cannot intervene. Interdependence includes the dimension of living together joyfully; therefore, interdependence between human beings and God means for God and human beings to live together joyfully. It appears to me that the world is heading for the age when God and human beings can live together joyfully on earth, as prophesied in the Christian Scripture in the Revelation to John.[18]

3. What Caused the Paradigm Shift towards Interdependent Relations?

What caused the paradigm shift from independence towards interdependence? What caused the paradigm shift towards the acceptance and increasing popularity of interdependent relations in various fields? In this section, we will examine the major causes of this paradigm shift.

First of all, in the case of husband-wife relations in the United States, the accumulation of empirical data suggests that for a large number of individual feminist women, their actual experiences probably played an important role in changing the paradigm of their relationship with their husbands. They became dissatisfied with their role as the self-realized independent woman relating with her alienated (and often divorced) husband, and began to seek an interdependent relationship with their husbands. I do not deny the importance of actual experience in causing the paradigm shift towards interdependent relations in many other fields as well.

When analyzing from a Unification Thought perspective, we can also see that the paradigm of interdependence is rooted in the reality of "dual characteristics," or the pair system, which characterizes all existent beings. It is rooted in the reality that each human being is an "individual embodiment of truth"—a unique individual who has something unique to offer through give-and-receive actions. It is also supported by the reality of each and every being existing as a "connected body." In short, we can say that the sum of various women's experiences confirmed such reality as described by Unification Thought, and that their empirical information facilitated the paradigm shift towards interdependence in husband-wife relations. In other words, we can respond to the question, What caused the paradigm shift towards interdependence in many fields? with an answer that the paradigm shift emerged because it fits with the reality of all beings. Unification Thought explains the reality of all beings in terms of dual characteristics, the individual embodiment of

truth, and the connected body, all concepts which are by far more congenial to the paradigm of interdependence than those of dependence or independence.[19]

Nonetheless, according to my observation, the most decisive factor that has contributed to the near universal paradigm shift towards interdependent relations in the late 1980s and 1990s was the demise of the conflict-inciting Communist ideology. The Communist ideology of Marxism-Leninism gradually lost credibility throughout the world in the 1980s and completely collapsed in the 1990s as the Soviet Union disintegrated and the East European Communist nations abandoned Marxism-Leninism.

As is well-known by now, doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism overemphasized the existence of conflicts in the world. It falsely asserted that only the struggle of conflicting elements could bring about development. It incited and justified violent struggles and wars in the name of class struggle. It encouraged believers to harbor deep hatred and to reject any mercy for their enemy. Marxism-Leninism gave rise to a culture of hatred and is rightly blamed for the tragic death of several tens of millions of innocent people in Communist nations under the dictatorships of Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot and others.

As I earlier introduced a story in order to expound interdependent relations, let me also mention a story that, I believe, represents the Marxist worldview. I read this Marxist moral story in Korean in 1971 when I took a course on "Elementary Reading in Korean Language" at Tokyo University. The textbook which contained this moral story was printed in Beijing and was probably published to indoctrinate children with Marxist values. More than a quarter century has passed since I read it. Nonetheless, I still remember its basic story line, not only because as a beginning student in Korean I had to carefully translate the story word by word, but also because I was so emotionally troubled by its moral lesson.

The story runs as follows: Once there was a warm-hearted grandfather in the countryside near a big mountain. One day, when he was walking on a mountain path, he found a ferocious and cunning wolf who was wounded and caught in a trap. The wolf asked the grandfather for mercy and for his help. Persuaded by the wolf, the grandfather helped the wolf get out of the trap. Then, later, the grandfather was attacked and eaten by the very same evil wolf that he had so kindly saved. Moral lesson: Have no mercy for your enemy; don't forgive your enemy; kill your enemy; it is dangerous to keep your enemy alive![20]

Apparently, the ferocious and cunning wolf symbolized the capitalists, the "enemies of the people." Human relations fostered by the Marxist worldview, as exemplified by the above story, are quite a contrast to the interdependent relations promoted by religious worldviews such as exemplified by Sundar Singh's story. Undoubtedly, awareness and appreciation of interdependent relations in many fields could never take root as long as there exist-

ed widespread support for conflict-inciting and hatred-spreading Marxism in our world. It is my conviction that only the demise of Communist ideology enabled many people to discern the legitimacy and crucial importance of interdependent relations.

Since the 1960s, Reverend Moon has devoted himself to liberating the world from Communism. The effect which his many efforts had in weakening Communism and strengthening the West's resolve to fight it is only beginning to be documented.[21] They included movements devoted to anti-Communist ideological education, notably CAUSA and the International Federation for Victory Over Communism (IFVOC), as well as the influential newspaper *The Washington Times*. Together with his disciple Dr. Sang Hun Lee, he developed and promoted a thorough critique of conflict-inciting doctrinaire Marxism, including a counterproposal which outlines his vision of interdependent relations.[22]

Reverend Moon has spoken volumes about the emerging culture of interdependence, which he calls the "culture of true love." In this sense, he has been on the front line of both the movement to defeat Communism and the movement to establish the new paradigm of interdependent relations. Given also that the demise of Communism (Marxism-Leninism) has been arguably the most decisive factor for the near universal rise of the paradigm of interdependent relations, Reverend Moon's contribution to the world's acceptance of interdependent relations must be underscored.

4. Conclusion

We have examined the cultural trend of the changing paradigms of relationships as it has manifested in families and in the larger world. In the first section of this paper, we discussed cultural trends in the relationships between husbands and wives in American families through examining the rise and transformation of the feminist movement in the United States. We discerned two paradigm shifts in the relationship between men and women: from dependence to independence, and then from independence to interdependence. Unification Thought emphasizes that the family is the most important place for inheriting and creating cultures and shared values.

In the second section, we further elaborated the meaning and implications of interdependent relations through a story by Sundar Singh and a discussion of the Unification Thought perspective on conjugal love. Then we pointed out the gradual rise of such interdependent relations in various fields throughout the world, especially in the 1990s. In the third section, we argued that the demise of conflict-inciting Marxism has played a decisive role in facilitating the rise of the new culture of interdependence in many areas of human relations.

Reverend Moon teaches that the culture of the interdependent relations is a culture of true love and a culture of true family. We naturally learn the existence and importance of interdependent relations first and foremost in our own family through our parents. Many problems in this world are derived from the existence of so many broken families and near-broken families, where husbands and wives, parents and children, and brothers and sisters merely coexist without establishing genuine and warm interdependent relations. Therefore, the creation of true families, where children can observe and learn the joy and happiness of loving interdependent relations, is key to the universal rise of interdependent relations. It is noteworthy that, by organizing the "true family movement" throughout the world and promoting global Blessing events (e.g., the Blessing of 3.6 million couples in 1997), Reverend and Mrs. Moon have also been working to create true families where such interdependent relations abound.

Where there are interdependent relations, there emerges unity and prosperity. Appreciation of their interdependent relationship will necessarily facilitate give-and-receive action between the two partners, which Unification Thought views as the source of all the forces the entity needs for existence, multiplication, and development.

We should strive for the rise of the culture of interdependence in families, in societies, and throughout the world. We should live not separately but together; we should live, not arms in hand, but hand in hand. In this age of the global village, if we hope to build a peaceful and unified world, we must make serious efforts to facilitate the rise of the culture of interdependence, that is, the culture of true love. Already the Marxist culture of hatred has been receding all over the world as morning fog dissipates in the sunlight. I sincerely hope that it will not be long before the culture of true love permeates all human relations throughout the world.

Notes

1. For example, see Jeffrey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman, eds., *Culture and Society: Contemporary Debates* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), who discerned and presented six approaches to culture: functionalist, semiotic, dramaturgical, Weberian, Durkheimian, Marxian and Poststructuralist.
2. Since moving to Korea In 1994, I have continued to visit the United States for two or three months every year.
3. For a summary and feminist critique of Aquinas's view of women, see, e.g., Mary Daly, *The Church and the Second Sex* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).
4. E.g., Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: Norton, 1963).
5. Betty Friedan, *The Second Stage* (New York: Summit Books, 1981).
6. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

7. Connell Cowan and Melvyn Kinder, *Smart Women/Foolish Choices* (New York: New American Library, 1985), p. 16.

8. Susan Faludi, *Backlash: Undeclared War Against American Women* (New York: Crown, 1991), p. xii. See Megan Marshall, *The Cost of Loving: Women and the New Fear of Intimacy* (New York: Putnam, 1984), p. 218.

9. Faludi, p. xiii. Faludi herself sharply criticizes these statements, although she aptly documented and summarized the various critiques of radical feminism.

10. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

11. Many members of the Women's Federation for World Peace belong to this new generation of feminists who appreciate the interdependent relations between males and females.

12. If I find this narrative method effective, I may attempt a book on a narrative Unification Thought which will explain various important concepts of Unification Thought through vivid and touching stories.

13. In Yoshihisa Odajima, *Kirisutokyou Rinri Nyumon [An Introduction to Christian Ethics]* (Tokyo: Yorudan-sha, 1988), pp. 118-19; translated into English by the author.

14. It is noteworthy that the Korean word *kong-saeng* was translated as "interdependence" in *Exposition of the Divine Principle* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1996), p. 342, a new English translation of *Wolli-kangnon* (Seoul: HSA-UWC, 1966).

15. Sang Hun Lee, "The Four Great Realms of Heart and the Three Great Kingships," *Unification Thought Quarterly* 39 (1996), pp. 49-61.

16. Yoshihiko Masuda, "Secularization or Sacralization? A Discussion of Modern Human History from a Unification Thought Perspective," in *The Establishment of a New Culture and Unification Thought: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium on Unification Thought* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1991), p. 101.

17. For the meaning and implications of give-and-receive action, see *Essentials of Unification Thought: The Head-Wing Thought* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1992).

18. "See, the home of God is among mortals. He will dwell with them as their God; they will be his peoples, and God himself will be with them." (Rev 21:3, New Revised Standard Version)

19. *Essentials of Unification Thought*, p. 70, declares, "all beings are created in the resemblance of God's dual characteristics, and therefore they exist not only as individual truth bodies, but also as connected bodies, whereby they are connected, directly or indirectly, with other individual truth bodies."

20. The other students in the Korean class—five or six in all—who read this story with me were Korean Marxist students born and educated in Japan and associated with the *Chosen Souren* organization which supports the North Korean government.

21. See especially Thomas Ward and Frederick Swarts, "Rush to History: A Notable Omission in Postmortem Literature on the Cold War" in this volume. For a study documenting *The Washington Times'* contribution to the demise of the Soviet

Union, see Hiroyasu Tomaru, *Sekai Saikyouno Shinbun [The Most Powerful Newspaper in the World]* (Tokyo: Kogensha, 1994.)

22. This paper is dedicated to the memory of my dear teacher Dr. Sang Hun Lee, the greatest systematizer of Reverend Sun Myung Moon's thought. Dr. Lee passed away on March 22, 1997, during the Ninth International Symposium on Unification Thought held at Sun Moon University, South Korea. Several hours before Dr. Lee lost consciousness, I had a personal opportunity to talk with him about my paper. Dr. Lee was happy to hear that I would include in the revised version of my paper a note acknowledging his very significant contribution to the demise of the Communist ideology.

STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE FAMILY

Jennifer P. Tanabe

In seeking to understand human development, one of the important issues is whether there are stages in development; and if so, what is the nature of the stages and, perhaps more importantly, the relationship between them. Jean Piaget, the eminent Swiss developmental psychologist who spent his life pursuing the goal of discovering how knowledge grows,[1] presented a stage model for the development of many cognitive abilities, including moral judgment.[2] However, unlike the stages in development of cognitive abilities, Piaget saw moral development more as a "two world" theory than as a theory of true stages. Many researchers, however, both past and present, such as James Mark Baldwin,[3] Lawrence Kohlberg,[4] Carol Gilligan,[5] Larry Nucci[6] and Elliot Turiel[7] generally assume that there are stages of moral development while disagreeing on their actual nature.

Unification Thought,[8] a new philosophical system, has been shown to be compatible with Piaget's Genetic Epistemology, while at the same time providing new insights into some of its limitations.[9] In this article, issues in moral development are examined from the viewpoint of Unification Thought, which regards relationships developed within the family as the basis for moral judgments.

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1. Stages in Development

First, let us look at the concept of stages in development. Although this concept is probably the best known of Piaget's ideas and seems to be central to his theory, in reviewing his work it becomes apparent that he has not in fact written a great deal about the stage concept.[10] However, since much of Piaget's writing is based on the raw material of his work and it is very hard for the reader to grasp the concepts involved, as he himself acknowledged,[11] this lack of quantity does not make his position on stages less clear. In the book summarizing his work on child psychology, Piaget concludes:

> Basically, the mental development of the child appears as a succession of three great periods. Each of these extends the preceding period, reconstructs it on a new level, and later surpasses it to an ever greater degree.[12]

Further explanation reveals three characteristics of stages:

> (1) Their order of succession is constant... (2) Each stage is characterized by an overall structure in terms of which the main behavior patterns can be explained... (3) These overall structures are integrative and non-interchangeable. Each results from the preceding one, integrating it as a subordinate structure, and prepares for the subsequent one, into which it is sooner or later itself integrated.[13]

Gruber and Vonèche, in their anthology of Piaget's work, include the definition of stages of intellectual development given by Piaget at a symposium in Geneva in 1955:

> In this special domain, . . . I will call *stages* those divisions that display the following characteristics:
>
> (1) If we are to speak of stages, *the order of succession of acquisitions must be constant*. Not the timing, but the order of succession...
>
> (2) The *integrative character of stages*: the structures constructed at a given age become an integral part of the structures of the following age...
>
> (3) We have always sought, together with Inhelder, to characterize a stage, not by the juxtaposition of unrelated properties, but by a *structure of the whole (structure d'ensemble)*...
>
> (4) A stage includes a level of *preparation* on the one hand, and of completion on the other...
>
> (5) But as the preparation of later acquisitions can bear on more than one stage... it is necessary to distinguish, in every sequence of stages, the *processes of formation* or the genesis and the *forms of final equilibrium*...
> I would like finally to emphasize the notion of *décalage*... We will speak

of horizontal *décalages* when the same operation is applied to different con-
tents… A vertical *décalage*, on the other hand, is the reconstruction of a
structure by means of other operations.[14]

Thus, Piaget believed that intellectual, or cognitive, development pro-
ceeds through stages which occur in a constant order, universally, regardless
of culture, that are integrated hierarchically from one stage to the next, and
which consist of a number of elements which taken together form a particu-
lar structure. Within each stage there are preparation (processes of formation)
and completion (forms of final equilibrium) levels, and there may also be rep-
etitions of the formative processes (known as horizontal and vertical
décalages). Note that Piaget does not claim that all development is charac-
terized by stages. In fact, he makes clear that stages so defined are found in
the development of intellectual operations but not in other domains such as
perception and language, in which there is "a continuity which one can divide
up according to some agreed upon convention, but which presents no distinct
and natural divisions."[15]

2. An Overview of Theories of Moral Development

Given the current interest in moral education, especially following the emer-
gence of the character education movement,[16] we have become aware of the
need for a clear understanding of the development of moral reasoning. It is
generally accepted that moral reasoning, i.e. the ability to judge whether
actions are "good" or "bad," is more substantial than behavior, since "good"
behavior can be achieved based on many different levels of understanding.
This section provides a brief overview of the foundational and current theo-
ries in this field.[17]

In his work on moral development, Piaget noted two types of morality:
a morality of constraint or heteronomy, and a morality of cooperation or
autonomy.[18] Heteronomous morality, which appears first, is characterized by
unilateral respect for parents or authorities and the rules they prescribe, cou-
pled with obedience to authority and authority-made rules. Autonomous
morality, which develops later, is characterized by mutual respect among
peers or equals, coupled with conformity based on identification with shared
goals and concern for approval of others. However, Piaget did not believe that
these two types of morality constitute true stages of development. His reasons
included the observation that the two moralities originate in two different
sorts of social relationships, namely, those involving unilateral and mutual
respect. He also noted that, although the two types are age-dependent, we see
a gradual predominance of the autonomous type over the heteronomous type
of morality rather than a qualitative transformation from one to the other.

On the other hand, Piaget described three stages in the development of distributive justice in the child: (1) until 7-8 years, when justice is subordinated to adult authority, (2) between 8-11 years, a period of progressive equalitarianism, and (3) from 11-12 years, when purely equalitarian justice is tempered by considerations of equity.[19]

Thus, Piaget's work on moral development includes the notion of stages, but rather than a single set of stages there are two types of morality, heteronomous and autonomous. The latter is considered by Piaget to be a higher and more desirable state of development than the former. There is also an indication that the development of these two types of morality proceeds through stages, albeit they may not be "stages properly so called."[20]

The person who brought the field of moral development to the attention of the world is Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg devoted himself to the study of moral development in research for his doctoral dissertation (completed at the University of Chicago in 1958). His methodology was designed to isolate Piaget's heteronomous and autonomous types by using moral dilemmas, which pitted conformity to authority or rules against fairness in the form of equality, reciprocity and human rights. The results led him to produce a six-stage model,[21] based more heavily on James Mark Baldwin's theory than on Piaget's, although the two dimensions of heteronomy and autonomy were later integrated as the two sub-stages in the three major periods. Kohlberg's six stages are defined as follows:

Pre-conventional Level
    1 -punishment and obedience orientation
    2 -instrumental relativist orientation

Conventional Level
    3 -interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation
    4 -"law and order" orientation

Post-conventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level
    5 -social-contract legalistic orientation
    6 -universal ethical principle orientation

At the pre-conventional level moral judgments are characterized by a concrete, individual perspective. The stage 1 heteronomous orientation focuses on avoiding punishment by obedience, while stage 2 involves the early emergence of moral reciprocity in which rules are followed when they are in one's own interest. Individuals at the conventional level understand that norms and conventions are necessary for the functioning of society and view morality as acting in accordance with these societal norms. Stage 3 is limited to the imme-

diate society made up of the family and local community; the individual seeks to be good in the eyes of local authority. Stage 4 expands to the larger social system of civic duty and obedience to the law for the sake of public good. The post-conventional level is characterized by reasoning based on principles, which underlie rules and norms apart from the authority of those holding these principles. Stage 5 focuses on general individual rights and standards agreed upon by the whole society; stage 6 is based on universal, abstract, ethical principles of justice which respect the dignity of all human beings.[22]

Kohlberg, like Piaget, was not concerned with the moral behavior of his subjects, but rather their reasoning about issues involving moral judgments. His theory is based on the cognitive developmental approach, which articulates a stage sequence from the immature, young child to the mature, adult form of reasoning. Critics of this type of approach note that the so-called adult form of reasoning is often not used by adults, and even appears rather unattractive as the goal of development.[23] In the moral domain, the issue of whether there are higher and lower stages of morality, implying a goal to be achieved by all, is a serious question. In fact, Kohlberg's final sixth stage failed to receive empirical support in later work, but rather appears as a logical construction necessary to complete his theory. Additionally, further research revealed many anomalies in the order of responses by adolescents, leading to the proposal of a transitional stage that is post-conventional but not yet principled. These facts, coupled with attacks on stage theory in cognitive development, have generated great controversy and large amounts of research aimed at supporting or refuting his model.

Carol Gilligan, a colleague of Kohlberg, raised the issue of gender in moral development, noting that Kohlberg's studies included only males. She provided empirical support for her theory that a morality of care and responsibility predominates among females. She also proposed a sequence of three stages: (1) caring for the self in order to ensure survival, (2) the "maternal" ethic that assumes responsibility for others' welfare and values care and responsibility for others, and (3) the realization that the self also needs care and the understanding of the interconnection between other and self.[24] Later research suggested, though, that the two types of moral reasoning do not follow such distinct gender lines.

Elliot Turiel, in an effort to resolve anomalies in the stage sequence that appeared in many studies, developed the domain theory of development. He draws a distinction between the domains of morality and social convention, conceiving them as distinct parallel developmental frameworks rather than a single system as Kohlberg assumed. Turiel's research over the past twenty years led him to conclude that social development includes coordinating understanding from several different domains, such as moral universals, cultural or social norms, and matters of personal choice.[25] He notes that moral

judgments are based on concepts of harm, welfare and fairness and are focussed on the well-being of others. Social conventions, on the other hand, provide the basis for predictable social exchanges within a group, and are structured by the individual's understanding of social organization. Thus, contrary to Kohlberg's stage theory, in which attention to convention was seen as characteristic of the lower stage of moral reasoning, the development of understanding social convention is seen as a separate, but coexisting, domain of development.

However, as Larry Nucci points out, separating the understanding of morality and convention does not deny that development occurs in both domains. Thus, young adolescents do not regard behavior that breaks social convention (such as wearing a bathing suit to a funeral) as wrong, whereas older adolescents, who had constructed an understanding of the role of conventions in the social system, viewed the violation of such conventions as having moral consequences (showing lack of respect to the deceased and to the grieving family) and therefore as wrong.[26]

In his cross-cultural research of Hindu culture, Richard Shweder identifies three "culturally coexisting discourses of morality." He describes them as follows: the ethics of autonomy, which is based on concepts of harm, rights and justice related to the person as a self-contained individual; the ethics of community, based on concepts of duty, hierarchy, interdependency, and the role and status of the person in relation to other members of the community; and the ethics of divinity, which expresses the belief that a sacred order is immanent in the world and protects the spiritual aspects of the person from degradation. He suggests that "there may be some advantage in possessing multiple discourses for covering the complexities of such an important area of human experience as ethics."[27]

We may note that in Nucci's and Shweder's research, issues involving violation of social convention are also seen as moral issues. Shweder illustrates this point by the example of people's attitudes toward a certain widow in the community who ate fish two or three times a week.[28] For the Indian Brahmans, this was a very serious violation because widows should devote themselves to their deceased husbands and not eat food (such as fish) which is believed to stimulate sexual appetite and lead them to have sexual relations with other men. For Americans, on the other hand, a rule making it wrong for widows to eat fish would be considered a violation of the widow's personal freedom to choose what to eat. Shweder and his colleagues note that in both cases the judgment of this item had really nothing to do with fish, but rather reflected the participants' moral view of the widow's moral rights and responsibilities. Shweder concludes:

> The differentiation of moral events from conventional events is not neces-
> sarily a developmental universal and the distinction between morality and
> convention, useful as it is within certain cultural worldviews, may well be
> culture-specific… Within a culture like our own where the morality ver-
> sus convention distinction does play a part, there are undoubtedly events
> that fall on the boundaries or partake of both domains, and it is relevant and
> important to ask the question proposed by Turiel, Nucci, and Smetana,
> "Which are the pure moral or conventional events and which are the mixed
> events?" Within orthodox Hindu culture, however, the relevant question
> may well be, "Are any events purely conventional?"[29]

The final issue with regard to moral development that will be addressed in this article was raised by Joseph Reimer, another colleague of Kohlberg. Reimer points out that Piaget had a negative view of the role that parents play in their children's moral development, seeing the unequal relationship between child and adult as a necessary evil not designed to promote moral develop-ment.[30] Kohlberg believed that family life played no role in moral development, as evidenced by studies of children raised on an Israeli kibbutz. However, Reimer, a co-worker on that project, notes that the kibbutz is not a non-famil-ial environment comparable to an orphanage, but rather a type of family sys-tem, albeit one that structures family life differently from the nuclear family.

Reimer cites studies by Sally Powers and her colleagues that showed that behaviors expected to stimulate (e.g. competitive challenging, non-competi-tive sharing of perspectives) or inhibit (e.g. avoidance, distortion) moral devel-opment were not related to adolescents' levels of development. On the other hand, mothers' and fathers' levels of affective support were positively relat-ed, while mothers' and families' levels of affective conflict were negatively related, to their children's level of development. In other words, family inter-action was found to be a significant factor in moral development.[31] Reimer's conclusion is that an expanded theoretical framework is needed to understand how moral development proceeds within the context of the family and other salient institutions.

Research by Betsy Speicher[32] also shows that parenting behavior has a greater impact on moral development than Piaget or Kohlberg allowed for. Her re-analysis of cross-sectional data from the Oakland Growth Study and lon-gitudinal data from Kohlberg's study showed numerous positive associations between parents' and offspring's moral judgments. Her conclusion, like Reimer's, calls not for replacing Kohlberg's developmental (constructivist) approach with an alternative theoretical paradigm, but rather for the integra-tion of various theoretical approaches in order to understand the underlying developmental processes.

Similarly, Judith Smetana, in her review of the influence of parenting on social and moral development,[33] proposes a third alternative to the opposing

approaches of structural-developmental theories and traditional socialization theories. Her analysis accepts that the process of moral development entails construction rather than reproduction of social knowledge through social interactions. While she calls for recognition of the importance of the role played by parents in this process, she regards their influence as occurring through reciprocal relations, rather than a unidirectional parenting effect. She also notes that the child constructs knowledge from a variety of social experiences and partners, including peers as well as adults.

Finally, in his cross-cultural research into moral development, Shweder reports an alternative post-conventional morality in Hindu society. This appears to develop from the tendency to view the family, not the market-place, as the prototype of moral relationships:

> Through a complex of relationships based on mutual reliance (e.g., husband and wife), asymmetrical interdependency (e.g., parent to child) and the obligations and agreements associated with kinship status (father, son, mother, daughter), the family seems to be able to function without the necessity of either a contract or outside regulation. In nonabusive families, of which there are many, a combination of loyalty, deference, empathy, altruism, love, and hierarchy protects the vulnerable from exploitation, while rewarding the powerful for caring for the weak.[34]

To summarize this brief review of current thought on moral development, most researchers continue to accept that moral development progresses through stages, or at least is dependent on the development of other structures that are age-related. They disagree, however, on the defining characteristics of these stages and the force driving the individual's development. A variety of models have been proposed: based on cognitive development, as the individual increases his/her ability to reason and make moral judgments (Piaget and Kohlberg); social development, with moral development occurring within one of several domains of social development and progressing as the individual increases his/her ability and knowledge regarding social judgments (Turiel and Nucci) or with increasing development of the concept of self in relation to others (Gilligan and Smetana); and as requiring a broader theoretical framework including factors such as parenting, family relationships, and relationships to other members of the community (Reimer, Speicher and Shweder). In addition to the question of the nature of stages of moral development, other issues that remain unresolved are gender differences, the relationship between social convention and morality, and the role of the family in moral development. In the following section, we will discuss the Unification Thought model of moral development based on the family in relation to these issues.

3. Development in Unification Thought – The Family as the Model

a. Stages of Moral Development

Based on the preceding review, the issues to be addressed are whether stages of moral development exist as true stages, satisfying Piaget's criteria for stages listed above; are such stages distinct from stages of cognitive development; and, if so, what is the basis for defining such stages and the force driving development through the stages. Finally, the relationship between the stages in this model and those proposed by others, such as Piaget, Kohlberg and Gilligan, will be discussed.

Unification Thought affirms a stage model of development: human beings are born with the potential for perfection, but with the responsibility for achieving that state through a process of growth.[35] Original human nature is defined[36] as having the following characteristics: united *sungsang* and *hyungsang* (roughly translated as internal character and external form); harmonious yang and yin (related to the concepts of masculinity and femininity but with certain important differences); individuality; loving character; the ability to live according to laws and to behave according to free will; creativity; and the ability to relate to others. Unification Thought maintains that the most essential characteristic of human nature is to possess a loving character, i.e. that the essence of true human nature is love, to be a "Being with Heart."[37]

According to Unification Thought, relationships within the family are the primary way through which each person grows and develops their ability to love. There are three major stages of development: beginning with the young child, through the growing child to adult who marries, and concluding with the parent. Through these major stages the individual experiences four basic types of relationship, with corresponding types of love between the individuals involved: children's love (from children to parents), fraternal or brother-sister love (between siblings), conjugal love (between husband and wife), and parental love (from parents to children). These four types of love are classified according to orientation:[38] vertical, between individuals of different ages or generations, i.e., parental and children's love, and horizontal, between individuals who are peers or the same generation, i.e., conjugal and brother-sister love.[39]

It is also noted that these types of love[40] have direction as well as orientation. Thus, parental love is downward in direction, to children from their parents who are older and in a position of greater responsibility and authority, whereas children's love is upward from children to their elders. Distinction is also made between the love of males and females: father's love, husband's love, son's love, and brother's love have different qualities from the corresponding mother's love, wife's love, daughter's love, and sister's love.[41]

Unification Thought also points out that these different relationships form the structure not only of the family, but also apply, by extension, to all relationships in human society. For example, individuals differing in age by twenty years or more, i.e., by a generation, relate to each other through a vertical relationship similar to that between parents and children. Individuals of the same generation relate horizontally, like siblings. The nature of people's relationships with each other in society, therefore, is based on the relationships developed within the family.

Using relationships within the family as the model, it becomes clear that the emergence of each type of relationship is age-dependent. A child goes through stages in forming relationships: from a position in which he or she relates primarily to parental figures and receives parental love; to relationships with siblings in which there is reciprocal or mutual love; to the conjugal relationship, also involving reciprocal and mutual love but with the addition of sexual love; to the stage of being a parent to one's own children and giving parental love. Thus, there is an order in which achieving the highest stage is the goal of development.

Yet, as each new relationship is entered into and develops, the existing relationships are not broken or abandoned. As the child grows to adulthood he or she continues in the relationship with his or her parents as their son or daughter, and as the brother or sister of siblings. Even as a parent, one still continues to have parents and, therefore to be their child, although the style of that relationship changes.

Finally, there is a hierarchical relationship between stages. Before advancing to the next stage the individual has experienced the previous stage. In fact, according to the criteria Piaget gave for true stages, each previous stage must be successfully completed as preparation prior to advancing to the later one. The family model asserts that there are serious consequences in the moral domain for children or adolescents engaging in pre-marital sexual activity prior to successfully developing brother-sister relationships and friendships with peers, and likewise for entering the stage of parenthood prior to the development of a successful conjugal relationship.[42]

Unification Thought draws a clear connection between the moral development of the individual and the development of these relationships within the family, and hence to their projection into society. Ethical judgments of human behavior in relation to other members of society are based on the standards of family relationships. This approach, therefore, regards the development of relationships within the family as the basis for moral development.

The Unification Thought model of development based on relationships within the family constitute true stages by Piaget's criteria. The stages are age-dependent. The stages occur in a universal order (child, brother/sister, husband/wife, parent). Each has its characteristic structure consisting of several

describable elements (relationships with horizontal or vertical orientation, consisting of types of love defined by direction and character, i.e. male or female). Moreover, there is hierarchical integration of the stages (before advancing to the next stage the individual has experienced the previous stage).

These stages differ from those described by theories of cognitive development in two respects. First, the stages of moral development have content distinct from cognitive development: moral development proceeds through three periods that contain the four types of relationship within the family that form the prototype for moral judgments. Second, while each stage is integrated within the higher stages, it also continues to exist in a transformed form. In other words, it is impossible for the adult to function on the pre-operational level on a particular task after having reached the level of formal operations, but each adult continues to relate as a child to their parents, as brother or sister to their siblings, and as spouse to their husband or wife even after becoming a parent him/herself. However, the nature of these relationships is transformed and integrated as the individual reaches the higher stage; for example, siblings relate differently to each other as adults with their own children compared to how they related when they themselves were children.

Within the family model, the distinction between vertical and horizontal orientation in relationships can be likened to the distinction made by Piaget, and also Kohlberg, between heteronomous and autonomous moral development. Heteronomous morality can be understood as developing through the experience of the vertical relationships that children have with their parents, while autonomous morality develops through the experience of horizontal relationships children have with their siblings and later their spouses. It is interesting to note that this model predicts a third type of morality, corresponding to the other vertical relationship, namely parental (from parent to child), in which the individual is actually in the position of the authority making the rules.

Thus, relating this model to Kohlberg's stages, the pre-conventional level stages 1 and 2 clearly correspond to the young child first relating vertically to parents (stage 1) and then horizontally to siblings and peers (stage 2). The conventional level stages 3 and 4 correspond to the older child, adolescent, and finally single adult, in vertical relationship to family and local community and horizontal relationship to the larger group of society. At this point the correspondence becomes less clear, suggesting, as empirical data and other theorists have implied, that Kohlberg's model fails to describe accurately development above the conventional level.

In the family model the next stage is that of marriage, which is a new type of horizontal relationship involving sexual activity along with intentions of permanence, exclusivity, and creation of a family.[43] Following marriage is the stage of parenthood with the new vertical relationship with children for

whom the parents are responsible to give love, care for, and ensure well-being. Since the family model extends to relationships within society as a whole, this final stage includes circumstances such as promotion at work, which puts the individual in a position of authority, responsible for other employees, i.e., in a vertical relationship. While the attributes Kohlberg suggests for the post-conventional level, namely the understanding of principles underlying the structure of society or humanity as a whole, need not be rejected, the family model suggests that other elements as suggested by Gilligan, such as assuming responsibility for others' welfare and understanding the interconnection between self and other, should also be included as components of moral reasoning on the post-conventional level. As Robert Kegan has stated, partnering, parenting, and working demand "of adults a qualitative transformation of mind every bit as fundamental as the transformation of the school-age child from magical thinking to concrete thinking or the transformation from concrete to abstract thinking required of the adolescent."[44]

Thus, we can conclude that the Unification Thought family model of moral development provides a model of development involving true stages, distinct from cognitive stages of development, and that the defining characteristics and driving force in this model are the relationships experienced within the family. Moreover, the Unification Thought model gives additional insights into the still poorly-understood area of post-conventional moral reasoning.

b. Gender Differences in Moral Development

The family model clearly predicts gender differences in moral development. The distinction between yang and yin, or masculine and feminine, is one of the basic characteristics of the Unification Thought understanding of human nature. However, this should not be misunderstood as implying that men have only yang (masculine) characteristics and women only yin (feminine) characteristics. Rather, men and women both have yang and yin aspects of intellect, emotion and will, but they are expressed differently.[45] Thus although Unification Thought emphasizes the different roles of father and mother, brother and sister, son and daughter, it does not predict exclusive differences in moral development.

c. Social Convention and Moral Development

Unification Thought affirms that the four relationships developed within the family are universal, providing the basis for moral judgment that applies to all human beings regardless of culture. However, due to the fact that the family does not exist in its ideal form at this time, a variety of moral standards have developed that are particular to different cultures. Until the ideal of the family is restored throughout the world, these varied standards are used with-

in the cultures to determine moral behavior, and often cause confusion and conflict in situations where different cultures meet. Unification Thought proposes that in the future universal standards that apply to all humankind, based on the family model, will be the basis for true moral judgments.

d. The Role of the Family

The model of development based on the family proposed by Unification Thought obviously ascribes a primary role to the family. Relationships learned within the family are the basis of each person's experience of relationships with all others, and thus the basis for moral judgments. Piaget observed that children initially develop heteronomous morality in the context of parental authority. However, he neglected to observe that these same children, after developing autonomous morality in the context of peer influence, later become parents themselves, and as such become the bearers of authority. We suspect that had he studied adult moral reasoning in detail, this stage, and its dependence on initial experience as a child under parental authority, would no doubt have become apparent to him.

The Unification Thought model clearly differs from theories such as Kohlberg's that regard cognitive development as the basis for the development of moral reasoning. In this view, moral development is not a question of developing reason or following laws, but rather depends on development of heart—the ability to love and care for others—in various kinds of relationships that are primarily experienced within the family. Thus, the highest level of moral reasoning is neither autonomous nor heteronomous respect for law, i.e. is not obedience to laws whether determined by some authority or agreed upon by peers, but consists of making judgments based on love and concern for all people whatever their age and position in relation to oneself. This model also states that development of such ability depends primarily on experiencing the four types of love in relationships experienced within the family, i.e. as child to parents, as brother and sister, as husband and wife, and as parent to one's own children.

Those who view moral judgments as belonging to the social rather than cognitive realm of development also regard social experiences, in the form of reciprocal interactions with parents and peers, as the basis for the construction of moral and social knowledge.[46] The Unification Thought family model goes beyond this position in ascribing a central role to all family relationships, i.e. as child, sibling, spouse and parent, in the development of moral knowledge and the ability to make moral judgments. And, as noted above, this model regards moral judgment as based on the type of relationship involved rather than on an intellectual process involving cognitive or social structures or knowledge. Thus, this position holds much in common with a social domain analysis, while also suggesting a somewhat different perspective.

4. Implications for Future Research

The effort in this article to expand the theoretical framework used to understand moral development by including the family as the model of development has both theoretical and empirical implications. On the theoretical side, the family model allows an understanding of stages of moral development that are distinct from those in cognitive development, and yet satisfy the criteria of true stages. The family model supports the differentiation between heteronomous and autonomous morality, observed by Piaget, to be explained as different types of relationship within a single structure, the family, rather than appearing as separate moralities.

The family model also explains a transitional stage of development in adolescence. Adolescence is the time when family relationships change dramatically: the former child moves from the position in which being a child receiving love from parents who are in a vertical relationship is primary, through the increasing importance of horizontal relationships with siblings and peers, to the possibilities of new horizontal (conjugal) and vertical (to his/her own children) relationships. Such an increase in the types of relationships experienced and restructuring of their priorities would be expected to be accompanied by a profound restructuring of moral judgments. The development of a complete understanding of the restructured moral reasoning required of adults is still awaited. We have presented reasons why the family model may be valuable in this enterprise.

The family model also explains gender differences, since the roles of father and mother, husband and wife, son and daughter are different within the family structure. Thus, a formulation such as Gilligan's, in which the ethics of care and justice predominates in females, is congruent with this model. However, the family model in Unification Thought is clear in its affirmation of the equality of value of each position within the family.

Finally, as pointed out above, it is natural that a theoretical model which makes the family the framework supporting moral development allows explanation of the various empirical findings of the impact of family interaction and parenting on moral development. Beyond this, however, the theory ascribes to the family the fundamental role of driving force rather than simply a modifying factor in a course of development that depends on the development of cognitive structures and/or social knowledge.

On the empirical side, it is obvious that if we develop our moral and ethical values from family relationships, then the nature of those family relationships will have significant impact on the quality of those values. This model predicts that as each individual experiences different relationships within the family, as child, sibling, spouse and parent, they enter a new realm of moral obligations. An analysis of the stages of individuals in terms of

moral reasoning should reveal a correspondence with their family experiences. Thus, for example, changes are predicted following marriage, or the onset of sexual activity, and parenthood.

This model also predicts serious consequences of failure to fully experience the various types of family relationships. Thus, given the numerous members of our current society raised in families with a single parent, multiple parents, teenage parents, etc., that do not resemble the family unit with four types of relationship or do not provide experience of successfully developed relationships of all four types, we can predict that these individuals would not exhibit the same level of moral judgments as those who experience successfully developed family relationships. Lest misunderstanding occur, let it be noted that these four types of relationship are not experienced exclusively in relationship to one's *biological* parents, siblings and children exclusively. Thus, the family model does not in any way devalue relationships with adopted parents or long-term caregivers as providers of parental love.

One particular point that the family model raises as significant in moral development is the beginning of sexual relationships. Unification Thought stresses that this relationship should be reserved for the conjugal relationship between husband and wife, and therefore represents the entrance into the third type of relationship. Thus, we should expect that individuals who have experienced sexual relationships show different moral judgments from those who have not. This has serious implications for our current societal situation in which there are numerous teenage pregnancies, leading to "children having children." Ten years ago, Allan Bloom mourned the loss of "spiritual virginity" among students who entered college having lost their physical virginity, leading them to be "flat-souled" and devoid of interest in the mysteries of life.[47] The family model of moral development suggests that loss of virginity has consequences not only for their motivation to develop as individuals, but also affects their moral judgments in relation to others.

Finally, this model predicts a stage of moral development corresponding to parenthood, in which the individual is in the position of authority making the rules (justice) and responsible to give love (care) to children. Again, this leads to the prediction of different moral judgments between individuals who have experienced parenthood and those who have not.

5. Conclusion

As researchers such as Reimer, Speicher and Shweder have noted, the study of moral development may benefit not so much by replacing the cognitive developmental constructivist account pioneered by Piaget and Kohlberg, as by expanding the theoretical framework to include various approaches, including the role of family relationships. This article has gone beyond that sug-

gestion. Not only does it suggest that experience of all major family rela-
tionships, i.e. as child, sibling, spouse and parent, are factors in moral devel-
opment, it proposes that participation in relationships within the family is the
driving force in moral development. The results are promising. The model
provides substantial explanatory power in the interpretation of data gathered
in the numerous studies summarized above, and also suggests a number of
questions that should be addressed in the future.

Notes

1. Piaget's published works are extensive both in number and in the topics covered.
    The main features of his work regarding cognitive development are to be found in
    Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child* (New York: Basic
    Books, 1969). For a comprehensive review of his work, see Howard E. Gruber and
    J. Jacques Vonèche, eds., *The Essential Piaget* (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson,
    1995).
2.   Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
    1932; Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1948).
3. John M. Broughton and D. John Freeman-Moir, eds., *The Cognitive Developmental
    Psychology of James Mark Baldwin* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1982).
4. Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development* (San Francisco:
    Harper and Row, 1981); *The Psychology of Moral Development* (San Francisco:
    Harper and Row, 1984).
5. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
6. L. Nucci and E. Weber, "The Domain Approach to Values Education: From Theory
    to Practice," in W. Kurtines and J. Gewirtz, eds., *Handbook of Moral Behavior and
    Development; Volume 3: Applications* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
    Associates, 1991).
7. Elliot Turiel, *The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention*
    (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
8. Unification Thought, the philosophical expression of Reverend Sun Myung
    Moon's teachings, has been presented in several texts under the name of the
    Unification Thought Institute, directed by Dr. Sang Hun Lee. The most recent
    expression is *Essentials of Unification Thought* (Tokyo: Unification Thought
    Institute, 1992).
9. Jennifer Tanabe, "The Epistemological Basis for the Development of Knowledge,"
    paper presented at the Twenty-third Annual Symposium of the Jean Piaget Society,
    Philadelphia, PA, June, 1993.
10. Gruber and Vonèche, *The Essential Piaget*, p. xxv.
11. Jean-Claude Bringuier, *Conversations with Jean Piaget* (Chicago: University of
    Chicago Press, 1980), p. 24.
12. Piaget and Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child*, p. 152.

13. *Ibid*, p. 153.
14. Gruber and Vonèche, *The Essential Piaget*, pp. 815-16.
15. *Ibid*., pp. 814-15.
16. See, for example, Thomas Lickona, *Educating for Character: How Our Schools Can Teach Respect and Responsibility* (New York: Bantam Books, 1991).
17. A clear overview of theories of moral development in relation to moral education has been prepared by Mary Elizabeth Murray, and is available on the Moral Development and Education Home Page (http://www.uic.edu/~lnucci/MoralEd/).
18. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, p. 197.
19. *Ibid*., p. 315.
20. *Ibid*., p. 284.
21. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Development," in Broughton and Freeman-Moir, eds., *The Cognitive Developmental Psychology of James Mark Baldwin*, pp. 277-325.
22. Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development*; Kohlberg, *The Psychology of Moral Development*.
23. See Jennifer Tanabe, "Developmental Psychology: The Need for a New Epistemological Foundation," in *The Establishment of a New Culture and Unification Thought* (Tokyo: Unification Thought Institute, 1991), for further discussion of the limitations of the cognitive developmental approach in this context.
24. Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*.
25. Elliot Turiel, Melanie Killen and Charles C. Helwig, "Morality: Its Structure, Function, and Vagaries," in Jerome Kagan and Sharon Lamb, eds., *The Emergence of Morality in Young Children* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).
26. Nucci and Weber, "The Domain Approach to Values Education."
27. Richard A. Shweder, Nancy C. Much, Manamohan Mahapatra and Lawrence Park, "The Big Three of Morality (Autonomy, Community, Divinity) and the Big Three Explanations of Suffering," in Paul Rozin and Allan Brandt, eds., *Morality and Health* (London: Routledge, in press).
28. Richard Al Shweder, Manamohan Mahapatra and Joan G. Miller, "Culture and Moral Development," in Kagan and Lamb, eds., *The Emergence of Morality in Young Children,* pp. 43-45.
29. Shweder, Mahapatra and Miller, "Culture and Moral Development," p. 72.
30. Joseph Reimer, "The Case of the Missing Family: Kohlberg and the Study of Adolescent Moral Development," in Andrew Garrod, ed., *Approaches to Moral Development: New Research and Emerging Themes* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), pp. 93-94.
31. *Ibid*., pp. 96-99.
32. Betsy Speicher, "Family Patterns of Moral Judgment During Adolescence and Early Adulthood," *Developmental Psychology* 30/5 (1994), pp. 624-32.
33. Judith G. Smetana, "Parenting and the Development of Social Knowledge Reconceptualized: A Social Domain Analysis," in J. E. Grusec and L. Kuczynski, eds., *Handbook of Parenting and the Transmission of Values* (New York: Wiley, in press).

34. Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller, "Culture and Moral Development," pp. 78-79.

35. *Essentials of Unification Thought*, p. 94.

36. *Essentials of Unification Thought*, pp. 111-12.

37. Unification Thought defines heart as "the emotional impulse to seek joy through love; it is the source of love and the core of God's character." *Essentials of Unification Thought*, p. 99.

38. *Essentials of Unification Thought*, p. 204.

39. Jennifer Tanabe, ed., *Unification Thought Supplementary Materials* (Barrytown, NY: Unification Theological Seminary, 1990, 1992), p. 32.

40. This model should not be confused with traditional socialization theories that assume a unidirectional influence of parents on children. See, for example, Smetana's chapter, "Parenting and the Development of Social Knowledge Reconceptualized: A Social Domain Analysis," for a fuller discussion of the reciprocal relations between parents and children in moral development.

41. *Essentials of Unification Thought*, pp. 247-50.

42. For a more complete description of growth through the "Four Great Realms of Heart" and the consequences of entering a higher realm too early, see Joong Hyun Pak and Andrew Wilson, *True Family Values* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1996), pp. 72-98.

43. Robert Kegan offers this distinction between premarital and marital relationships in the context of demands placed on individuals by their various relationships at different times in their lives. See Robert Kegan, *In Over Our Heads: The Mental Demands of Modern Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 61-63.

44. Robert Kegan, *In Over Our Heads*, p. 11.

45. See Jennifer Tanabe, *Contemplating Unification Thought* (Barrytown, NY: Unification Theological Seminary, 1993), pp. 16-19.

46. Judith G. Smetana, "Parenting and the Development of Social Knowledge Reconceptualized: A Social Domain Analysis."

47. Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 134.

BOOK REVIEWS

Sacred Violence: Paul's Hermeneutic of the Cross.
By Robert Hamerton-Kelly. Fortress Press, 1992.

Not since the days of Bultmann's challenge to "demythologize" has there been anything like the commotion over Rene Girard's attempt to reformulate New Testament theology. Robert Hamerton-Kelly's book *Sacred Violence* is the best exposition of the Girardian approach applied to the theology of Paul.[1] Hamerton-Kelly sees Paul's theology of the cross as a revelation of "sacred violence"; that is, by viewing the death of Christ, Paul's eyes are opened and the crucifixion reveals to him that all religion is based on violence along with the dissipation of violence by rituals of sacrifice. Paul's rejection of the Law of Moses is not based on a criticism of "works of the Law" per se, but is a rejection of all organized religion because of its implication in murder and scapegoating.

Violence had been an essential part of Paul's life as a zealous persecutor of Christians. When he awakened to see sacred murder from the point of view of the victim, he then renounced his ancestral religion and joined the community of victims who held that the Cross of Christ is a decoding of the system of religion. To be baptized is to be co-crucified with Christ and means a renunciation of all bogus sacrificial language, including doctrines such as: Christ's death is a sacrifice for the sins of the world and *"dulce et decorum est pro patria mori."*[2]

For Girardians, Jesus' death was the murder of an innocent young man in order to promote public safety. The high priest, Caiaphas, says as much, "It is expedient for you that one person die and not the whole people perish." (John 11:50) Jesus himself knew about Girardianism when he said:

> Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, for you build monuments of the prophets and decorate the tombs of the righteous, while you say, "If we had been there in the days of our forefathers, we would not have been like them, partakers of the blood of the prophets." In this you testify against yourselves, because you are the sons of them that killed the prophets. So fill up with the measure of your fathers. (Matt 23:29-32)

This passage perfectly illustrates the "double transference" of Girardian theory: first the victims carry in themselves the violence of the social system, and then they are sanctified as holy because of the consequences, peace and safety, which come with their demise.[3] In the case of Jesus both images of the double transference are plain: he bears the sins and brutality of the whole world (1 John 2:2) and in so doing becomes deified as the divine agent who was "sent from God" (John 3:16). This traditional *kerygma* is also reflected in Paul's writings: "Christ died for our sins" (1 Cor 15:3) and "God sent his Son..." (Gal 4:4).

The Girardians, however, argue that the Cross of Christ is an anti-sacrifice because the victim is sent here, not driven out into the wilderness, and in dying the victim unveils violence at the heart of the social order. Typical of the Girardian standpoint is Hamerton-Kelly's exegesis of Gal 3:13, "Christ bought us off from the curse of the Law by becoming accursed for your sake, as it is written: 'Cursed is everyone who hangs upon a tree.'" He interprets the passage to say that Christ enters on our behalf the human (not divine) realm of vengeance:

> The mendacity of the double transference which identifies human violence
> as divine becomes inescapably evident when the "divine" vengeance falls
> on Jesus, because it punished the one person who had truly fulfilled God's
> will of mutual love.[4]

Christ is not seen as a type of Torah sacrifice, but as an example of scapegoating. The proper starting place to understand Pauline theology, then, is that "Christ is the end of Law" (Rom 10:4) and the beginning of a new community of righteousness. Paul's teaching of the second Adam is also a rejection of systemic greed and vengeance—"mimetic rivalry," to use the Girardian term—and an opening to a life of "abundance of grace and righteousness" (Rom 5:17).[5]

The Cross of Christ, in this new theology, stands for a deconstruction of all religious myth and ritual, at least that of the Western world.[6] It is the negative moment which Paul applies to tradition to open the road to freedom in a society where people have acquired understanding of their origins. Kelly quotes Othello in the last act of the play of that name: "Thou makest me call what I intend to do, a 'murder,' which I thought a 'sacrifice.'" Othello would kill Desdemona over a question of chastity. He thinks the murder will act like a sacrifice and reinforce the divine moral order, but in the play the myth of sacrifice is unveiled before all of us. "Sacrifice" is shown for what it is, a euphemism for murder, because people who sacrifice for the cause only know one way to behave: obedience. This, of course, revives social order, even if war, murder and poverty are the consequences of sacrifice.

Can the sacrificial language of the New Testament and the theology of

the Cross, so prominent in Paul, be decoded and re-understood as a negation of all violence in religious myth and ritual? The Girardian interpretation of Job is that here is a man who said no to scapegoating. His friends gather around and tell him, "Curse God and die." But Job refuses to die and continues to proclaim his innocence.

In line with Girard's challenge, I asked my Pauline Seminar, "Did Christ come to die on the Cross?" What of Gandhi and Martin Luther King? Were they willing martyrs or did they pay good money for guards? My seminary students were divided on the topic of vicarious suffering and atonement. Most respect theology's traditional answer that it was in the will of God that Christ should suffer and redeem some favored individuals. This answer, however, is being repudiated today by prominent theologians, both Catholic and Protestant.

William Thompson, a highly respected Jesuit scholar in Chicago, in his recent work, *The Struggle for Theology's Soul*, argues that the doctrine of substitutionary redemption favored by Luther is not "necessary for the Christian faith, since it is neither strictly biblical nor credal."[7] Bradley McLean, a Protestant at the University of Toronto, claims that there is not one instance in Paul's writings of the doctrine of Christ's death modeled on Jewish ideas of sacrifice.[8] McLean concludes that Paul did not view Christ's death in terms drawn from Judaism but rather was influenced by Near Eastern ideas of scapegoating. For this model he coins the word "scapeman."[9]

The evidence from Paul, however, is not unanimous. He writes, "Our Passover is sacrificed for us, that is, Christ." (1 Cor 5:7) Also, he understands Christ's death to be necessary, "according to the scriptures" in 1 Cor 15:3, and in accord with obedience to the divine will: "he humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, the death of the Cross." (Phil 2:8) However, apart from 1 Cor 5:7 noted above, the Greek word for "sacrifice," *qusia*, with reference to Christ occurs in Paul's letters only at Ephesians 5:2, a disputed letter.[10]

But careful consideration of the matter seems to show the Pauline doctrine of atonement to be a perfect example of a new religion inventing its own myth and ritual out of typical staples of violence. Baptism is "dying with Christ"; "are you ignorant that all we who were baptized unto Christ Jesus were baptized unto his death?" (Rom 6:3) The Holy Communion ritual commends the sacred violence visited upon the obedient servant of Isaiah 53,[11] "On the night in which he was betrayed... he took the cup saying, 'This cup is the new covenant in my blood.'" (1 Cor 11:23-25) Certainly traditional Catholic doctrine, with its promotion of the mass as a daily sacrifice offered up to God, carries the marks of sacred violence. It should be noted, however, that Paul's interpretation of Holy Communion is primarily commemorative: "This do in remembrance of me," and then eschatological, "for as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord's death, til he come

again." (1 Cor 11:25-26) The idea of this ritual as death-dealing is present in 1 Cor 10:16-22, "Do we provoke the Lord to jealousy?" and 1 Cor 11:30, "for this reason many among you are sick, and not a few have died."

It has been noted by many that Paul after his conversion seems not to have renounced much of his feelings toward sacred violence.[12] He seems to have looked forward with satisfaction to the wrath of God coming down upon Judea.

> You, brethren, became imitators of the churches of God which are in Judea
> in Christ Jesus, for you also suffered the same things of your own coun-
> trymen that they suffered of the Jews, who both killed the Lord Jesus and
> the prophets. And drove us out, and are contrary to all men... but the wrath
> of God is come upon them to the uttermost. (1 Thess 2:14-16)

Hamerton-Kelly admits that Paul did not carry through with his project of decoding sacred violence. Unable to suppose that "God could cast off his people" (Rom 11:1), Paul answers by inventing the myth that Israel has become an instrument of God to provoke the Gentiles to jealousy: "I say then, 'Did they (Israel) stumble so they should fall?' God forbid! But by this fall, salvation came to the Gentiles to provoke them (Israel) to jealousy." (Rom 11:11) What does this do but turn Israel into a scapegoat for the convenience of the new religion? Unable to see Israel as one of many exponents of sacred violence, because of "nostalgia,"[13] Paul finds their destiny to be victims of divine election. They are to become like Esau and Pharaoh: "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated (Mal 1:2). ... for the scripture says to Pharaoh, 'for this very purpose I raised you up, that I might show in thee my power...'" (Rom 9:13, 17)

Can Unification theology adapt itself to Girardianism? A revised Girardianism might be the better product. To see Christianity itself as a vehicle of violence with Jesus as both martyr and deified victim is absolutely consistent Girardianism, with none of the excuses for Paul's nostalgia or the anti-Semitism of the New Testament writers. Instead of arguing for rehabilitation of the Pauline theology and that of the Johannine school, in which Jesus' sacrifice at Passover is a blessed event, Unificationism should be true to its origins as devotees of the historical Jesus, the unwilling martyr who asked for swords and a guard to keep him safe in the garden of Gethsemane.

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Notes

1. See also *Dialog 32* (Fall 1993); the whole issue is a review and critique of Girard with a reply by himself.

2. Horace: "Sweet and proper it is to die for one's country"; quoted in Hamerton-Kelly, *Sacred Violence,* p. 84.

3. See "double transference" in Hamerton-Kelly, pp. 24-29.
4. Hamerton-Kelly, p. 79.
5. Reading with Vaticanus and the Sahidic, omitting "the gift of" before "righteousness."
6. Eastern religions seem to be immune to the Girardian critique.
7. W. Thompson, *The Struggle for Theology's Soul* (Crossroad, 1995), reviewed by Gerard Sloyan in *Horizons 23* (Fall 1996), p. 314.
8. B. McLean, "The Absence of an Atoning Sacrifice in Paul's Soteriology," *New Testament Studies 38* (1992), pp. 531-53. McLean means sacrifice according to Old Testament ideas and practices.
9. *Ibid.,* p. 553.
10. Paul uses "sacrifice" as a metaphor for Christian living in Rom 12;1, Phil 2:17 and 4:18. Paul also uses the Greek words for "redeem," *agorazw* and *exagorazw,* which can denote a price to buy back a slave, in 1 Cor 6:20 and 7:23, "you were bought with a price," and in Gal 3:13 and 4:5, where the context is redemption (freedom) from the law, possibly understood as a commercial transaction.
11. The suffering and obedient servant of Isaiah 53 is not mentioned in Paul's letters.
12. See Krister Stendahl, "On Sacred Violence: How to Unmask It and How Not to," *Dialog 32* (Fall 1993), pp. 261-64.
13. Hamerton-Kelly's word for Paul's failure to proceed with deconstruction, p. 138.

The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History. By Rodney Stark. Princeton University Press, 1996.

How often, in refuting the cult animus attached to the Unification Church, have we argued, "Look, early Christianity was a cult." It is a seemingly obvious statement, yet few church historians have taken it seriously. It has been commonplace to regard the growth of new religions as a social phenomenon explainable by theories of deviance, e.g. as appealing to people disaffected from society and deprived of satisfying social goods. Theologians and not a few church historians, on the other hand, typically view the rise of Christianity as a triumph of faith, as exemplified in the legendary conversion of the emperor Constantine; thus St. Augustine opined, "Christianity must have reproduced itself by means of miracles." If the statement, "Early Christianity was a cult," means anything, then the abundant findings from sociological studies of the conversion to and the growth of new religious movements should be of more than passing interest to historians of early Christianity.

With *The Rise of Christianity*, such an analysis of early Christianity is at hand for the first time. Sociologist Rodney Stark, who pioneered the study

of new religions back in the early 1960s when, together with John Lofland, they studied Young Oon Kim's early mission to America, turns his sociological insights to the subject of early church history. The result is a book full of powerful insights that is well worth reading—and pondering for ourselves.

A number of findings learned from studying new religions are helpful in elucidating issues in church history. For example, what was the population of Christians in the days of Paul's ministry? Paul addresses churches in many cities of the Greco-Roman world; in Romans 16 he salutes no less than 28 fellow-workers and many house churches. Do these abundant greetings indicate a flourishing Church of many thousands? Stark compares letters which Dr. Kim (then known as "Miss Kim") wrote to her pioneer missionaries in the 1960s, in which she also includes profuse greetings, typically, "To sister Ella, to brother Howard, to Dorothy visiting from Dallas, and to all who now partake of the Unification Church in San Jose, greetings in Father's name." (p. 218) Yet in all America at that time there were fewer than 200 church members. Stark concludes that there may well have been fewer than 2,000 Christians when Paul wrote his letters.

A comparison with new religions also indicates why Christianity was never attacked by the Romans as a political threat, even though Jesus was crucified ostensibly for his political claims—as "king of the Jews." The Jews in Palestine were subjected to brutal conquest and deportations for two abortive uprisings against the state, yet the persecutions against Christianity were never so brutal, and far more haphazard. Why? Based on a wide range of empirical data, Stark notes, "Cult movements overrecruit persons of more privileged backgrounds." (p. 46) Like modern cult movements, Christianity was never a proletarian movement. According to Stark, "had Christianity actually been a proletarian movement, it strikes me that the state would have responded to it as a political threat, rather than simply as an illicit religion." Instead, Christians included members who were well-connected, who could use their influence to secure favorable treatment. Unificationists do the same.

A look at another example allows us to glimpse the theoretical core of Stark's perspective. He asks, What positive value does persecution and social stigma have in promoting church growth? Why, in the words of Tertullian, is "the blood of the martyrs the seed of the church"? Eschewing supernatural explanations, Stark discusses these issues informed by the socio-economic theory of cost-benefit analysis. Joining a religion is a "rational choice" (p. 169), he says, in which consumers weigh the costs against the benefits of affiliation. What are the rewards and benefits of joining a new religion, even one that is severely persecuted? Among the benefits of religion, some are worldly, e.g. social status and power. Others are scarce, e.g. health, good fortune and long life, and may be available to some outside the church. A third type of benefit is absolutely unavailable to anyone in this life: the promise of heav-

en, eternal life, the resurrection. While affiliation with an established church might bring worldly rewards, it is the new religions which have the most compelling promise of supernatural benefits. Nevertheless, even the most spiritual of benefits must be established through social interactions in this world. A successful new religion must bear witness, by its collective commitment and sacrifice, to rewards that are sure and worth the cost.

I should point out that Stark's theoretical framework of cost-benefit analysis is hardly universally accepted. Is it true that religious affiliation can be explained by the economic model of rational choice in the religious marketplace? Is self-interest, even for spiritual rewards, sufficient to explain the motivation of religious commitment? Such criticism of Stark's theoretical foundations has been joined by many sociologists of religion.[1] Nevertheless, even for those who regard his paradigm as metaphor rather than as causal explanation, Stark's analysis is revealing and insightful.

From a sociological perspective, martyrdom helps deal with three problems faced by any new and struggling religion: (1) the credibility of the faith, (2) the discouragement that providential timetables are delayed, and (3) the problem of "free riders." As regards credibility: in a society with a plethora of choices, people must have confidence in the great value and benefit that their religion confers, or they will shop elsewhere. The martyrs, by testifying to the ultimate preciousness of the Christian faith, often suffering tortures and death in public spectacles for all to see, confer great credibility to the religion.

Furthermore, martyrdom, especially the deaths of James, Paul and Peter in the 60s, eased the discouragement of the first generation of Christians who had expected the imminent return of Christ in the glory of the Kingdom (e.g. Mark 13:30, "Truly, I say to you, this generation will not pass away before these things take place"). They would also be disheartened by the small size of the Church, as the number of Christians in the decade of the 60s could not have numbered more than a few thousand. Yet Peter was resolved to die even when he had opportunities to flee, and Paul refused many chances to recant and save himself. The witness of their deaths eased the crisis of the first generation, demonstrating the abiding worth of faith in Christ. We may compare the heartening effect of Reverend Moon's Danbury imprisonment on a discouraged American church.

Third, the "free rider" problem arises in every organization when people join to gain the benefits of membership without contributing their share to the collective effort. Free riders are a plague upon churches, and for new religions they are particularly baneful. Demanding constant attention, they undermine the movement's resolve to achieve its higher goals. Their weak commitment undermines the discipline and faith of everyone else. As long as a group is persecuted, however, free riders will be reluctant to join. "Sacrifice [e.g., martyrdom] and stigma [being branded as deviant by society] mitigate the free-rider

problem faced by religious groups," says Stark. (p. 177) Under such conditions, those who join necessarily sacrifice more and participate more zealously in church activities. At the same time, the collective religious experience becomes emotionally richer and more fulfilling. As Stark summarizes, "Membership in an expensive religion is, for many people, a good bargain. Conventional cost-benefit analysis alone suffices the continued attraction of religions that impose sacrifices and stigmas upon their members." (p. 178)

An issue in the rise of Christianity—and of new religions—is the role of the theology. A religion's teaching is proven in its practice. Christian teaching proved its worth when the Roman empire was gripped by plagues: two epidemics, around the years 165 and 260, each striking with such virulence as to wipe out a quarter to a third of the population. In the midst of pervasive fear and death, while pagans fled for their lives leaving stricken family members to fend for themselves, Christians volunteered to nurse the sick. In showing Christian charity, some of them lost their lives to the contagion. According to Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria:

> Heedless of danger, they took charge of the sick, attending to their every need and ministering to them in Christ, and with them departed this life serenely happy; for they were infected by others with the disease, drawing on themselves the sickness of their neighbors and cheerfully accepting their pains. Many, in nursing and curing others, transferred their death to themselves and died in their stead... (p. 82)

Their charity and dedication, so opposite the survival instinct of the general public, was the direct result of Christian teachings, "For I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink... I was sick and you visited me." (Matt 25:35-36) In addition to commending the Christian faith, their charity actually saved many lives and gained converts.

Unificationists may take many lessons from Stark's presentation of the growth of the early Christian church. In the midst of a diverse and pluralistic America, much like ancient Rome with its abundance of religions and cults, how can the Unification movement distinguish itself and prosper in a competitive religious marketplace? Does our commitment, sacrifice and charity testify to the fact that in the True Parents we have access to a spiritual benefit far more valuable than that offered elsewhere? Does our lifestyle commend True Parents to others, as the early Christians by their charity and morality commended Christ to the people of the Roman Empire?

Just as importantly, we may reflect upon some of the ways in which the Unification movement may differ from the early Christian church. Stark echoes many historians in arguing that Christian universalism made Christianity far more attractive than Judaism with its ethnic requirements of the Mosaic Law. What of the persistence of Korean culture in the Unification movement: to what

extent, if any, has that been an obstacle to its universal spread?

More significantly, the advent of the Blessings of 3.6 million and 36 million couples may signal that the Unification Church is moving away from the paradigm of a high-demand religious movement (a "cult" in sociological terms) towards something more like a low-demand "client cult" in which a few priests service a large population without requiring much of them. The statement, "Being a Moonie today is an act of deviance" (p. 17), hardly applies to the millions of Blessed couples in the FFWPU. The rapid growth of Blessed couples far outstrips the growth rate of the early Christian church, and it seems that in some countries the Unification movement may be on its way to achieving a kind of majority status even though the population of full-time dedicated members remains small. It is ironic that at the moment when a scholar has given us such an insightful treatment of Christianity based upon the model of a new religion as a high-demand cult movement, the Unification movement, always for sociologists the archtypical "cult," is breaking out of that mold.

Should the Unification movement become a client cult? As with most client cults, membership in the FFWPU is non-exclusive, as adherents can retain their membership in other churches at the same time. If so, here is a caution to us, for the sociology of client cults is not encouraging. The pagan cults of Isis, Orpheus and Mithra—client cults all—had millions of followers, but they crumbled in the face of a determined Christianity. Since affiliating with a client cult is so easy, the price of the grace it offers is perceived as correspondingly slight. As Stark points out,

> Exclusive firms [e.g., high-demand Christianity] are far stronger organizations, far better able to mobilize extensive resources and to provide highly credible religious compensators [perceived rewards] as well as substantial worldly benefits. (p. 204)

He quotes historian E. R. Dodds:

> A Christian congregation was from the first a community in a much fuller sense than any corresponding group of Isiac or Mithraist devotees. Its members were bound together not only by common rites but by a common way of life.... Love of one's neighbor is not an exclusively Christian virtue, but in this period Christians appear to have practiced it much more effectively than any other group. The Church provided the essentials of social security... But even more important, I suspect, than these material benefits was the sense of belonging which the Christian community could give. (p. 207)

A strength of the Unification movement has been its strong sense of intense, purposeful community. Unless the FFWPU can nurture in all Blessed couples a similar commitment, community and collective action, creating a

mass movement in the fullest sense, we may lose power even as we gain membership. History teaches that no freely-dispensed blessing, no matter how ultimately precious, can by itself substitute for a community built on absolute faith, absolute love and absolute obedience.

—Andrew Wilson, Unification Theological Seminary

Notes

1.   See the substantial review by Joseph Byrant in *Sociology of Religion* 58/2 (Summer 1997), pp. 191–95.

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God's Secret Formula: Deciphering the Riddle of the Universe and the Prime Number Code. By Peter Plichta. Rockport, MA: Element Books, 1997.

I was introduced to Peter Plichta several years ago, while I was working with Franz Fiege at the International Religious Foundation. Dr. Plichta had some revolutionary new ideas about science, and especially about how numbers, like 3 and 4, were at the center of reality. Franz introduced him to the Divine Principle, and he was impressed particularly by the Four Position Foundation, a concept which he saw remarkably compatible with his own theories. Eventually, Dr. Plichta would have an audience with Reverend Moon, who heartily encouraged him to continue his research.

Peter Plichta is a man with a mission: to bring God back into science. His dreams and visions led him into an arduous search for the divine blueprint behind the natural world. Unlike many other scientists, who are mainly interested in describing what the world is and how it functions, Plichta began to ask the question "Why?" In particular, he asked why there are repeated patterns that transcend the individual sciences. More often than not, these patterns had to do with numbers.

Why do so many things exist in threes? We find three dimensions of space, three aspects of time (past, present and future), three components of atoms (protons, neutrons and electrons), three states of matter (solid, liquid and gas), three types of chemical bonds (ionic, covalent and metallic), three forms of life (plants, animals and humans), three components of DNA (sugar, base and phosphate), three races of man, etc. Why are there exactly 81 stable elements? $81 = 3^4$ and also has the curious property that its reciprocal is an infinite sum composed of the whole numbers: $1/81 = 0.0123456789$ (10) (11)... or $0.0 + 0.01 + 0.002 + 0.0003 + 0.00004$ and on out to infinity. Of the

81 elements, only 20 have a single isotope. Likewise, out of all the possible amino acids, only 20 make up all proteins. Why, moreover is the speed of light almost exactly $3 \ x \ 10^{10}$ cm/sec?

Plichta became convinced that beneath the surface of physical, chemical and biological phenomena lay a deeper structure, composed of numbers. He is not the first to have such an idea; that pedigree goes back to Pythagoras. But he tries to give it a rigorous scientific foundation.

He is up against a heavy prejudice against numbers on the part of most scientists. Scientists are used to thinking in terms of probabilities, of a disordered universe, of physical constants that seem arbitrary and that must be determined accurately to many decimal points. Numbers, for most scientists, are human inventions to allow us to measure things. They have no inherent reality in and of themselves. And surely, there cannot be anything unique and outstanding about the *whole* numbers, like 1, 2, 3 and 4?

Euler's number e (= 2.718...) is the foundation of the natural logarithm, the basis upon which all kinds of physical processes which involve events happening at random occur, such as radioactivity, entropy, etc. The familiar bell-shaped curve describing the distribution of intelligence, height or other goods in a population is described by a logarithmic function involving the number e. Yet surprisingly, it had long ago been proved by the mathematicians Hadamard and Poussin that the function $x/\log_e x$ describes the distribution of the prime numbers. Mathematicians have long marveled over the elegance of this, the Prime Number Theorem, but they took it to be simply a formula. They pondered over it, but did not grasp its true significance. The prime numbers do not occur at random; why is their distribution described mathematically by a formula which ordinarily describes randomness? Plichta turned the issue on its head and thus recognized the answer: the Prime Number Theorem shows that the apparent randomness and fuzziness of nature is in fact grounded in the underlying order of numbers.

Space, time and numbers: if the structure of numbers is the hidden dimension of reality, then it must be the veritable *sungsang* aspect of matter and energy. Numbers are the scaffold upon which light waves dance across the universe and spread out according to the inverse-square law. Numbers are the blueprint that determines the shape of atoms and the structure of molecules. Why does the chemist observe that all atoms form bonds to fill up their 8-electron shells? Scientists describe these electrons as constituting 1 *s*-pair plus 3 *p*-pairs, but they do not explain why it should be so.[1] Plichta hypothesizes that this structure is determined by the scaffold of numbers which extends outward from any point in concentric circles, with the four pairs of rays on which the prime numbers are situated forming a cross. (His Prime Number Cross bears a surprising resemblance to the Unification Church symbol.)

Along the way, Plichta comments about many surprising facts that seem

to suggest that the world we live in is the product of design, not the result of chance. While not directly commenting on what physicists call the Anthropic Principle, he has much to say about the particular parameters of our world that refute the common materialist notion that we are just a speck in the vastness of space. The Earth, which God created as a special environment for humans, is not some accidental planet. If we seek, we can find signs of its uniqueness.

The Earth has a partner as it courses around the Sun; the Moon is its object partner. Think of them dancing around the Sun every 365.25 days, with the Moon revolving around the Earth every 27.32 days—the length of the sidereal month. Is there any connection between these dual circular motions? The reciprocals of their orbits correspond:

$$1/27.32 = 0.0366 \qquad 1/366 = 0.002732$$

The length of the lunar month exactly corresponds to a solar leap-year! It also happens that the radius of the Moon measures 0.272 Earth radii, and the ratio between the mass of the Moon and the mass of the Earth is 1:81 (remember, $81 = 3^4$). Even from ancient times, astronomers wondered that in a solar eclipse, the Moon's disk is exactly the right size to cover the Sun. The relationship between these three heavenly bodies could not be set up more precisely. What's more, the number 0.2732 can be calculated by pure geometry. Inscribe a circle within a square; it is the ratio between the area of the remainder of the square after the circle has been cut out and the area of the circle. For a circle of diameter 2 inches inside a square whose side is 2 inches long, the ratio is $(4-\pi)/\pi = 0.2732$.

Science is uncomfortable with such correlations, for they give the lie to the conventional view that the universe arose by the workings of chance. It is easier to bury them from the public eye or dismiss them as mere coincidences. Is it a coincidence that a human fetus spends exactly 273 days—10 sidereal months—inside the womb? Maybe this is a clear example of the law of growth to completion through 10 stages. Is it a coincidence that absolute zero, the lowest theoretical temperature possible when all motion stops, is $-273.2°$ C.? This number depends upon the Celsius temperature scale, which is based upon the freezing and boiling points of water. The Moon, the womb, water—we might expect based on the Principle that these three manifestations of God's femininity should have correlative qualities. Nature shows them to be joined with precision, in the manner of the pieces of a structure designed from a single blueprint formulated by the Creator.

Plichta is certainly pioneering the edge of scientific thought. Although one might say he is 20 years ahead of his time, he is working with mainstream mathematicians and chemists with the goal to one day win acceptance for his theories. How advanced is he? His ideas are far beyond the understanding of

quantum mechanics, for example, which Plichta believes to be a house of cards about to topple. This reviewer can appreciate quantum mechanics for opening the topic of subjectivity and mind, which may one day bear fruit in a scientific understanding of mind and matter as a unitary reality. Yet conventional quantum mechanics is still essentially materialistic. Its notion of probabilistic phenomena is largely compatible with the view that matter evolves by chance. What Plichta is investigating, however, is the deep structure of the Logos, which is essentially numbers. As the Divine Principle states, "the universe... was created based on numerical principles to be the unfolding of the dual characteristics of the invisible God."[2]

God's Secret Formula is written for the non-specialist. It walks the reader through complex ideas and equations through the device of autobiography, describing how they were uncovered in the course Plichta's life. For the general public, the book is written well enough that most of the mathematical concepts are easy to grasp. However, this reviewer, who has a science background, is left with some disappointment that there is not more detailed discussion and rigorous demonstration of the validity of the theory. For this, one must turn to Plichta's major work, The Prime Number Cross, which unfortunately has not yet been translated from the German.

—Andrew Wilson, Unification Theological Seminary

Notes

1. On the divine pattern 4 = 1 + 3, see Exposition of the Divine Principle, p. 296.
2. Exposition of the Divine Principle, p. 294.

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"An Understanding of Sin and Redemption in Traditional Christianity and in Unification Theology." Doctoral thesis by Alfred O'Connor, University of Wales, 1995.

Alfred O'Connor's Ph.D. thesis, "An Understanding of Sin and Redemption in Traditional Christianity and in Unification Theology," is, in my view, a ground-breaking effort in the process of affirming academic respectability for the discussion of Unification theology in scholarly circles. The Faculty of Arts of St. David's University College at the University of Wales, Lampeter, Great Britain, and in particular the thesis supervisor Prof. Paul Badham, have to be commended for their pioneer spirit for approving an in-depth comparative analysis between Unification theology and traditional Christian theology on the Ph.D. level.

The major thrust of this work can be seen as an attempt to engage the reader in an ecumenical dialogue between Unification theology and mainline Christian doctrine. Rather than following an apologetic approach, merely showing the reasonableness of Unification teachings against the background of Christian doctrine, O'Connor seeks to present a productive ecumenism that takes into account the unique innovative characteristics of Unification theology. In other words, according to O'Connor, differences between Unification and Christian teachings are not to be perceived as irreconcilable but present occasions for a constructive dialogue.

Following the outline of any traditional Christian systematic theology, the thesis discusses three major topics, namely, (1) the origin of sin and evil, (2) the person and work of Christ and (3) the process of redemption. O'Connor has to be commended for his thorough treatment of these topics based on extensive research that includes arguments from scripture, historical theology and the natural sciences. Both the Christian and the Unification positions are presented with theological acumen allowing the reader to discern doctrinal agreements and differences while intending to develop an ecumenical approach by affirming an essential continuity between the two traditions.

The question arises as to what degree O'Connor is successful in carrying out his ecumenical agenda. In my opinion, O'Connor provides the best foundation for ecumenical dialogue when presenting issues related to the origin of sin and evil, but he is less convincing in his discussion of Christology and the process of redemption. Why the reader could arrive at such an evaluation is shown in the following reflections.

In order to show the compatibility of a sexual interpretation of the Fall with traditional Christian teachings, O'Connor emphasizes Augustine's view on the cause of the Fall, and in particular his assertion that the wilful disobedience of the first couple was closely connected with concupiscence. For Augustine, concupiscence is an uncontrolled emotional desire that shows itself especially through the experience of sexual lust in procreation. The important point in O'Conor's argument seems to be Augustine's insistence that Adam's offspring were born through carnal lust, which in turn is perceived as a punishment "in the likeness of his [Adam's] disobedience." In other words, for Augustine, the nature of Adam's disobedience resembles uncontrolled sexual desire as the distinct manifestation of the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Based on these observations, O'Connor affirms that the sexual interpretation of the Fall in Unification theology has sufficient resonance with traditional teachings on the Fall.

In addition, O'Connor identifies three issues for the origin of evil that are essential for both traditional Christianity and Unification theology, namely, the teachings about one original human couple as our common ancestors, the literal historical Fall, and the inheritance of our fallen condition in terms

of the propagation of original sin. These three doctrines have been acknowl-
edged by systematic Christian theology and Unification theology as the indis-
pensable foundation for our understanding of salvation through Christ.
O'Connor quotes Augustine, Hans Küng and the most recent edition of the
Catechism of the Catholic Church in order to demonstrate the validity of
these teachings not only in the context of historical theology but also with
regard to the contemporary theological discussion. Thus, O'Connor seems to
be successful in pointing out the foundation for ecumenical dialogue based
on the full agreement between Unification theology and Christian theology
in terms of the systematic presuppositions for the doctrine of redemption.

   Although O'Connor's general argument is effective from a systematic
viewpoint, the reader is surprised to find, in the conclusion of chapter one and
in the concluding chapter, a sudden shift from theological argumentation to
scientific reasoning in support of the biblical truth of one common pair of
ancestors for humankind. Citing the evolutionary theories of the mitochon-
drial African Eve and Y-chromosome African Adam, O'Connor shows that a
part of the scientific community would favor monogenism over polygenism
as the more plausible theory for the origin of the human race. However, even
though such scientific support of a revelatory truth about our first ancestors
seems helpful in drawing the interest of non-believers, in my view it does not
advance the ecumenical agenda of showing the compatibility of Christian
and Unification doctrines. Theological discourse presupposes belief in reve-
lation, while the dialogue between theology and the natural sciences, which
aims primarily at showing the compatibility of revelation with scientific data
in order to invite a non-believing audience to grant theological doctrine a fair
hearing, is a different project.

   In his discussion of the person of Christ, O'Connor seems to get entan-
gled in a number of Christological and Eschatological doctrines that emerge
from a traditional approach to Christian theology, namely, to see the Christ
event as central to all theological thinking. Rather than treat particular doc-
trines such as the divinity of Christ, the Virgin Birth or the manner of the
Second Coming by means of a direct comparative approach, it would have
been more effective, in my view, to start with an explanation of the shift from
a Christ-centered to a Creation-centered systematic theology when discussing
the Unification position. In other words, for Unification theology the doctrine
of Creation is normative for the doctrine of Christ. Through understanding the
Adamic mission, the person and work of Christ becomes comprehensible.
Within traditional Christian theology it is the doctrine of the Incarnation that
implies the importance of creation. Today, new interest in Incarnational and
Creation-centered theologies within the Christian tradition is greatly facili-
tating the ecumenical dialogue with Unification theology. O'Connor could
have avoided a rather confrontational style of argumentation in his discussion

of Christological issues by investigating the contribution of Incarnational thinkers, rather than supporting Unification views with modern liberal theology.

The effectiveness of emphasizing the systematic consistency of Unification theology in terms of its Creation-centered approach also holds true for discussing the process of redemption. Instead of focusing on the First Article of the Creed that affirms God as Creator, O'Connor starts his discussion of redemption with the vicarious death of Christ, salvific grace and the forgiveness of sin. That is to say, it would have been more effective to focus on the ideal of creation with its subsequent concepts of spiritual and physical rebirth as the central paradigms for the process of salvation, instead of presenting the Unification doctrine of restoration against the background of the Second Article of the Creed that deals with the redemptive work of Christ. In fact, O'Connor ends up abandoning his intended ecumenical agenda when he tells the reader how traditional Christianity and Unification theology "display great variance" in their understanding of redemption. His ecumenical purpose is further compromised when he refers to the influence of Confucian teachings in order to explain the centrality of the family for the Unification understanding of the redemptive process. In short, the reader cannot clearly see the systematic power of the Principle of Creation for explaining the compatibility of traditional Christian and Unification teachings.

The above-mentioned weaknesses with reference to a consistent systematic treatment of theological doctrine, jeopardize, in my opinion, O'Connor's overall intention of advancing an ecumenical dialogue between Christian and Unification theologians. However, based on the richness of the presented material and the in-depth comparative analysis of Christian and Unification teachings, the reader can at least agree with O'Connor that traditional Christian theology and Unification doctrine have much more in common "than either of them with modern liberal thought." Despite its systematic shortcomings, this thesis can still be seen as a significant contribution to the academic discussion of Unification theology.

—Dietrich Seidel, Unification Theological Seminary