Explorations in Unificationism edited by Theodore T. Shimmyo and David A. Carlson
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Explorations in Unificationism edited by Theodore T. Shimmyo and David A. Carlson |
In Unificationism particular existents, which it refers to as "individual truth bodies," enjoy so-called "internal relations" and not "external relations" unlike Aristotle's primary substances and Leibniz's "windowless" monads. So far, much of Western thought has been plagued with the nonrelational concept of substance. Note Descartes' definition of the concept: "Really the notion of substance is just this -- that which can exist by itself, without the aid of any other substance."1 Hence in the West it has been very difficult to affirm the genuine relationships of individual substances. Unificationism, however, attempts to overcome this difficulty; it sees no real tension between the individuality of a particular existent and its relations to other particular existents. On the contrary, it even wants to say that the genuine individuality of a particular existent would enhance its harmonious relationships with other particular existents.
Individuality and relationship are two main concerns in Unificationism, so that Sang Hun Lee in his Explaining Unification Thought says: "In Unification Thought, the first problem is that of 'existence,' and the second concerns how all existing beings interrelate, i.e., the problem of 'relationship.'2 These two main concerns permeate the whole of Unificationism, whatever field it may find itself dealing with -- ontology, epistemology, axiology, logic, theology, anthropology, or whatever.
The purpose of the present essay is to show how Unificationism, as I understand it, affirms the "internal relations" of particular individual existents. We will find that in this regard Unificationism has the ability to appreciate and develop some of the profound insights of such thinkers as Aristotle, Kant, Rahner and Whitehead.
Unificationism affirms the "internal relations" of particular existents by blurring the traditional sharp distinction between "universals" and "particulars." If you adhere to the traditional sharp distinction, then you would have to say that the relations of particular existents are merely "external" and not "internal" because in this case the relations can only be described purely in terms of universals. There is no direct interaction between particular existents themselves in this case. Actually this difficulty is what such traditional theories as the "substance-quality" metaphysics (or "subject-predicate" logic) of Aristotle and the "representative theory" of Descartes and Locke could not overcome. But, if you blur the sharp distinction between universals and particulars, as Unificationism does, by saying the following two things: 1) that universals are particular in the sense that they do not really exist except as exemplified in particular existents; and 2) that particular existents are universal in the sense that they can, by reason of their exemplifications of universals, enter into the description of each other, then you can talk about the "internal relations" of particular existents. Unless you accept the above two things, you would not be able to affirm the "internal relations."
Plato's extreme realism rejected the above two, while Aristotle's amended realism accepted the first but rejected the second. Aristotle's acceptance of the first was a great accomplishment in the history of philosophy, but because of his rejection of the second his substance-quality thinking was still unable to affirm the "internal relations" of individual substances. The "transcendental method" of Kant and Rahner, however, attempted to appreciate the second as well. Whitehead's "philosophy of organism" was a most significant attempt to accept the two together in order to affirm the "internal relations."
It goes without saying that Unificationism accepts the above two. Sections II and III of the present essay, therefore, will respectively deal with the two as understood by Unificationism. In those sections, we will find that Unificationism involves an effective "theory of collation" based upon its doctrine of God's "Heart" and "dual characteristics." In accepting the above two, then, Unificationism is not merely an eclectic synthesis of what is good about Aristotle, Kant, Rahner and Whitehead who are to be dealt with somewhat briefly in Section IV On the contrary, it has its own integrity as a thought system, even though its outward expressions may have to be more polished. This point will be discussed in Section V, the final section.
When Unificationism says that universals are particular in the sense that they do not truly exist except as exemplified in particular existents, this sense has at least two different meanings depending upon what we are talking about as universals. 1) In the first place, if we are talking about the "universal image," then the above sense means that the "universal image" is not concrete except as individualized in a particular existent. 2) Secondly, however, if we are talking about "concepts" as universals, then the above means that "concepts" are not concrete except as exemplified in particular existents. Let me explain these two meanings separately:
1. In Unificationism the "universal image" refers to God's "dual characteristics of Sung Sang and Hyung Sang, positivity and negativity," which appear "universally in every created being."3 Sung Sang and Hyung Sang are Korean terms roughly translated as "internal character" and "external form," respectively; they are respectively mental and physical in character. Positivity and negativity are equivalent to what Taoism calls yang and yin. God's dual characteristics are never meant to split God into two pieces, but rather they refer to two distinguishable sides of one and the same God indicating the presence of their inseparable reciprocity and relationality within God himself.4 What is important in our discussion here, however, is that the "universal image" as God's dual characteristics would not be concrete without having particular existents in the created world embody it in particular ways. Therefore, the "universal image" must be individualized in each particular individual existent. Hence, Unificationism introduces the "individual image" of each particular existent, saying: "The individual image is in actual fact the individualization of the universal image."5 EUT gives good examples of the individualization:
In the case of human beings, for example, one person may express his joyfulness by laughing, another by joking. This is an example of the individual image in the positivity of the mind (Sung Sang). As for the positivity of the body (Hyung Sang), one person may have a large nose and long fingers, while another has a snub nose and short fingers. Negativity of the mind and of the body are similarly individualized. The individual image, therefore, is the individualized Sung Sang and Hyung Sang, or individualized positivity and negativity.6
Here the "individual image" as the "individualized" universal image is the mental image of a particular creature in God's mind. Before God creates a particular existent, he "individualizes" the universal image to make the "individual image" of that particular existent. The "individual image" thus made in the mind of God is also called the "idea" of that particular creature.7 There are an infinite number of "individual images" or "ideas" made in the mind of God. The "individual image" of a particular existent is that which makes that particular existent different from all other particular existents. Thus it is very close to what Duns Scotus called the "thisness" (haecceitas) of an individual thing.
2. In Unificationism, as in traditional philosophy, a "concept" is referred to as "the mental image of -- or a name given to -- the common properties abstracted from a group of individuals."8 For example, the concept of "yellowness" is abstracted from particular yellow things. To draw another example, the concept of "man" is abstracted from all individual men:
The concept "man" is a "rational and valuable being," while the individual peculiarities of a Mr. Kim may be expressed by his particular appearance, stature, personality, unique temperament and the like.9
Unificationism also recognizes the existence of "a series of subordinate and superordinate concepts":
...the subordinate concepts may be considered individual compared to the superordinate concepts. For example, though "fowls" is the superordinate concept to sparrows, doves, hens, and the like, it may also be regarded as a subordinate concept along with fish, reptiles, mammals, and so on in relation to the concept "Vertebrata."10
What is important in our discussion here, however, is that "concepts" as universals, "subordinate" or "superordinate," are not concrete except as exemplified in particular existents. "Concepts" themselves are never created as concrete individual creatures. It would be strange if there were such general creatures as yellowness, man and fowls which are merely "concepts." What God creates are such and such concrete, particular human beings, birds, and so forth, and universal "concepts" are merely abstractions from them or from their "individual images" or "ideas." Thus universal "concepts" are not concrete except as exemplified in particular individual creatures. In this sense, Unificationism rejects Plato's extreme realism and accepts the Aristotelian theory of what Scholastic philosophy called universalia in rebus (universals in things).
Thus, depending upon what we are talking about ("universal image" or "concepts"?) as universals, there are two different meanings of their exemplifications in particular existents. The difference between the two meanings exists because the "universal image" is not exactly the same as "concepts." In other words, the relationship of "universal image" to "individual image" ("idea") does not quite correspond to the relationship of "concept" to "individual image" ("idea"). For it is clear that "universal image" is prior to "individual image" because the latter emerges as the individualization of the former, whereas "concepts" are posterior to "individual images" ("ideas") because the former emerge as abstractions from the latter.11
In spite of this difference, however, the two meanings discussed above are the same in that in both cases universals, in order to truly exist, are individualized in particular existents (or in their "individual images" or "ideas") based upon a certain principle. This principle can be called the "principle of individuation" as in Scholastic philosophy. In Unificationism the "principle of individuation" is the "individual image" just as for Scotus it was the "thisness" (haecceitas) of an individual thing. As was seen above, the "individual image" is the individualized Sung Sang and Hyung Sang, individualized positivity and negativity, or an individualized "concept," so that it is neither Sung Sang nor Hyung Sang nor positivity nor negativity nor any "concept" nor the composite of these, insofar as any of these is a general characteristic. Rather, the "individual image" constitutes just what it is as a particular existent. And it is the "principle of individuation" in Unificationism. Thus Unificationism would not accept the view of Thomas Aquinas which regards "prime matter" (roughly equivalent to Hyung Sang in Unificationism) as the "principle of individuation" and which, therefore, is not so much interested in essential difference as in quantitative difference of individual things.
Concerning the "principle of individuation" in Unificationism, it should be noted that it is God that individualizes the "universal image" to make the "individual image." God creates particular individuals by individualizing the universal image first. The reason why he creates the world this way is that his "Heart" seeks joy by loving his individually unique objects:
Why did God give each being individuality?...God's most essential character is Heart, or the emotional impulse to seek joy through loving an object. Thus, He created man and all things as His objects. How monotonous it would have been, however, if all individuals were exactly the same! One person or a million -- joy would not have been any greater. Consequently, God's infinite "appetite" for joy necessitated His giving man and all things individuality.12
Behind the "principle of individuation," therefore, God's "Heart" exists. Therefore, we can say that it is God's "Heart" as his impulse to seek joy through love that necessarily makes universals ("universal image" and "concepts") exemplified or individualized in particular existents. God's "Heart" in Unificationism is similar to God's "Eros" in Whitehead's thought. According to this process thinker, God's "Eros" is "the living urge towards all possibilities, claiming the goodness of their realization"13 and thereby seeking the intensity of experience from his objects, and it is because of this divine urge that universals (what Whitehead calls "categories" and "eternal objects") are made truly existent only as realized or individualized in particulars (what he calls "actual entities").
The last section dealt with the Unification assertion that universals are particular in the sense that they do not truly exist except as individualized in particular existents. Particular existents are concrete individualizations of universals, and they are called "individual truth bodies" in Unificationism. An "individual truth body" has its own "individual image" (or "idea"), which in turn is the individualization of the "universal image," so that it is "a being [which] does contain the aspects of universal image and individual image."14
The present section is treating the other Unification assertion that individual truth bodies (particular existents) are universal in the sense that they can, by reason of their exemplifications of universals, enter into the description of each other.
How is it possible that particular existents enter into the description of each other? Unificationism answers this question in two different, if interrelated ways: 1) by appealing to the "universal image" as the fundamental source of relationality, and 2) by developing a "theory of collation." Let me explain one by one.
1. As was seen in Section II, the "universal image" is God's dual characteristics of Sung Sang and Hyung Sang, positivity and negativity. God's dual characteristics are never meant to split God into two pieces. Rather, they refer to two distinguishable yet inseparable sides of one and the same God. They enjoy "give-and-take action," "C-B-H action," and a "quadruple base"15 to maintain their relational unity within God. Thus the "universal image" indicates relationality within God. Therefore, when this "universal image" is exemplified in the created world the world enjoys relationality or order within itself. "Order within the created world is a reflection of the order within the Original Image."16 This argument is somehow similar to the Christian doctrine of vestigia trinitatis in creatura, which means that in creation there is a vestige of the Trinitarian relation of God. It is also similar to Karl Barth's relational view of the imago dei, which says that our human relations reflect relationality in the image of God. We have to know, however, that Unificationism sees the enjoyment of relationality in the created world on two different levels: individually and collectively. Individually, each particular existent has a relationship between subject and object elements within itself. Collectively, particular existents have subject-object relationships among each other:
Accordingly, every individual truth body has subject and object elements within itself, and is, at the same time, connected with other individual truth bodies in subject-object relationships.17
This means that particular existents and their relations are equivalent. Therefore, when individual truth bodies are related to each other to constitute an aggregate for some purpose, this aggregate makes a new individual truth body with its component individual truth bodies as subject and object elements within itself. Thus it is correct to say that:
...from elementary particles to the great macrocosm, there are numerous levels of individual truth bodies, each one consisting of subject and object parts. The individual truth body of one level constitutes only a part of an individual truth body of the next level, while containing the individual truth bodies of the levels below it.18
Consequently, when an individual truth body can, by reason of its exemplification of the "universal image" (i.e., relationality within God), enter into the description of its relations to other individual truth bodies, we can also say that it can enter into the description of more collective or higher levels of individual truth bodies.
2. When the first way directs attention to the fact that the "universal image" is concretely reflected in the relationality within each individual truth body of any level, it can lead to a second way to argue for the "internal relations" of individual truth bodies. For when we know that different individual truth bodies severally exemplify and reflect the "universal image" as their common denominator, we can say that they enter into the description of each other in terms of this exemplified "universal image." The second way, then, attempts to see "collation" between the "universal image" exemplified in one individual truth body and the same image exemplified in another. The second way still looks similar to the first insofar as it uses the "universal image" as the common denominator. But it is actually different from the first because it uses not only the "universal image" but also various subordinate "concepts" which the first way does not use as common denominators.
This second way, i.e., the Unification "theory of collation," has formulated about ten fundamental "categories" or "forms of existence" from the "universal image": 1) self-existence and force, 2) Sung Sang and Hyung Sang, 3) positivity and negativity, 4) subjectivity and objectivity, 5) position and settlement, 6) relation and affinity, 7) action and multiplication, 8) time and space, 9) original law and mathematical principle, and 10) infinity and finiteness.19 They are all derived from "give-andtake action," "C-B-H action," and "quadruple base" which the "universal image" has. These "categories" are the highest generic "concepts," so to speak. They are the most fundamental "conditions of existence" that every individual truth body must exemplify. There are, however, subordinate "concepts" such as that of yellowness, so that Unificationism makes a "second" group of categories in addition to the "first" ten. To name some of them, they are 1) quality and quantity, 2) content and form, 3) essence and phenomenon, and so forth.20 Concerning still more subordinate "concepts" such as that of man, Unificationism does not speak of them in terms of "categories." They are merely "concepts." Whereas the "first" ten categories primarily concern fundamental relationality, the "second" group and "concepts" do not. But what is important in the Unification "theory of collation" discussed here is that since "categories" (whether "first" or "second") and "concepts" do not truly exist except as exemplified or individualized in particular existents, particular existents are "collated" with each other in terms of these immanent "categories" and "concepts." Thus particulars can enter into each other. Hence, the genuine relations of particular existents. According to this theory, the more genuine the individualizations of universals in particular existents are, the more genuine their relations are. Thus genuine individuality enhances genuine relationality or interconnectedness. Therefore Unificationism refers to a particular existent not only as an "individual truth body" but also as a "connected body"21
The Unification theory of collation was originally developed mainly in Unification epistemology with a self-conscious man as the subject of cognitive "give-and-take action."22 But it can be used ontologically as well. Thus we can say that different particular existents with categories and concepts as their "common factors" establish "reciprocal bases" to perform ontological "give-and-take action."23
We have just dealt with two different ways to argue for the "internal relations" of particular existents. The first way appeals to God's dual characteristics as the source of relationality, while the second uses exemplified categories and concepts to collate different particular existents. The two ways, while distinguishable from each other, are interrelated in that without the first the second would not work effectively. For without God's dual characteristics as the fundamental source of relationality, categories and concepts alone would not be enough to really collate and combine particular existents. For categories and concepts always tend to be mere abstractions isolated from particular existents, no matter how you may say that they are concretely exemplified in particular existents. As was seen in the preceding section, "God's Heart" as his impulse to seek joy through love necessarily makes categories and concepts exemplified in particular existents. It is on the basis of God's "heart," therefore, that his dual characteristics function as the source of relationality in the world.
The present section is going to see somewhat briefly how such thinkers as Aristotle, Kant, Rahner and Whitehead addressed the problem of the relations of particular individuals in terms of universals. Aristotle in his theory of universalia in rebus maintained like Unificationism that universals truly exist only as exemplified in concrete particular things, as was seen in Section II. Indeed it was a great historical achievement. But, unlike Unificationism, Aristotle did not see God as having dual characteristics of Sung Sang and Hyung Sang which would become the source of relationality in the world. On the contrary, he regarded God only as "pure form" (or "pure act") devoid of all materiality. Furthermore, Aristotle's God has no "Heart" to seek joy through love since he is the "unmoved mover" not even moved by his objects of love. Therefore, Aristotle's doctrine of "categories" could not affirm the "internal relations" or primary substances. In other words, although he proposed ten "categories" (i.e., secondary substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection) as qualities which are exemplified in, i.e., "predicable of" or "present in," primary substances, nevertheless he had to admit that primary substances are "neither predicable of... nor present in" each other.24 Hence, there are no genuine relations of primary substances. This is the limitation of the Aristotelian "substance-quality" metaphysics (or "subject-predicate" logic).
Within this Aristotelian tradition, epistemologically the so-called "representative theory" was formulated by people such as Descartes and Locke. This theory, needless to say, failed to affirm the genuine relation between a particular subject and his objects of perception because it held that perception only occurs purely in terms of universals which merely "represent" concrete particulars.25 If this line of thought is pursued something like Hume's skepticism about causal relations would naturally come about.
Kant's "transcendental method" however, was a good attempt to solve the problem of the gap between a cognizing subject and his objects. By regarding the "forms of intuition" (i.e., space and time) and the "categories of thought" (i.e., quality, quantity, relation, and modality) as "transcendental" or already present a priori (prior to experience) in the subject, and by imposing these a priori "forms" and "categories" of the subject on the sensible experiences ("contents") given from the objects, Kant attempted to affirm the "synthetic" relation of the subject to the objects. For this purpose, he even formulated by pure reason the "transcendental" idea of God as the "regulative," if not "constitutive," source of all relationality in the world.26 Kant's method of affirming the genuine relation of the subject to the objects was not successful, however, since it saw the a priori "forms" and "categories" only in the subject and not in the objects. In other words, it was not able to "collate" the subject with the objects. Hence, Kant's agnosticism about the "thing in itself" (Ding an sich).
Karl Rahner, therefore, amended Kant's "transcendental method" by applying the word "transcendental" not only to the subject but also to the objects. This led him also to give the word "transcendental" a vertical meaning which Kant had rejected i.e., the possibility of a metaphysical knowledge of God.27 This way Rahner was quite successful in affirming the mutual relation between the subject and the objects.
It was Whitehead however, who made a very significant ontological (not merely epistemological) attempt to affirm the "internal relations" of particular existents. In an Aristotelian manner, Whitehead suggested that general "categories" and "eternal objects" ("forms") truly exist only as embodied in particular "actual entities," and called this the "ontological principle."28 Unlike Aristotle but like Unificationism, however, Whitehead regarded God as having dual characteristics: his "primordial" (mental) and "consequent" (physical) natures, which, being "integrated" with each other, constitute the chief example of relationality in the world. Furthermore, Whitehead's God has "Eros" (like God's "Heart" in Unificationism) which seeks to see "categories" and "eternal objects" exemplified in "actual entities." Hence, Whitehead's "philosophy of organism" was able to affirm the "internal relations" of actual entities. According to him, eternal objects exemplified in actual entities "function relationally" between actual entities, so that, to use the Aristotelian phrase here, actual entities are "present in" each other.29
In spite of the strong affinity between Whitehead's thought and Unificationism, however, there are some important metaphysical dissimilarities between them. One such contrast is that while Whitehead's "actual entities" are momentary drops of experience, Unificationism's "individual truth bodies" usually endure and persist through a lapse of time. It is beyond the scope of the present essay, however, to deal with them.30
From the above it is clear that Unificationism, with regard to the "internal relations" of particular individual existents, can appreciate Aristotle's theory of universalia in rebus, Kant's "transcendental method" Rahner's amendment of it, and Whitehead's "philosophy of organism." Unificationism can also appreciate Abelard's moderate realism and Scotus' doctrine of haecceitas, as is clear from Section II. Unificationism, however, is not merely an eclectic synthesis of what is good about such thinkers as Aristotle, Abelard Kant, Rahner and Whitehead. On the contrary, it has its own integrity as a thought system. "It is not formed... from the synthesis of traditional thoughts; it is a new-dimensional, revealed thought, which encompasses traditional thoughts."31
The philosophical systematization and conceptualization of Unificationism, as we see it in such books as UT and EUT, has been done mainly by Sang Hun Lee. Even though he admits that its outward expressions may have to be still improved32 he, at the same time, holds correctly that Unificationism has its own integrity. For the essence of Unificationism was originally presented by Sun Myung Moon, founder of the Unification Church, as he received it through "revelation."33
Revelation here does not mean, however, a certain doctrinal statement which is given from above regardless of man's concerns and efforts and which must be believed unconditionally. Rather, revelation means God's communication of truth which takes place only when man makes genuine efforts to interpret the reality of the whole world. Reverend Moon made such efforts, when he saw the unspeakable misery of the fallen world and really wanted to help mankind to go back to the love of God.34 Only in this way was he able to receive revelation from God. Here we see a God-centered "hermeneutical circle," so to speak, between Reverend Moon the interpreter and the reality of the world to be interpreted. What is important here is that this "hermeneutical circle" becomes open for the "horizon" of God because of the interpreter's genuine efforts to know the truth in order to serve to bring mankind back to the love of God. The essence of Unificationism thus obtained must have its own integrity, being not merely an eclectic synthesis of past major thoughts.
Paradoxically enough, however, it is because of its own unique, distinctive integrity that Unificationism has the ability to appreciate and even "encompass" past major thoughts. How is this possible? The answer to this question lies in the very thesis of the present essay that a particular individual can, by reason of its distinctive exemplification of universals, enter into the description of other particular individuals which are also distinctive exemplifications of universals. Thus the "unification of thoughts," to which Unificationism certainly wants to address itself,35 is not going to be done in a absolutist or coercive way at all. A true unification will be realized by encouraging and recognizing the integrity of each tradition. The emergence of Unificationism today has a special significance, however, because it seems that it has stated this thesis for ecumenism more seriously than any other existing thought system.
1. The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 2 vols., trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1911-12 and 1931)2:101.
2. Explaining Unification Thought, (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1980) xxiii. Henceforth abbreviated as EUT.
3. EUT, 18.
4. The "universal image" as relationality within God is rather a novel notion, for traditionally God has usually been regarded only as Sung Sang or positive and not as Hyung Sang or negative. But this Unification doctrine of "universal image" is not totally alien to the history of Christian thought. For, as will be seen in Sections III and IV, it is somehow similar to the Christian doctrine of the Trinitarian relationship within God, Karl Barth's relational view of the imago dei, and Whitehead's dipolar theism.
5. EUT, 72.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 68.
8. Ibid., 74.
9. Sang Hun Lee, Unification Thought, (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1973) 68. Henceforth abbreviated as UT.
10. Ibid., 68-69.
11. Unificationism also holds, however, that in a way "concepts" are prior to "ideas." Concerning the Unification view of the rather complicated relationship between "concepts" and "ideas," see EUT 74-75. From this we can understand that Unificationism accepts both the realist proposition, universalia ante rem, and the nominalist proposition, universalia post rem, at once as well as the Aristotelian theory of universalia in rebus. Thus Unificationism in this regard is very close to the moderate realism of Abelard, Aquinas and Scotus.
12. EUT, 19.
13. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1933), 381.
14. EUT, 45.
15. Ibid., 28-41.
16. Ibid., 83.
17. Ibid., 57.
18. Ibid., 58.
19. Ibid., 149-50.
20. Ibid., 187.
21. Ibid., 76.
22. Ibid., 152-57.
23. Ibid., 62.
24. W.D. Ross, Aristotle: Selections, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), 1-7.
25. Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1960); see especially Meditation II. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1959); see Books I and II.
26. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965).
27. Francis P. Fiorenza, "Karl Rahner and the Kantian Problematic," in Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), xix-xlv.
28. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, corrected ed., David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, (New York: Free Press, 1978), 40.
29. Ibid., 50,291.
30. For the metaphysical dissimilarities (as well as similarities) between Whitehead's thought and Unificationism, see my unpublished paper, "The Fourfold Structure of Whitehead's 'Process' and Unificationism's 'Quadruple Base': A Comparison," presented to the Process-Unification Dialogue in May, 1982 in Arrowhead, California.
31. EUT, xxi.
32. See his unpublished paper, "Questions and Answers on Unification Thought" (1986).
33. EUT, xxii.
34. For an in-depth study of Sun Myung Moon and his movement, see Frederick Sontag, Sun Myung Moon and the Unification Church, (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1977).
35. EUT xxi.